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BRITISH DIPLOMATIC INSTRUCTIONS
FRANCE, 1689-1721

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1689-1789

VOLUME II—FRANCE, 1689-1721

EDITED FOR THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY

BY

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PREFACE

IN the eighteenth century, as the elder Horace Walpole was fond of remarking, Paris was the "centre of all the business of Europe," and this, coupled with its proximity to London, which was not more than five days' journey distant, involved the home government in more active correspondence with its representatives in Paris than with those in any other capital. Even allowing for the fact that of the thirty-nine years that elapsed between 1688 and 1727 no less than eighteen were years of war, the mass of material available was so great for the adequate representation of British relations with France during those years that it soon became apparent that it would be impossible to cover the whole ground in a single volume. One obvious breaking place suggested itself. The deaths of Stanhope and Craggs, following closely on the retirement of Stair from Paris, bring a new section of Whigs to the front in England, and this occasion has therefore been chosen for the division between the first and the second volume.

The multiplicity of the points of diplomatic contact between Great Britain and France, European, dynastic, military and naval, economic, colonial, raised further problems with regard to the choice of material for inclusion in the volume. If economic and colonial questions were to be fully represented, the volume would soon be overweighted. It has therefore been decided that no attempt should be made to illustrate the progress of negotiations over colonial questions, but that the British case, as represented by the instructions given to the commissioners for settling colonial questions, should be printed in full in an appendix. Dunkirk was a thornier problem, for, unlike the colonies, it was a question in which the ministry was vitally interested, and it affected week by week the degree of the friendliness in the relations between Britain and France. In this case, the instructions to the commissioners to supervise the demolition of Dunkirk have been printed in the

Appendix, without their subsequent reports, but the effect of the question on Anglo-French relations is shown by a selection from the many recriminatory despatches from the Secretary of State in England to the envoy in Paris.

Then again, what was to be done about Congresses, of which no less than three are to be found in the period 1689-1727? The argument that, Ryswick and Utrecht being in Holland, the proper place for the documents of these congresses should be the volume dealing with Anglo-Dutch relations was specious but not convincing. It also might be suggested that the proceedings of these congresses could be included in the Spanish volume, seeing that, next to the Protestant succession in England, the most important matters adjusted at Ryswick were the territorial boundaries between the dominions of France and Spain, and at Utrecht the succession to Spain. But there is no denying the force of the argument that Louis XIV was the protagonist against the coalition and that these congresses, while regulating the affairs of Europe in general, had as their main object the conclusion of peace between France and her enemies, and therefore the natural place for the documents on these Congresses is the already heavily burdened volume on Anglo-French relations. Fortunately the problem was less formidable than it appeared at first sight. As regards Ryswick, it was not found possible to trace any copy of the instructions to the English plenipotentiaries. But these plenipotentiaries were little else than dummies, and their chief function was to support the Dutch, who could negotiate with the greater dignity owing to there being no doubt about the legitimacy of their government, and it was not likely that their instructions would, even if recovered, throw much new light on the policy of William III towards Louis XIV. As to the acts of the Congress, they have for the most part been printed in the *Actes et mémoires . . . de la paix de Ryswick* (1725), and after all, the real business of the peace was done, not in writing, nor at Ryswick, nor by the Congress, but by word of mouth, in an orchard near Hal, by Portland and Boufflers. Turning to the Congress of Utrecht, the difficulty was apparently greater. But the original instructions of 1711 were printed in the *Report of the Committee of Secrecy*, to which a reference will be found in the appropriate place, and they have therefore been omitted. The subsequent instructions of 1712, though their interest may be said to lie mainly in the light they throw on the attitude of the British ministry

towards the Dutch, have been included in the collection. Finally, the correspondence of the home government with the plenipotentiaries has been omitted. It deals on the whole with secondary matters, and all questions of real importance between France and Britain were not settled at the Congress, but through the British representatives in Paris, and a selection of the public despatches to Prior and Shrewsbury will be found in their proper sequence. As to the Congress of Cambrai, no apology is needed for omitting from volumes on Anglo-French relations the proceedings of a congress dealing wholly with Spanish and Austrian interests in Italy. For the same reason the instructions to Byng in 1718 have been omitted from this volume.

While, however, "instructions" to plenipotentiaries at Congresses and to commissioners for colonial boundary questions often contain matter of interest and importance, it is necessary to repeat here the warning already given by Mr. Chance about the nature of the "instructions" to the British ambassadors and envoys in foreign capitals. Any parallel drawn between these documents and the elaborate Instructions issued to their agents by the Court of Versailles would be most misleading. In the majority of cases, no information is to be gleaned from the "instructions" as to the policy of the British Government, and to subordinate the despatches of the Secretaries of State to these instructions would defeat the object of this series of volumes, which aims at illustrating the mainsprings of the foreign policy of Great Britain. We have only to reflect that most of the clauses of these "instructions" are identical,¹ whether William III, Queen Anne or George I is on the throne, or whether the Whigs or the Tories are in power, in order to realize that it is not to the instructions that we must go for our information about British policy. This must be gleaned from the despatches written week by week, or oftener, from Whitehall to Paris, and therefore the greater part of this volume consists of a *selection* from these despatches. In order, however, to effect as strict an economy of space as possible, no attempt has been made to print documents which are known to be already in print, but references are given at the appropriate place to the sources where these documents may be found. Undoubtedly the most important

¹ These clauses will be found in the Instructions to Portland, and they have not been subsequently reprinted in full. The reader who wishes to see what is omitted is referred therefore to Portland's instructions (pp. 1 and 2).

omission lies in the last four years of Queen Anne's reign, but it was surely superfluous to reprint selections from so well-thumbed a work as the *Bolingbroke Correspondence*.

The despatches, which form the main body of this work, are to be found in private collections and in public libraries such as the Record Office, the British Museum or the Bodleian Library. Of documents in private possession no use has been made in this volume, mainly because they have been edited already in such well-known collections as Cole's *Memoirs*, the *Bolingbroke Correspondence*, the *Lexington Papers*, the publications of Archdeacon Coxe and the Historical Manuscripts Commission. The papers of Lord Stair, the ambassador whose period of service in Paris was the longest of all during this period, have been freely used by Murray Graham and Wiesener from the collection at Oxenfoord Castle. The documents for this volume come entirely from the Record Office, for though the British Museum contains the great collections of Carteret and Newcastle papers, these sources do not become available until after the close of this volume. In the Record Office are to be found the remnants of the correspondence of the Secretaries of State themselves, and it is from these copies that the present volume has been compiled. It may be taken that any despatch taken from *King's Letters*, *Foreign Entry Books* and *Regencies* is a copy made for purposes of reference. When the document is taken from *State Papers, France*, an indication is given at the beginning, whether it is a copy or a draft.

The material is very unevenly distributed, not only on account of the wars, but also from what we should to-day call carelessness. Of the embassies of Portland and Jersey nothing remains except the formal instructions, and it is not until we reach Manchester's embassy in 1699 that we find records of the despatches sent out to him. With the close of the Spanish succession war, material becomes more abundant. The official despatches to Marlborough and Townshend during the abortive negotiations of 1709 and 1710 are well registered, and so also are those sent to Prior and Shrewsbury by Dartmouth and Bolingbroke. But over the critical years 1715 and 1716 the material is very thinly distributed. All Stair's reports during the closing days of Louis XIV's life have disappeared, and we only know of Stanhope's policy on hearing of the death of the *Grand Monarque* from a rough draft in his own hand for cyphering which, as it contains the actual cypher figures between the

lines, may be taken as an authentic copy. The same scantiness of material is evident in 1716, and it is worthy of note that the whole of the correspondence of the first two years of Stair's embassy is included in a single volume of *State Papers, France* (No. 160), whereas six months' correspondence is the normal amount for one of these volumes. This may be explained by the fact that, Dubois being at The Hague and Hanover in the summer of 1716, there was less for Stair to do ; but it will not account for all the deficiency. Nor do the *Foreign Entry Books* help us here. No letter to Stair is there recorded before July 1716, and none of importance until Addison becomes Secretary of State in April 1717. After the beginning of 1717 the papers seem to have been kept in better order, but even so, there are gaps, notably during the King's visits to Hanover, for it is not until 1723 that the correspondence with Paris begins to appear in the volumes known as *Regencies*. Indeed, it is hardly an exaggeration to say not until the Duke of Newcastle becomes Secretary of State were the office papers kept in good order. Whatever his deficiencies as a statesman, historians owe him a debt of gratitude for having had that reverence for *paperasses* which not only betrays the well-organized bureaucracy, but gives posterity the fullest chance of understanding the motives and ideals of their ancestors' policy.

At the end of the second volume it is proposed to give a number of notes, biographical and otherwise, in order to elucidate points that may seem to be obscure.

Unless otherwise indicated, dates are in old style.

I have many acknowledgments to make. The Director especially has given me constant encouragement and help in searching for documents and in the correction of proofs, while my colleague, Mr. David Ogg, Fellow of New College, and Mr. Feiling, Student of Christ Church, have both helped me with many most valuable suggestions in the Introduction, which Mr. Chance has also kindly read and commented on in proof. To Professor W. T. Morgan's kindness I owe some references throwing light on the careers of the Commissioners for the Commercial Treaty of 1713. But I feel that it is to the Fellows of the Society that I owe the heaviest debt of acknowledgment in view of the heavy drafts I have made upon their kindness and patience in the delays, caused largely by the pressure of university examinations and college business, which have occurred in the preparation of this volume.



INTRODUCTION

BY altering the succession to the Crown of England, the "glorious Revolution" of 1688 introduced into the relations between Great Britain and France an element from which they were not to be free for nearly three-quarters of a century. To the enduring causes of Anglo-French friction, such as commercial jealousy and colonial rivalry, there was now added the Protestant succession, which was the main issue of the war of the League of Augsburg—an issue apparently settled by the arbitrament of arms in 1697,—but it was never far absent from the minds of the kings and ministers who debated over the Spanish succession and the affairs of the North during the four years of peace that succeeded the treaty of Ryswick. The Grand Alliance, which was destined ultimately to bring the so-called war of the Spanish Succession to a triumphant close, was quickened into life, not by Louis XIV's violation of the partition treaty, but by his slight on the English attitude to the Protestant succession. Dislike of the Hanoverians, common to the Tories and to Louis XIV, brought the countries together after the peace of Utrecht, and finally it was the need of securing the Protestant dynasty that inspired the apparent *volte face* of 1716, when, under Whig auspices, the bases were laid of an alliance between this country and her traditional foe. And even later on, when the French government was no longer directly interested in the maintenance of the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht, it was the appearance of the Young Pretender at Versailles in 1744 which caused the rupture of diplomatic relations, and brought the two countries to war again after a peace of over thirty years.

Considering therefore the importance of the issues at stake, as well as the splendour and prestige of the court of Versailles, it is not surprising that the British ambassadors in Paris should be men of

distinction. In the years covered by this volume all the names but one are those of men who were either of very high social standing or close to the centre of official circles. Portland, Bolingbroke and Stanhope were in the inmost councils of their sovereign; Shrewsbury and Stair combined lineage with great positions of trust; Jersey and Matthew Prior owed their position to their knowledge of routine and the confidence of their superiors: one only, Sir Robert Sutton, was distinguished among them by being a non-entity. But it is not always easy to find men of social distinction who have the necessary ability for the conduct of negotiations of European importance, and it is only too clear that with many of these magnates, the diplomatic responsibilities laid upon their shoulders were by no means in proportion to their personal greatness. Especially is this the case under William III, when neither Jersey nor Manchester, nor even Portland, was entrusted with the negotiation of the most weighty matters of the day. This is not the place to enlarge upon the problems of the Spanish partition, which have been fully treated of by many other hands¹; but it is impossible not to comment here on the contrast presented by the meagre fragments which have survived of the correspondence of Portland and Jersey with the copious despatches from Tallard to Louis XIV. The most cursory examination of these documents reveals that there is but one explanation of the contrast, namely, that nothing more important than the routine work of the embassy passed through the British ambassador's hands, while the really important work was reserved for William himself. This was due partly to Portland's initial mistakes at Versailles, for Louis seems originally to have intended to work through him; but the consequence to-day is that the workings of William's mind on the Spanish question must be studied, not in the instructions from

¹ A masterly summary of the negotiations for the partition treaties may be found in Chapter XVIII of Sir Richard Lodge's volume of the *Political History of England*, published by Messrs. Longman. The student who wishes to follow the matter more closely is recommended to consult Onno Klopp's great work *Der Fall des Hauses Stuarts*, Vols. VIII and IX, which is based on information in the Austrian archives, and A. Legrelle, *La diplomatie française et la succession d'Espagne*, Vol. II. The unduly favourable view taken by M. Legrelle of the abilities of Louis XIV should not be allowed to obscure the great authority the book derives from its wealth of documentary evidence. A. Gaedeke, *Die Politik Oesterreichs in der spanischen Erbfolgefrage*, Leipzig, 1877, should also be consulted for the documents it contains.

William to his ambassadors, but as they are reflected in Tallard's reports,¹ and in the correspondence, or rather incomplete collection of letters of William to Heinsius, Portland and others made by P. Grimblot. The despatches to Manchester, which are far more complete than those to Portland and Jersey,² point the same way. The main principles of the Spanish partition do not pass through Manchester's hands. At discretion, he is informed of the progress of the negotiations, and after the second partition treaty has been signed receives instructions as to subordinate modifications; but this is generally during Tallard's leaves of absence from England, and after the recognition of Philip V by William III the King once more resumes complete control of the policy towards Spain. It is different however with regard to the northern question, where the coalition against Charles XII declared itself in 1699. Here Manchester played a more important part. He was ordered by William III to sound Louis XIV as to the possibility of joint intervention in the Baltic by the despatch of a squadron; but he found that Louis XIV was not prepared to move. The arguments of the French court in 1700 were similar to those used more than two hundred years later with reference to other waters: "I cannot see any inclination of this court to proceed further than by endeavouring to persuade those Princes, that are concerned, of the ill consequences a war may have. . . . Upon my saying that the King had ordered a Squadron to be got ready . . . and my asking if France would likewise act in the same manner, . . . he said, that he hoped that there would be no occasion of coming to that extremity; that the very report of our King's intending it might have the same effect, and would be sufficient to bring the King of Denmark to agree to reasonable terms; that . . . the sending of ships ought to be deferred as long as possible, lest it might make the Danes more obstinate. . . . This court will not engage further than by doing the best offices they can to prevent a war."³ English intervention therefore had to be made without the co-operation of France, which remained aloof until Anglo-French relations were broken off in 1701.

The acceptance of the will of Charles II of Spain involved a most

¹ These can be fully studied in M. A. Legrelle's comprehensive work already quoted.

² See Christian Cole, *Historical and Political Memoirs*, London, 1735.

³ Cole, *op. cit.* p. 116, Manchester to Jersey, Paris, April 7, 1700, N.S.

serious menace to the cardinal points of English policy. The Netherlands, hitherto in the hands of the Hapsburgs, now became subject to the house of Bourbon, and the huge Spanish empire with its immense economic potentialities, was now within the sphere of influence of our most formidable rivals. Nevertheless, such was the apathy of public opinion to this danger of a Bourbon domination of the world that William was forced to acquiesce in the undoing of the work of four years' patient negotiation and recognise the *fait accompli*. The rashness and chivalry of Louis XIV however gave him his opportunity, and the recognition of James Francis Edward as King of England aroused the dormant spirit of the country and built up the Grand Alliance. But the war which followed did not entirely suspend negotiations between Great Britain and France. Most of the winters of the war time were occupied in making specious offers for peace, mainly through the channel of the Dutch. These overtures were scarcely serious, and the chief purpose they served seems to have been to give to busybodies like Helvetius a strong sense of self-importance. In 1709 however came Louis XIV's first earnest prayer for peace, and in the conferences at The Hague, Marlborough and Townshend were brought face to face with the French envoys. Their instructions were quite plain; the preliminaries were to be settled among the allies, and presented to the French for acceptance or refusal.

It might have been expected that, with so slender a basis for negotiation, the conferences must have broken down at once. Yet Louis was reduced to such an extremity that, had not the allies been wholly unreasonable in one of the demands they pressed, peace would have followed. The King of France was prepared to recognise the Protestant succession which he had repudiated on the outbreak of war; he promised to satisfy all the commercial demands of the allies, to abandon on Philip's behalf the whole of the Spanish dominions, and to cede Dunkirk, Lille, Tournai, Maubeuge and Strassburg, together with various towns on the frontier of Savoy. Such trifles as Newfoundland and Hudson's Bay were not considered worth the breath of an argument and were given up at once. Never again did the allies have so fair an opportunity of wreaking in full their vengeance upon Louis XIV and of imposing thoroughly vindictive terms upon their haughty foe. Fortunately for the ulterior peace of the world, the allies put forward a demand which even in his extremity Louis XIV found it impossible to

accept. Philip V was to abdicate the whole Spanish monarchy in two months' time, failing which Louis XIV was to turn his arms against his own grandson,¹ and only in the event of his carrying out this odious condition, amongst others, would the allies grant an armistice at all.² The unnatural and vindictive demand was pressed by the home ministers,³ the Dutch and the Emperor, contrary to the opinion of Marlborough and Godolphin, the former of whom was strongly of opinion that as the Spaniards would not abandon him, "Anjou" must be compensated. It was found that the allies had over-reached themselves. Louis XIV rejected the preliminaries, greatly to the annoyance of the Whig ministers, and negotiations were not renewed until the following winter. When at last they were reopened at Gertruydenberg in January, 1710, it was found that the position of Louis had not by any means been weakened. The Pyrrhic victory of Malplaquet had shown that the French powers of resistance were by no means negligible; the French armies were still in the field in being; the slaughter of the war was beginning to tell upon public opinion, where the stories of Marlborough's personal interest in the continuance of the war gained more and more credence; proposals for peace were received with more sympathy, and the Whigs themselves betrayed their misgivings about Article XXXVII of the preliminaries by issuing instructions that an "expedient" must be settled in regard to it. In the dead of winter the French opened negotiations with a project involving material alterations in the disposition of the Spanish dominions; the Wittelsbachs were to be restored to their own dominions, and the Pretender was to be allowed to retire wherever he pleased after his expulsion from France. To the British these proposals were unacceptable, for they represented a rise in the French demands, and liberty to the Pretender meant removing an essential guarantee of the Protestant succession. To the great annoyance of the Whig government, the Dutch had given in an answer which by loose expressions had apparently varied the terms of the preliminaries.

¹ Art. IV. The text of the preliminaries may be found in G. de Lamberty, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire du xviii. siècle*, Vol. V, Hague, 1727, pp. 288-95, and Torcy's *Mémoires* (Vol. LXVII of *Collection des Mémoires relatifs à l'histoire de France*, Paris, 1828), pp. 305-25.

² Art. XXXVII.

³ See the despatch from Boyle to Marlborough of July 15, 1709; printed in T. Somerville, *History of Great Britain during the Reign of Queen Anne*, London, 1798, p. 633.

aries. A tendency to sacrifice the interests of the allies, provided that those of the Dutch could be assured, was detected. "The most solemn declarations of the States," wrote Boyle, "will be but little depended upon for the future, since they are so liable to change without any visible reason." With these remonstrances passing between Britain and Holland, the conferences opened at Geertruydenberg in the spring. Louis betrayed a genuine, even an abject desire for peace. On the bitter question of the dethronement of his grandson he offered cautionary towns in the Netherlands and a subsidy to the allies in their efforts. Nevertheless, the allies, and especially the Dutch, failing to read the signs of the times, raised their demands yet higher and insinuated that all Louis' proposals were based on bad faith. Rejecting the offer of subsidies as wholly insufficient, they ended in July by asking that Louis XIV should dethrone his grandson without any assistance, and should, alone and unaided, succeed where the united allies had signally failed during the last eight years.

It might almost be said that had the allies really been possessed of a desire for the continuance of the war, they could hardly have acted otherwise. The conference of course broke down, but the doubts of Marlborough and Godolphin were not allayed by these violent demands. The ministry themselves began to betray a certain nervousness about the cupidity of their allies. Marlborough and Townshend had not taken part in the conferences, lest other allies would demand representation, which would give an opportunity to the French to sow dissension among the allies; but the British envoys could at any rate disown responsibility for the Dutch manner of negotiation. The tone adopted towards the Dutch in the British despatches will be seen to grow markedly cool, and we may contrast the brave instructions issued to Marlborough and Townshend in 1709 about the maintenance of the Grand Alliance with the mistrust inherent in the demand that "no essential step be made towards a peace without Her Majesty's concurrence."¹ The Grand Alliance was cracking under the strain of successful war, and it therefore behoved ministers to see to the peculiar interests of this country. The instructions to Townshend deal at length with the problems of the cession of Newfoundland, Hudson's Bay and St. Kitts, for ministers saw clearly the danger that, if the Dutch were allowed to proceed as at present, then "the interests of the allies

¹ See below, p. 18.

would run great hazard of being laid aside by the impatience of the States to conclude and sign the peace when all that concerns their interest and security is comprehended in the preliminaries.”¹ However much the Whigs in later years may have denounced the policy of leaving the Dutch in the lurch, it is clear that while they were responsible for the country's welfare there were limits to their patience.

If such were the private views of the war ministry, we need hardly be surprised if the peace ministers endorsed them, and indeed were prepared to go farther. They realised, on grounds that were perhaps honest and patriotic, that there was more danger to the balance of power from the victorious allies than from an exhausted France, and negotiations were at once resumed, not by way of Holland, nor openly, but by way of France, and secretly. It was at first a matter of outbidding the Dutch, and in view of that nation's fault of “ offering too little and asking too much ” this was not difficult. Yet there were the dangers of a break-up of the alliance before a suspension of arms had been declared and of permitting France to beat a divided coalition in detail. Hence the need for secrecy, and for the elaborate make-believe that France was submitting “ spontaneous ” offers to Britain, whereas in fact the offers were dictated from London. No wonder that, when the secret came out in the autumn of 1711 and the Dutch discovered that the British had served up to them some of their own sauce, their recriminations became loud and frequent. To the Whigs of course the opportunity was too good to miss, and the Tories, who knew how dissatisfied the Whigs had been with their allies, may be pardoned their language about this factious show of indignation. For in fact their demands, so far as this country's interest is concerned, do not at first sight show much essential variation from the Whig instructions. There is the same insistence on the repudiation of the Pretender and the recognition of the Protestant line, on a new French tariff, on the destruction of Dunkirk, on the cession of Newfoundland, Hudson's Bay and St. Kitts, on a grant of trading privileges in the West Indies, and the erection of a barrier between France and Holland, the Empire and Savoy. But except in the matter of the Protestant succession, they lay the emphasis very differently. In the Whig demands first and foremost had come the maintenance of the barrier, the towns of which were specially

¹ See below, p. 22.

mentioned ; Philip V was, at any rate at The Hague conference, to have been ejected from all the Spanish dominions ; the Grand Alliance was to be maintained and renewed as a means of securing a just and honourable peace. Under the Tories all these demands sank into the background ; by their very act of separate negotiation, the Grand Alliance was a thing of the past ; Philip V is not to be ejected, for Villa Viciosa and Brihuega had done their work, and the British demands were satisfied by a promise that the crowns should never be united on one head ; while the Dutch barrier, though demanded and granted in principle, was left vague, and its details were kept to be settled at the general congress. Contrast with this general lack of preciseness in the barrier which the Dutch were to receive and the vagueness with which " some " cautionary towns in Spain are to be yielded for the execution of the treaty, the definite cession of Gibraltar and Port Mahon, the grant of the *asiento* contract to Great Britain for a term of thirty years, and the specific mention of the places which the British are to receive for the more convenient carrying on of that odious trade. All this, coupled with the demands for Hudson's Bay, Newfoundland, and St. Christopher's, common indeed to the preliminaries both of the Whigs and the Tories, and the foreshadowing of a commercial treaty with France in lieu of merely the restoration of the tariff of 1664, points to the preliminaries being the work of men who considered that the vital interests of Britain lay overseas rather than in continental entanglements, and in a stable rather than a vindictive peace.

Not that the Tories disregarded European affairs : their jealousy of the Dutch was sufficient to prevent any policy of " splendid isolation." The indignation of the Dutch at seeing the negotiations pass out of their immediate control was countered by the determination of the British ministers that peace should be concluded, if necessary by reducing its opponents to impotence by a separate treaty. Therefore at the close of 1711 the first great blow was struck by a ministry strong in the support of the Queen, who was resolved on peace. Marlborough was dismissed and the Whig majority in the Lords was swamped by the creation of twelve Tory peers ; in the late spring of 1712 the agreement with France for the surrender of Dunkirk as guarantee for the suspension of arms left the Dutch and Imperialists to meet Villars alone at Denain. Then only did the Dutch realise that further resistance to peace in accord-

ance with the wishes of Britain was useless, and the work of the Congress of Utrecht began in earnest.

In the negotiations, the policy of the British ministers, while keeping a watchful eye on the interests of the Tory party, was chiefly directed to keeping the demands of their allies within bounds. Moderation was favoured, and when discerned, rewarded. The Dutch in September showed that they had learnt the bitter lesson ; and by a timely renunciation of their claims to St. Venant, Le Quesnoy, Douai and Lille, found that their firm stand to retain Tournai was supported, in spite of earlier promises to the French, by the whole strength of the British, who compelled Louis to give way in October and cede the town. Not so the Imperialists. The dogged court of Vienna refused as usual to recognise that the game was lost, and the British ministry in the autumn of 1712 had to listen to demands for Sicily, Strassburg, the exchange of the Netherlands for Bavaria, the establishment of Catalonia as a free state under international guarantee, and a polite request that Charles VI should not be compelled to renounce his claims to the Spanish throne. The Imperial ambassador even whispered about a claim on one half of Spain and on Metz, Toul and Verdun. The extravagance of many of these demands involved all in a common rejection, and regardless of the Imperialists, it fell to the Congress, under British inspiration, to frame a peace in the interests of Europe as a whole.

While however the British ministers did all they could to moderate the excessive demands of the Dutch and the Imperialists, they did much to forward the claims of one important neighbour of France. The house of Savoy had clung to the Grand Alliance, and now that the Emperor Charles VI was as objectionable a candidate to the Spanish throne as a Bourbon, the best compromise in view of descent was to provide for the succession of the Duke of Savoy to the Spanish throne. This prince became the peculiar object of the Tory ministers' favour. The geographical position of his territories made him singularly important for the maintenance of the balance of power in Italy, and the strengthening of his position became a cardinal point in the policy of the British. One of the articles of the preliminaries of London provided not only for the restoration of Savoy, but for the establishment of a barrier of which, unlike that for the Dutch, the towns were specifically mentioned. In the spring of the following year it occurred to Oxford that an opportunity had presented itself of furthering at once the

interests of Victor Amadeus and the prestige of the Tory party, and he thought that the question of the French succession might be solved if, instead of merely renouncing his claims to succeed to the French throne, Philip V would exchange Spain and the Indies for Savoy and Piedmont, Montferrat, Mantua and Sicily, which on his succession to the French throne would be incorporated in the French dominions. The plan had the advantage of completely exorcising the Bourbons from Spain; and the problem of the succession to that country, which "non anni domuere decem, non mille carinae" would have yielded at last to the peaceful diplomacy of the Tories. But it was not to be. In spite of pressure exercised by the French at Madrid, Philip decided without hesitation that Spain and the Indies in the hand were worth an enlarged France in the bush, and the ministry was compelled to accept a nugatory renunciation by Philip to his claims to the French crown. Yet this great disappointment did not hinder the British from continuing to champion the cause of Amadeus, and, as a consolation prize for not obtaining Spain and the Indies, the Duke of Savoy was granted the Kingdom of Sicily, the harbours of which, in friendly hands, would be valuable complements to Gibraltar and Minorca.

It may easily be imagined it was no easy task that the British government had set itself. The disappointments of the Dutch and the Imperialists gave too obvious an opportunity to the French, who during the winter of 1712-13 gave a characteristic exhibition of chicanery, by raising difficulties over the commercial treaty, threatening an alliance with the Dutch against the English, and postponing a conclusion as long as possible in the hope that even the shadow of the Grand Alliance might be dissipated. But as the spring approached, so also did the campaigning season, and a threat by Great Britain that if France did not come into the treaty in accordance with Great Britain's wishes, the war would be renewed,¹ was sufficient to bring the French king to resigning himself to the treaty as it stood. On April 11, 1713, the treaties were signed by all the powers, save the Emperor.

It is easy to criticise the treaty made at Utrecht and the policy which led up to it, and it is difficult to resist the conclusion that much of the criticism is just. For party motives, the Tory ministry threw over the allies and entered upon negotiations for a separate

¹ *Bolingbroke Correspondence*, Ed. 1798, Vol. II, pp. 256-69. Bolingbroke to Shrewsbury, February 17, 1713.

peace contrary to the terms of the Grand Alliance, nor can the argument that promises made by a Whig Government to the Catalans could not be held binding on the Tories be considered entirely satisfactory. Up to the advent of the Tory ministry we had been content to allow the Dutch to put forward preliminaries which had been agreed among the allies as the terms which France should be bound to accept, and so had preserved, though with great searchings of heart, the solidarity of the Grand Alliance. Far otherwise was it in 1711. We left our allies imagining that the basis of a peace would be the terms stipulated for in 1709 and 1710, whereas, by settling the Franco-British terms separately from the rest of the allies, we feathered our nest at their expense. Such conduct is undoubtedly dishonourable; yet it may be urged, in fairness to the ministry, that never has there been a clearer illustration of the truth of the saying that out of evil good may come. A peace, such as the Dutch and Imperialists desired, dictated under the walls of Paris, would have been no peace. The loss of Vauban's fortresses and Strassburg, and the insulting phraseology of the terms of peace would have rankled in the minds of the French and have laid up a war of revenge as surely as did the peace of Paris of 1763 and the treaty of Frankfort. Humiliating as the general course of the war had been, sore as they doubtless felt over details like the loss of Tournai, Louis and his ministers must have realised that they were more than compensated by terms which, compared with what they had been prepared to accept, seemed to be due to the interposition of Providence. France had escaped from a grave menace, and the generous terms of 1713 secured that never again did the north-eastern frontier become, like Alsace, a bone of contention between France and her neighbours. Though the "natural frontiers" have never ceased to be the ultimate goal of French ambitions, the statesmen who laid down the frontier at Utrecht, by refraining from wounding French pride, and by paying due regard to the salutary principle of an equilibrium, may be justly credited with the honour of having established, at that critical point, what has come to be a permanent European settlement.

As for this country, the advantages gained at Utrecht can easily be estimated. First and foremost, Dunkirk, that nest of privateers, was to be demolished. On no point did ministers lay more stress than on this, and on few points indeed did Louis XIV find the allied terms harder to bear. After the signature of the peace he

continued to angle for the preservation of the port, and when he found the British ministry adamant,¹ he put into play all those arts of chicanery with which he and the French were in those days credited. Hence the building of the Mardyck canal,² which was clearly a subterfuge, and the despatches, wearisome to writer and reader alike, on the subject of these works during the next four years. In this matter indeed the Tory ministry was able to point to little else than a paper advantage; but they had to their credit the encouragement of trade across the ocean by their acquisitions in North America and the West Indies, and the grant of the *asiento* privileges; the Netherlands had been kept out of the hands of a satellite of France, and firm *points d'appui* had been gained in the Straits and the Western Mediterranean. Still further advantages might be expected from the commercial treaty which was to break down the barriers to trade between England and France. Internationally, the British position was not unenviable. If she had earned the hatred of her allies, and seemed to be isolated, she had been mistress of the congress. It was at her request that Sicily was given to Savoy and Tournai yielded to the Dutch; it was in accordance with her wishes that Strassburg was retained by France, and the Catalans were left to their fate; and it was at her command that Louis XIV made up his mind to sign the treaty in 1713. Nor, after the treaty had been signed, was her position clearly weakened by the technical dissolution of a moribund Grand Alliance. The friendship of Holland, as the Imperialists sadly admitted, was worth little; the military strength of the Dutch was contemptible, and they were only too prone to abandon their allies for the sake of commercial gain. Consequently a triple alliance of Holland, Savoy and the Empire would entail sacrifices on the part of the Empire that were not commensurate with its advantages.³ Yet the Emperor refused to come into the treaty, and this was the chief European difficulty of the time; for in the first place he might have to defend himself single-handed against France, and be forced to sign a humiliating peace, and in the second place, as he had not recog-

¹ *Ministère des affaires étrangères*, Angleterre, Vol. 247, fo. 156. Gaultier to Torey, London, Dec. 19, 1713, N.S. "La proposition que j'avois faite a Madame Masham touchant la conservation du Port de Dunkerque n'a pas été acceptée. La Reyne n'oseroit mesme y songer."

² See the curious plan of the Mardyck Canal in Carte MS. 180, fo. 455, in the Bodleian Library.

³ O. Weber, *Friede von Utrecht*, pp. 322-3.

nised the neutrality of Italy, the aggrandisement of the house of Savoy contemplated by the Treaty of Utrecht was jeopardised. Both these tendencies made their appearance and both were checked in 1714. In the one case, firm despatches to Prior made clear the "sense" of the Court of St. James's, and the Treaty of Baden corresponded generally with that of Utrecht as regards France and Germany; in the other, the Emperor made no secret of his desire to overthrow the settlement of Utrecht in Italy. The danger to their favourite King of Sicily drew Britain and France together, and a treaty of defensive alliance between the powers was ready to be signed when the death of Queen Anne ushered in a revolution in British policy.

Side by side with this official correspondence, a secret negotiation was being carried on with the French court. Of this not a word appears in the despatches to Prior, nor is it likely that Prior knew anything whatever about it. Through the channel of Gaultier and Torcy, ministers were sounding the Pretender at Bar-le-Duc as to his policy in the event of his restoration. Whatever their ultimate motives, Oxford and Bolingbroke were deeply involved in this intrigue, which was naturally facilitated by the French court to the utmost of their power. But the Pretender's letter of February 26, 1714, N.S., made his restoration impossible, and though Gaultier continued to indulge in hopes which kept him writing all through the spring and summer to the honest Prince, and although Oxford and Bolingbroke continued to assert their refusal to recognise any king after Queen Anne other than James III,¹ it seems clear that the Tory ministry had some time before Queen Anne's death abandoned all idea of an immediate restoration.²

The new King approached the problem of European politics from an angle very different from that of his predecessor. Not only had he an unrivalled knowledge of the politics of Europe, but as Elector of Hanover he was deeply committed to the intricacies of the northern question, in which England hitherto had been interested only to a secondary degree; and whereas the Protestant succession

¹ *Ministère des aff. étr.*, Angleterre, Vol. 255, fo. 143. Gaultier to James III, Apr. 26, 1714, N.S.

² The whole foreign policy of the Tory ministry has been most ably defended by Felix Salomon, *Geschichte des letzten Ministeriums der Königin Annas*, Gotha, 1894. Reference may also be profitably made to Mr. K. G. Feiling's *History of the Tory Party*, Oxford, 1924.

had been to Queen Anne a matter of sentimental dislike, to her successor its maintenance was a matter of life and death. This difference reacted at once on the relations of Britain to France. Louis XIV, seeing the hopes that he had entertained of a Catholic succession shattered by the Queen's death, began at once to prepare support for the Pretender. He sheered off from the friendly attitude he had maintained to the Queen's government, and remained more than ever evasive on the subject of Dunkirk. But Britain, if it lost the friendship of France during Louis XIV's lifetime, regained, from the accession of the Elector of Hanover, the probability of friendship with Austria, and from the return of the Whigs, the certainty of friendship with the Dutch.¹

The interval of friendship with France was therefore at an end, and Stair, the new envoy, was not the man to meet Louis XIV and Torcy half-way. Besides the questions of the Pretender and of Dunkirk, on which there could be no compromise, there was the subordinate question of the Imperialist troops in Majorca, and during the few remaining months of the life of Louis XIV, Stair was involved in strong and even personal disputes with him and his ministers. Nor can it be said that he was able to secure much advantage for his country in these matters. The dialectical arguments on the French side were too strong: it could be urged that the treaty had been literally complied with; the Chevalier was no longer on French soil; and such operations as were being carried out at Dunkirk and Mardyck were blandly stated to be necessary to prevent the country from being flooded. Short of an actual conflict there was no reason why either side should comply with the other's wishes, and neither could afford to face a fresh war. All that the British could do was to remember that Louis could not live much longer, and to follow the example given to them by the ministers of Queen Anne² by taking measures to salute the rising sun and offer support to Orleans when, or even before, the time should come. Stair was to enter into communications with the Duke and to inform him of the intelligence the British government had received that in the will laid by with so much pomp and cere-

¹ For an authoritative exposition of Anglo-French relations in the first four years of George I see W. Michael's *Englische Geschichte im xviii. Jahrhundert*, Vols. I and II (1), a work which may be said to supersede all previous studies of the period.

² See below, p. 75.

mony Louis XIV had left the Regency to the King of Spain with assurance of the legitimisation of the Duke of Maine and the Count of Toulouse. Therefore Orleans was to be promised support in his claims to the Regency, but in return it was expected of him that he would demolish Dunkirk and Mardyck, expel the Pretender beyond the Alps and refuse to countenance or harbour the disaffected subjects of George I. But the instability of Orleans' character and the precariousness of George I's position in Britain during the last quarter of 1715 meant that the British ministers were to be gravely disappointed in the Regent. Drawn hither and thither between the young men who had grown up with him and the old men who had stood before his uncle, Orleans had not the resolution of Rehoboam, but tried to play two games at once. While making advances for a defensive alliance with Britain to guarantee the French and British successions laid down at Utrecht, he at the same time gave facilities underhand to the Pretender as he journeyed to Scotland. This treachery did not escape the notice of the British, and when George I had suppressed the rising, Orleans was faced with the due reward of his misdeeds.¹ He found himself without a friend in Europe; George I, in spite of French reproaches,² had reinsured himself by a defensive alliance with Austria, and when Orleans made advances to George for an alliance, they were at first sternly rejected, and later the price of friendship was firmly laid down.

Instead of being confronted, as in 1715, with no more than a request that he would meet the wishes of George I on the subject of the Pretender, the rebels, and Dunkirk, Orleans now found these wishes put forward as the absolute condition of any restoration to favour. No negotiations were held to be possible so long as the Pretender was on this side of the Alps³—a hard condition which the Hanoverian government did not eventually insist on, in commercial matters, all idea of a treaty was to be abandoned,

¹ It is fair to observe that Stair thought the Duke of Orleans "was more inclinable to our side than any of his counsellors." (B.M. Eg. MS. 2170, fo. 317. Stair to Bubb, Paris, Dec. 11, 1715, N.S.) He repeats this opinion in March, 1716. (B.M. Eg. 2171, fo. 155. Paris, March 2, 1716, N.S.)

² P.R.O. France 160, Stair to Stanhope, Paris, May 6, 1716, N.S. "La prudence demandoit qu'on se mît à couvert contre les entreprises que la France pourroit former . . . semblables à celles qu'elle avait donné (*sic*) par le passé."

³ B.M. Eg. 2171, fo. 323v, Stair to Bubb, Paris, May 21 (?), 1716, N.S.

because the Whig merchants were opposed to it ; and, worst of all, the demolition of Dunkirk and Mardyck was to be carried out according to the British interpretation of the Treaty of Utrecht. These terms were so galling to French pride, that Orleans at one moment exclaimed that war was preferable to the humiliation of granting them. Nevertheless, the partisans of the English alliance won the day and Dubois started on his memorable journeys to the Hague and to Hanover. Here, for all their high demands, George I and his Hanoverian ministers were more anxious to conclude the treaty than they appeared, for the presence of Peter the Great's troops in Mecklenburg were a menace to George's electoral dominions, and a source of immediate anxiety to George himself, who, as Elector of Hanover, was responsible for the preservation of order in that circle of the Empire. Policy therefore dictated that France should not be pressed too far, but by bluffing his anxiety over Peter, George succeeded in extracting the necessary terms from Dubois.¹

Had Peter been the only danger in the North, George I's position might have been easier ; but there was also the King of Sweden to be reckoned with. Charles XII and Peter the Great, divided on everything else, were now united in their hatred of the Elector of Hanover, and it was this immixture of the Northern question, hitherto kept fairly separate from the affairs of Western Europe, which proved the chief obstacle to the smooth working of the Triple Alliance of 1717. On the danger to European peace that was threatened from Spain under Elizabeth Farnese, the French and British governments were united. To the Catholic King's claims to the French throne and his Queen's demands for reversionary rights to principalities in Italy, the chief obstacle undoubtedly was Britain, and therefore Spain became the happy hunting-ground of the Jacobites. Here then was a common danger against which both Britain and France could work ; but in the affairs of the North, which under George I assume a proportion extraordinarily large in the diplomatic correspondence of the time, it is only too clear that the two courts did not see eye to eye. And the levity of the Regent never made it certain that the alliance would be lasting, for Dubois, the chief partisan of the English alliance, could not rely on the Regent's unfailing support nor neglect the intrigues of the " old court." He had not full control of his own diplomatic agents, who,

¹ Two years later, Dunkirk was to be the subject of fresh complaints from the British.

presumably receiving contradictory orders, did as they thought right in their own eyes.¹ This apparent double-dealing bred constant mistrust of the French, so long as Orleans was Regent, and George I neither received nor gave that "openness and frankness" in negotiation which he so constantly demanded and on which he always flattered himself.

Friendship with the King of Sweden was a habit too far ingrained in the French court to be abandoned because an ally of France had a personal quarrel with him. But the position was peculiarly delicate when, simultaneously with the signature of the treaty of the Triple Alliance, the Gyllenborg conspiracy was revealed in England, and war between Great Britain and Sweden was on the point of breaking out. In these dangerous circumstances the French government were approached by the British to act as mediators, and it was through Stair that the release of Gyllenborg and the British envoy in Sweden was brought about; but the mediation, though the French were willing it should extend to other matters in dispute between Sweden and Great Britain, was not effective, and it was not until Charles XII met his fate at Fredrikshall that friendly relations between the two governments were restored.

The chief danger-spot, however, was the Mediterranean. The grievances of Charles VI against Philip V and Victor Amadeus had never been appeased, and war was only averted by the guarantee of Italian neutrality afforded by Britain and France. Moreover the approach of succession questions in Parma and Tuscany caused Elizabeth Farnese to cast covetous eyes on those territories. Now, George I had, late in 1716, thought out a "plan" for securing the peace of the South, and was advancing its claims for consideration. Charles VI was to recognise Philip V as King of Spain and the Indies, and in return was to receive Sicily in exchange

¹ See for this especially a letter from Stair to Robethon of October 20, 1717, N.S., in B.M. Stowe MS. 230, fo. 253.

"Il faut avouer que la conduite des ministres de France est extraordinaire quasi partout. Mons^r de Chateauneuf contrecarre le Roy en tout a la Haye, et agit directement contraire a ce que nous savons des intentions de S.A.R. et meme contre ses intentions manifestes. Mons^r de Rottenbourg est intime avec Gortz et veut le cacher chez luy, le Comte de la Marek sollicite la paix particuliere avec le Czar . . . Mons^r de Bonac foment la guerre du Turc, qui est le moyen le plus sûr de faire echouer notre plan, pour ne rien dire de Boussin et de notre Mons^r d'Iberville."

for Sardinia, while Parma and Piacenza were to go to Elizabeth Farnese's eldest son, Don Carlos. Victor Amadeus, being the weak party in the arrangement, was to be sacrificed, and with a cynicism equal almost to that of the authors of the "plan," he sacrificed his own subjects provided he was restored to the Emperor's favour, and thereby secured his mainland territories from attack. Charles VI however was in no mood to listen to such proposals; he imagined that the Triple Alliance was directed against himself, and while lending more than half an ear to the chimerical proposals of Clement XI for an alliance between Austria, Spain, and the Italian princes against the Protestant and Jansenist powers of the North, he was planning under Eugene a successful attack upon the Turks. If Austria held aloof, the attitude of France was not very helpful either towards the successful issue of the "plan." The Regent was possessed by an idea of getting the King of Prussia to join the Triple Alliance, and of making engagements with the Tsar, who was at that time visiting Paris. Such a policy the British declared would be fatal to the "plan," as it would hopelessly alienate the Emperor whose adherence it was essential to secure. The events of the summer helped to bring about this desired object. June saw a definite breach between Austria and Spain, when the arrest of the Spanish Grand Inquisitor at Milan precipitated the Spanish intervention in Italy which Alberoni had advocated and to which the Austrian campaign in the Balkans had given a fair opportunity. At once the Emperor became more attentive to George's arguments. The Triple Alliance ceased to be a bugbear, and he announced his willingness to recognise the Orleans succession to the throne, but on condition that there could be no question of admitting Prussia and Russia to the Triple Alliance. It was exactly what the British ministers had been saying for some weeks past, and Dubois had a hard struggle against the old court which was now championing the advantages of a triple alliance between France, Prussia and Russia with a view to securing Sweden some of her German possessions. Spanish action however brought about a crisis. A fleet was fitted out, the destination of which kept diplomatic tongues wagging all through July and August, but which landed its troops at Cagliari in the middle of August, just at the moment when Prince Eugene won the battle of Belgrade and drove the Turks far from the right bank of the Danube. So exciting a situation took Dubois on his travels again, and he crossed to London in September to work out

the "plan" in close conjunction with the British ministers. The Emperor, though pitching his demands high, had no objection now to joining the Triple Alliance against Spain, while Dubois was at one with the British on the necessity of excluding Spain and compelling her to submit to the dictation of the four powers. Suddenly, however, news came of a change in the attitude of the Regent. With Dubois safely in London, the opponents of the British alliance, joining with the ultramontanes, directed all their batteries of argument against the Regent, and at the end of October he wrote to Dubois that he was prepared to come to terms with Spain.¹ Full of dismay,² Dubois rushed back to Paris, where he found that Torcy had been fighting inch by inch against Huxelles and Villeroy and had succeeded in turning the Regent from the pro-Spanish policy. The crisis was over for the moment and Dubois was able to return to London on the last day of 1717 to renew his interrupted negotiations.

The objects of the "plan" were the settlement of the incessant claims of Austria in Italy, the termination of the now petty personal quarrel between Charles VI and Philip V, and the dictation of a peace by the greater powers upon the less.³ Nobody indeed wanted war, least of all the British ministry, threatened as they now were with furious Tory assaults in the House of Commons and a schism in their own ranks. And they further found that objections were being raised to their "plan" by several powers. The French Regent conceived the idea of granting Tuscany to Don Carlos. He considered himself bound to see that justice was done to Spain, and Stair and Schaub, Stanhope's Swiss secretary from Vienna, were unable to move the Regent from his position. They had to abandon their compromise of keeping Pisa and Leghorn in Imperial hands, and Schaub went back to Vienna

¹ It was proposed that Philip V should recognise Orleans' right of succession to France if he would guarantee the succession of Don Carlos to Parma.

² His fears may have been exaggerated. Cf. Stair to Robethon, Nov. 15, 1717, N.S. "Il n'y a rien de si clair que tout le ministère tasche de toutes les manieres a engager le Regent a une guerre avec l'Empereur. Le Regent quasi seul est pour le plan." On the other hand Stair wrote to Robethon on Nov. 3: "Je vous avoue qu'il me paroît de temps en temps que nous avons grand besoin de Mons^r l'Abbé icy." (B.M. Stowe MS. 230, ff. 271v. and 264v.)

³ This was laid down in the preamble which was suppressed in view of Austrian objections. It may be seen in Michael, *op. cit.* Vol. II (1), pp. 626-7.

to lay the proposal in the form now accepted by France before the Emperor. Confronted with a renunciation of his claims to Spain and the cession of Parma and Tuscany to the children of Elizabeth Farnese, jealous moreover of Britain which had played the predominant part in all these negotiations, the Emperor at first refused to assent to the "plan," but a veiled ultimatum from England brought him round, and he announced on April 4 his general adhesion.¹ This event had its repercussion in France, where the sincerity of the Regent in adhering to the "plan" was still in doubt, and even before Schaub had left Paris for Vienna, Dubois himself was not convinced as to the true policy to be pursued. The accession of Austria settled the question, at any rate for a time, and Dubois continued in London devising with Stanhope the enticements which it was hoped would allure Spain also to give her adhesion. Parma and Tuscany it was thought might be sufficient, but to make sure, Stanhope gave his approval to the French proposal that Gibraltar should be given back to Spain as a *douceur* for coming into the "plan," but for the present it was the status of Parma and Tuscany that most occupied the minds of the statesmen. In June, Schaub returned from Vienna with the text of the Emperor's adhesion to the "plan." On examination it was found to contain a proviso, exacted by Charles VI, as the condition of his agreement, that the Spanish princes should not occupy the duchies with Spanish garrisons. But this was just what Nancreé, Dubois' envoy at Madrid, had been promising to the Spanish court under instructions from Huxelles. Nancreé's action had indeed put Orleans in a quandary. With Dubois in London, he was under the direct pressure of the Abbé's hottest opponents, but even so, he was sufficiently under his influence to be anxious not to break off the British alliance on which his whole dynastic ambitions rested. Stair and Schaub, with an ingenuity which does them credit, found a way out of the difficulty the Regent was in by suggesting that the Regent should order the whole matter to be referred to London "with observations." The receipt of this document caused Dubois a fit of despair. It looked as if the whole "plan" had come to a deadlock; but one chance yet remained, and that was that Stanhope, the "grandfather" of the treaty as Dubois called him, should himself go to Paris and exercise his diplomatic talent upon the Regent. Before Schaub had reached London, Stanhope's

¹ For all this in detail see W. Michael, *op. cit.*, Vol. II (1), 1920, pp. 133-9.

instructions had been made out, and on June 29 he arrived with the little secretary at the French capital, with a proposed "expedient" in his pocket. This was that the duchies of Parma and Tuscany should be held by Swiss and British troops and be maintained by the Triple Alliance, a suggestion which it was hoped would allay the natural apprehensions of the Emperor and give the desired security to the new Dukes. The matter however was very urgent, for the campaigning season had begun, and Orleans was to be requested to come into this arrangement as soon as possible. No opposition to the expedient was anticipated from the Emperor; and should the Regent agree to sign as soon as the Imperial minister was ready to do so, then Stanhope was to go on to Madrid to try and persuade that court to come to a peace. Stanhope found the Regent civil, but in a sad state of indecision. Fortunately for Dubois, Huxelles failed at the critical moment: he played "a despicable comedy" which involved him in personal humiliation and brought complete defeat upon the pro-Spanish party, and on July 18 the preliminary convention was signed at Paris. Stanhope's "expedient" was accepted, and the way cleared for the formation of a "Quadruple Alliance"¹ which was definitely joined by Austria when Penterriedter, the Imperial ambassador in London, signed the convention on his master's behalf on August 2.

It now remained to convince Spain of the benefits of the "plan." To encourage her to join, the instrument contained a threat of war in three months from August 2nd, should she fail to agree to its provisions. As if to show that this was not merely an empty threat couched in diplomatic verbiage, Sir George Byng was ordered to proceed from home waters to the Mediterranean. On the day after the signature of the convention in Paris, Stanhope left for Madrid, and arrived to find the Spanish court in a state of optimism. Palermo had fallen into Spanish hands; the rest of Sicily was being overrun and the Spanish troops were being received by the populace with enthusiasm. Better still, the West Indian treasure convoy had arrived safely at Cadiz, where Byng had called shortly before. Spanish confidence rose high. After concerting plans with Nancré and having some interviews with Alberoni, Stanhope was

¹ It is perhaps well to remind the reader that it has been demonstrated by H. von Srbik, *Oesterreichische Staatsverträge, Niederlande*, Vienna, 1912, Vol. I, pp. 579-86, that Holland was never a party to the so-called Quadruple Alliance. This view is endorsed by W. Michael, *op. cit.*, pp. 173-80, 253-6.

admitted to an audience of the King, to whom he unfolded the "plan" with the "expedient" about the garrisons of Parma and Tuscany, and, as seems probable, he dangled the bait of Gibraltar before the Catholic King. But Philip was in no mood to listen. He rejected plan, expedient and bribe alike, and Stanhope, finding his presence useless, left Madrid, and fortunately for himself had crossed the frontier before the news of Byng's action at Cape Passaro had reached the Spanish court.

Philip's answer to Stanhope made a breach with the powers of the alliance probable; Byng's action rendered it inevitable, and it is surprising at first sight that, seeing that Spain was in British opinion the root of the mischief and the "upstart Cardinal" the villain of the piece who had instigated the attack on Sicily, war was not officially declared until the very end of the year.

This delay was due to French hesitation and to British difficulties in the North. With Charles XII eager for any opportunity to invade Britain in support of the Jacobites, Stanhope and his party were not going to commit themselves to war with Spain single-handed. Moreover they had to face the uncertainties of debate in a Parliament as yet uncontrolled by the party machine. Nevertheless in October they were urging the Regent to declare war on Spain. That prince had simplified his system of government by ridding himself of the cumbersome councils and placing all real power in the hands of Dubois as secretary of state. But even an all-powerful minister cannot neglect public opinion, and there was no doubt that the English policy of Dubois was profoundly unpopular both in government and in general circles. Hence, even after Cape Passaro, efforts were made to patch up a peace, and Alberoni, for all his chagrin at the destruction of his fleet, was willing to accept the offer of an accommodation. But no arguments could prevail with Philip V and his Queen, and on November 1, the three months provided by the treaty having elapsed, Nancré left Madrid, followed shortly afterwards by William Stanhope. Yet still the declaration of war was delayed until Parliament had decided, and this grave question was not solved until December. But in that month two events greatly simplified the situation. The death of Charles XII in action at Fredrikshall threw Sweden into confusion and removed the great enemy of George in the North, and the discovery of the Cellamare conspiracy revealed the lengths to which the court of Spain would go in countenancing the intrigues of

legitimists in France. Torcy was won over to the side of Dubois and Orleans, and at the beginning of January, 1719, a few days after his ally, the Regent declared war on Spain.

Great Britain and France now stood side by side; the British were to provide the sea-power, the French the land-power. Even now full confidence was not established between the two governments. The French commander-in-chief was Berwick, who though *persona grata* in British circles, was never fully trusted on account of his parentage, and William Stanhope, who was accredited as British agent in the French armies, was instructed to take note whether the French generals did their duty wholeheartedly. More openly expressed was the annoyance caused in London by the discovery that even after the declaration of war Nancre was negotiating with Alberoni at the instance of the Regent. Dubois hastened to disavow any responsibility for the negotiation, but the matter left a very nasty taste in British mouths. When however Stair, in what seems to have been a panic,¹ announced the Spanish armada that was fitting out in March to invade England, the French government was able with a good grace to offer to send eighteen regiments of infantry and ten of cavalry to Britain to repel the invasion,² together with 1,500 French seamen to fill possible gaps in the British fleet. The military aid was rejected, but it is curious to record that the services of five or six hundred seamen were accepted,³ if necessity should arise, though it is fair to say that the motives that actuated the British government in this action seem to have been those of courtesy and a desire not to wound the vanity of the Regent by rejecting his offers in their entirety. The services of the French sailors were never needed, for though the new armada sailed, it was dispersed by a hurricane, and, such as it was, the danger passed away. So much for the sea. On land the war dragged on for a year, a British descent on Galicia and the French reduction of frontier fortresses at length compelling the King and Queen to come into the Quadruple Alliance and sacrifice Alberoni.

¹ See his letter to Craggs, dated Paris, March 15, 1719, N.S., in B.M. Stowe MS. 247, fo. 76. "My dear Craggs, press the fitting out of your ships, raise as many troops as you [can] and send to the Dutch to have their troops ready. The Spaniards could not saill before the 7 or 8 of this month. I hope our squadrons will be ready in time. I think the D. of Orleans is heartily in earnest to help us but it is good not to want French assistance."

² P.R.O., France 163, fo. 226. ³ *Ibid.* fo. 282 (Apr. 6, 1719, N.S.).

In the North matters were more complicated, but the same mistrust in the relations between the French and English Governments is to be discerned. George I devised a plan, this time for the pacification of the North so as to avoid the humiliation of Sweden and her new Queen Ulrica, whom he took under his defence against the Russians. Here again he found the action of France and her ministers as unreliable as ever, and instead of receiving support for his union of all the powers of the North to recover for Sweden the provinces she had lost on the east side of the Baltic, he complained through Stanhope that the Regent's ideas were wholly different. It was the opinion of Dubois that Peter, the strongest power in the North, should be satisfied with all or part of his conquests; George I was prepared to give him only Narva, St. Petersburg and Kronstadt, retaining Finland, Esthonia and Livonia for Sweden: Dubois saw no advantage in standing by Denmark; George I considered that power the only northern ally who had kept faith with him: Dubois wished Sweden to retain her German provinces; George wished they should be given up: Dubois was aiming at imposing a peace on the North, while George had the same ambition for himself. There was plenty of ground for jealousy, and it is not surprising to find that Stair wrote that there was only too much ground for suspicion that the French government were not acting "openly and above board." He continues: "Whatever they say, they do not mean the same things to us, but are every now and then returning to their old maxims and politics which they will not or cannot understand to be incompatible with their new treaties."¹ Worse was to come. Stair imagined that he had succeeded in bringing the Regent round to the British point of view, when La Marck, the French envoy at Stockholm, returned to Paris and insisted on the German provinces (including a part of Bremen and Verden) being returned to Sweden. Regardless of the understanding he had come to with Stair, the Regent swung round again to La Marck's view, and such was the emotion of the British government at this vacillation that a request was sent in June that the French minister at Berlin should be sent to Stockholm, "*ou tout autre, pourvu que ce ne soit pas le comte de la Marck.*"² The next year was to see another instance of this mistrust, when through Campredon the "*vieille cour*" began a separate negotiation with Peter the Great

¹ March 9, 1719.² June 7, 1719.

to the disadvantage of Britain.¹ In May, 1719, Stair proposed that the British court should take its own measures, advice which was adopted, so that in the North the alliance was a dead letter. France never supported the schemes of George in the North, and indeed they served but little purpose save to exhibit his impotence against Peter, while at last the collapse of the South Sea Bubble withdrew what strength he might have derived from a sound financial position.

Meanwhile events in Paris were rapidly approaching a personal crisis with regard to Stair. Unpopular in many circles on account of his arrogance and ostentation, crippled by his lavish expenditure on secret service and incessant gaming, he fell foul of Law, and on February 20, 1720 N.S., he demanded his recall. Before leaving in June, he was able to contribute to the settlement of a grave misunderstanding between the two courts over Gibraltar. There is little reason to doubt that Stanhope offered the fortress to Philip V when visiting Madrid in 1718, and there is no doubt whatever that in 1717 the opinion in government circles was that Gibraltar was a less valuable possession than Minorca, which, with a landlocked harbour capable of sheltering a whole fleet, offered more facilities than the exposed roadstead of Gibraltar. If the Rock controlled the entrance to the Mediterranean, Port Mahon was a greater menace, strategically, to French domination in the Western Mediterranean. But in 1719 public opinion began to veer round against the rumoured cession of Gibraltar, and the proposal to cede the fortress made by a private member was received in ominous silence by the House of Commons. Now however the Regent demanded that the offer of Gibraltar to Spain should be fulfilled; but to make it would have involved certain defeat in Parliament, and the contention between the two courts became so sharp that Stanhope, who had crossed in January, 1720, to assure himself that the French were not concluding a separate treaty with Spain and to remonstrate on their northern policy, had to cross the Channel once more in March in order to meet the recriminations of the Regent. He was able, plausibly enough, to point out that the cession of Gibraltar formed no part of the "plan," that it had been offered as a *douceur* to induce Philip to adhere, but that as Philip had rejected all the offers and war had followed, the proposal with regard to Gibraltar had fallen to the ground. But the rapidity of Stanhope's movements in the first quarter of 1720 are a gauge of

¹ July 15/26, 1720.

the seriousness with which the loss of Gibraltar was viewed, and of the gravity of the crisis in Anglo-French relations. Stanhope succeeded in his efforts, but even after this he was prepared to cede the Rock provided a good equivalent could be obtained for this country, and not for France.¹

The departure of Stair from Paris is the beginning of a transformation scene in Anglo-French relations, culminating in the deaths of Stanhope, Craggs and Sunderland at the beginning of 1721. With a nonentity at the British embassy, and with peace once more established with Spain, Dubois turned with relief towards that country, and throughout the latter half of 1720 was building up a defensive alliance between France and Spain, to which British ministers were not privy. The discovery of the intrigue belongs to the successors of Stanhope and Craggs, but the incident serves to remind us of the essential hollowness of the friendship between Britain and France under the government of the Regent.

In the tangled skein of European politics during the years that followed the peace of Utrecht, the leading principles that guided British policy whether under Whig or Tory can be clearly discerned. Under them, as under the younger Pitt, security is the watchword of the government, and this leads to the avoidance of extremes which is characteristic of British foreign policy. Whigs and Tories alike show their mistrust of Dutch rancour and of Imperial arrogance, nor can it seriously be doubted that the Whigs would have been the first to regret the logical consequences of a peace dictated on the soil of France. The neutrality of the Netherlands was of greater importance to Britain than the humiliation of Louis XIV, and the insistence on the demolition of Dunkirk sprang from the perennial desire of this country to use their supremacy at sea to maintain security for such as pass on the seas upon their lawful occasions. On the other hand extreme demands, whether put forward by Louis XIV or Charles III, must all be resisted, and common sense and justice shall dictate the compromise between the conflicting claims. That the separation of the French, Austrian and Spanish crowns was not achieved until Utrecht and Rastadt is to be attributed not to the villainy of the Tories and the Whigs,

¹ For all this in detail see Michael, *op. cit.* II (1), pp. 261-82. See also Stanhope's letter to Craggs, Hanover, Oct. 1, 1720, in Lord Mahon's *History*, 1853, Vol. II, pp. xeviii-cii, and Stanhope's letter to Schaub, Paris, March 28, 1720, N.S., printed in Michael, p. 633.

but to the pride of the Imperial court, whose obstinacy was only to yield to the necessity created by the Spanish attack on Sardinia and Sicily. And, after the accession of the Whigs to power, their policy was to endorse the most vital clauses of the wicked treaty of Utrecht, and to make all provision against its overthrow. To guard the treaty they oppose the designs of Louis XIV and the Regent, until the latter is brought to his knees by the failure of the Rebellion of 1715; and for this same reason the renewed attempts fomented in Spain and Sweden to shake the security of the Hanoverian dynasty, dictate, though they do not inspire, the hostilities undertaken against those countries.

There is not, in fact, very much to choose between the foreign policy of the two sections of British political opinion; but when we consider the attitude of the monarchs, then we do see a real difference. Nobody in reading the despatches of Stanhope and Craggs can fail to be impressed with the immense increase of attention paid to northern affairs under George I as compared with Queen Anne, and the sensitiveness of the King to any suggestion of a renunciation of Bremen and Verden. The adherents of the view that under George I the policy of this country was steered by the Hanoverian rudder may point to these features with legitimate satisfaction. But apart from the possibly inevitable fact that the man having the profoundest knowledge of any in Europe of the northern question should reflect his interests in the orders given to his ambassadors, the Protestant succession had to be paid for in terms of hostility to Charles XII and Peter the Great, for the accession of George I with all its blessings inevitably entailed these evils. Threatened therefore with trouble from both north and south in Europe, the Whig government had the same aims as the Tories, namely the security of peace on a permanent and equitable basis.

France on the other hand underwent a grave crisis in the conduct of her foreign affairs. Brought to her knees and then as by a miracle delivered, she was still under Louis XIV convinced of the expediency of her orthodox hostility to this country, and continued during the century to be at heart of that opinion. The prevalence of this belief among the majority of the French meant that the alliance of 1717 was, in the minds of both of the contracting parties, a device rather than a reality, and there can be little doubt that Orleans and Dubois, deflecting the policy of France from the natural channels along which public opinion would have sent it,

became profoundly unpopular. Even nowadays distinguished historians are urging that the Regent and his former tutor sacrificed the plain interests of the country to their own selfish designs. According to this view the English alliance was unnatural; it deflected France from her natural ally, Spain, an understanding with whom might have saved her from the humiliation of the treaty of 1717. Further, the English alliance wrecked the system of the French alliances in the north, and an understanding with Sweden, Prussia and Russia, rather than with England and Austria, would have secured advantageous terms for Sweden and averted the losses inflicted upon her by the Treaty of Nystad. Such a policy, it seems clear, would have involved the ruin of the ambitions of Orleans and Dubois, and in all probability that of the Treaty of Utrecht as well. Even if this be considered an advantage to France, it may well be doubted whether Huxelles, the chief advocate of this policy, had the ability to carry it through, and whether Peter the Great would have deliberately refused the opportunity that the death of Charles XII was bound to offer him to tear up any treaty guaranteeing Swedish territories. Moreover, it is not easy to see what advantage would have been gained under the circumstances in which Orleans was placed, by adherence to the old policy. Weakened by the war of the Spanish succession, France and Spain, even in alliance, would not have been secure against a revival of the coalition, nor, considering the ambitions of Philip V and the state of public opinion in France, would any agreement between the two powers have been a guarantee of the renunciations imposed at Utrecht. Any repudiation of those renunciations would infallibly have brought about a war, which France was in no position to wage. Peace was what France needed, and peace could only be obtained by maintaining the successions as dictated in 1713, and it may be said that whatever the secret motives of Orleans and Dubois may have been, they did give France peace and a chance of recuperation, which, if husbanded and developed, might well have restored her in the eighteenth century to the position she had held when Colbert served Louis XIV. The ruin of that prospect cannot be laid to their door, and the memorable feature of their achievement is that with French opinion almost wholly against them, they carried out the new policy, not indeed with complete consistency, but with a substantial amount of success and even with advantage to their country.

EARL OF PORTLAND

1697-1698

WILLIAM BENTINCK, Earl of Portland, the famous friend and confidant of William III, had already won his spurs as a diplomat, and in 1697 had been the chief instrument, together with Marshal Boufflers, whereby William III and Louis XIV had made what was virtually a separate agreement with regard to peace, behind the backs of William's allies. He was therefore not altogether an unknown quantity at Versailles when he arrived on a mission, the magnificence of which seems to have made the French court exaggerate its importance. Believing that Portland would have proposals to make with regard to the Spanish succession, Louis XIV delayed the departure of his own ambassador, the Marquis d'Harcourt, to Spain, pending Portland's arrival; but Portland carried no message, and as will be seen below, his instructions were purely formal. Indeed, his conduct was disappointing at first to Louis XIV, for he insisted on raising the question of James II's presence in France at his audience of presentation. While signifying his displeasure at the moment, Louis XIV soon after restored him to high, though only apparent, favour, and entrusted the negotiation of the affairs of Spain to his own ambassador at the court of St. James', Count Tallard, and nothing of any real importance passed through Portland's hands. (For further details of Portland's life, see *Dictionary of National Biography*.)

Copies of his correspondence during the embassy are stated to have been kept at Stanford Court, Worcestershire, in the 1st Report of the *Historical MSS. Commission*, 1870, p. 55, col. 1, and there is a letter from Vernon to Portland in the Bath Papers (*Hist. MSS. Comm.*), Vol. III, p. 187, which reveals the aridity of Portland's work in Paris. Other letters may be found in Grimblot,

Letters of William III and Louis XIV, Vol. I, p. 148 *et seq.*, and Vol. II, pp. 16-37.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR WILLIAM EARL OF PORTLAND, APPOINTED
AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY TO THE MOST CHRISTIAN KING.
Kensington, 30th December 1697.

(*P.R.O., State Papers, France, No. 152.*)

Having received these Instructions with your Letters of Credence you shall with all convenient speed repair to Paris or such other place, where the most Christian King shall keep his Court, and as soon as you are ready for it, you shall ask an Audience in Our Name, at which, having delivered your Credentials, you shall declare to him the great satisfaction We have in seeing the War which has afflicted Europe for so many years, brought to an end, and our earnest desire that the Peace may be durable and lasting. You shall more particularly acquaint him with the value and esteem We have for his person and friendship and how ready We shall always be to preserve and cultivate the good Correspondence so happily renewed between Us and Our Dominions.

You shall likewise desire audience of the Dauphin and deliver him Our Letter accompanying the same with a suitable compliment, which you shall likewise make in Our name to the rest of the Princes of the Blood, according to the Stile and practice of that Court, taking care at your audiences and on all other occasions to maintain Our Dignity, and that you be treated with all the honours and respects that are given to the Extraordinary Ambassadors of Spain and other crowned Heads.

You shall carefully observe the motions and intentions of that Court with respect to any Designs they may have against Us or Our Dominions, as well as against any other of their Neighbours; You shall observe their Inclinations in relation to the present State of affairs abroad, whether they are entering into any Leagues or Engagements with other Princes especially such as may be prejudicial to the Peace which is so happily established in Christendom.

You shall entertain a good Correspondence and Entercourse with the Ambassadors and Ministers of all princes and States in Amity with Us residing at the French Court, and particularly with those of the States General of the United Provinces.

You shall on all occasions protect and countenance Our Mer-

chants trading to any of the Territorys of the most Christian King, and use your endeavours to obtain relief for them upon any just Complaints they shall make to you, and to procure the restitution of such Priviledges and Immunitys as they formerly enjoyed.

Whereas Our Royal Uncle King Charles the Second did by Our¹ Order in Council bearing Date the 26th day of August 1668 direct his Ambassadors not to give the hand in their own houses to Envoys, in pursuance of what was practis'd by Ambassadors of other Princes, and the same having been ever since observed, We think fit to repeat this direction to you, not to give the hand to any Envoy in your own house.

Of all matters you shall be informed of during your Embassy, which may be of consequence and worthy Our knowledge, you shall constantly give an Account to Us by one of Our Principal Secretarys of State, from whom you shall receive such further Instructions and Directions as We shall think fit to send you, which you are to observe accordingly.

At your return from your Embassy We shall expect from you a particular account and Narrative of what hath happened remarkably in that Court during your continuance there, with relation to the Abilitys and Affections of the French Ministers, their Interests, mutual Correspondency and differences one with another, their Inclinations to Foreign Princes and States, together with all such other observations as you shall be able to make which may contribute to inform Us of the present Condition of that Government and Kingdom.

¹ *Sic.* In the register in *Foreign Entry Book* 199, p. 15, the reading is "an."

EARL OF JERSEY

1698-1699

EDWARD VILLIERS, Earl of Jersey, had been envoy at The Hague since 1695 and was one of the Plenipotentiaries at the Congress of Ryswick. As brother of the King's former mistress, Elizabeth Villiers, he seems to have stood higher in William's opinion than many of his contemporaries deemed to be his deserts. He was sent to succeed Portland, with instructions that were purely formal, and he does not appear to have been occupied during his embassy with anything more weighty than the routine work of the office. The vital negotiations on the matter of Spain continued to be conducted through the channel of Tallard. He left Paris in the middle of May 1699, and shortly after became Secretary of State to William III. (See also the *Dictionary of National Biography*.) Little or nothing of his correspondence during the embassy appears to have survived.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR EDWARD, EARL OF JERSEY, APPOINTED AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY TO THE MOST CHRISTIAN KING.
Kensington, 16th July 1698.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 199, p. 19.*)

[Purely formal, being a repetition of those given to Portland.]

EARL OF MANCHESTER

1699-1701

CHARLES MONTAGU, later created first Duke of Manchester, was transferred from Venice to Paris after the recall of Jersey. He also received the meagre formal instructions that had been given to his predecessors, and it cannot be said that his correspondence reveals any enhanced importance accruing to the British embassy in Paris. Most of it has been printed in Christian Cole, *Memoirs of Affairs of State*, 1735, p. 33 *et seq.*, from papers at Kimbolton Castle, and correspondence to him from the home Government may be found in Grimblot, Vol. II. He remained ambassador until the recognition of James Edward as King of England in October 1701, when he received orders to quit the court of France without taking leave. There is a notice of him in the *Dictionary of National Biography*.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR CHARLES, EARL OF MANCHESTER, APPOINTED
AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY TO THE MOST CHRISTIAN KING.
Kensington, 30th May 1699.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 199, p. 36.*)

[Purely formal, being a repetition of those given to Portland.]

EDWARD, EARL OF JERSEY, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO MANCHESTER.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 199, p. 125.*)

Whitehall April the 1st 1700.

. Your Lordship may continue to represent to the Court
of France the ill Consequences that a War in the North will produce,
And that We do not question but France will take the Methods

which will be properest to avoid these mischiefs, and which will contribute most effectually to the reestablishing a Peace in those parts. I have heard that Denmark is courting France; they will without doubt make them very large offers and promises, But we rest assured that his most Christian Majesty will prefer the Public good to any other Consideration whatsoever. As to the Squadron which is fitting out, it will require some time, so that the report of it will probably be sufficient to produce the effect We desire by this preparation.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 199, p. 160.*)

Hampton Court the 20 June 1700.

I have this evening laid before His Majesty Your Excellencies Letter of the 26th V.S. As to the Treaty made with the Duke of Lorraine, Monsieur Tallard has shown it to the King; His Majesty makes no Objection against it, provided that the Article in it which relates to the Prince de Vaudemont does take nothing from that Prince which was granted to him by the Treaty of Ryswick, and hereupon Count Tallard has promised to give any such further Declaration as His Majesty may think fitt. The King's Minister at the Hague will have Order to sign there with the Minister of Lorraine. It happens as well from what you write, as from what Mons^r Tallard says, that the 9th Article is the only hard point which remains with the Emperor¹; the Suppressing the Article entirely will meet with its Difficulties: however if every thing Else be agreed to by the Emperor, the King does consent that the Partage allotted to the ArchDuke may go to a Person who may be King of the Romans, or Emperor, in case the ArchDuke dyes without Children, and that there remains no other heir Male of the family.

Monsieur Tallard has promised to bring me an Article drawn up on this Subject, and it being immediately the concern of the French, the management of it is to be left to them; His Majesties' Consent is only necessary when he shal hear in what manner it is proposed. In the mean time I send you His Majesties opinion for your own private information.

¹ See H. Vast, *Les grands traités . . . de Louis XIV*, Paris, 1899, Vol. III, p. 8, for this and other clauses of the partition treaty of The Hague of Oct. 11, 1698.

Monsieur Tallard has shown us here the Conditions upon which Portugal would come into the Treaty. Since you have not these conditions I must discourse upon them with him here; I will only tell you that the King will not consent that Portugal shal have a Voice in the naming a Prince to enjoy the Partage assigned to the Archduke in case that Prince does not accept of it.

Your Lordship may tell Monsieur de Torcy, that his Majesty will give Order to Monsieur d'Herverte to do what he can privately that the Suisse may hinder the Emperors Troops from passing thro' their Country, in case of a War upon occasion of the Treaty.

As to the affair of the North, the King is very Willing to enter into the Mediation conjointly with France, provided his doing so may not interfere with the Guaranty of Altena, in which his Majesty is already engaged.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR CHARLES, EARL OF MANCHESTER, AMBASSADOR
EXTRAORDINARY IN FRANCE. Kensington, 16th January
1700/1.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 199, p. 175.*)

Whereas the States Generall of the United Provinces being pressed to declare themselves whether they would acknowledge the Duke of Anjou for King of Spaine, have thought fitt to come to a previous Resolution; That they ought first to be satisfied how the Peace and Tranquility of Europe shall be preserved, and have accordingly directed their Minister at Paris to propose in their Name That a Negotiation may be set on foot for this purpose; We have likewise thought fitt upon this Occasion to signify Our Pleasure to You, that You enform Your Selfe from the Dutch Ambassador what Answer is, or shall be, given to the said Proposall; And if it be such as shews an Inclination in that Court to Comply with the same, You are then to second the said Proposall in Our Name; but in case no direct and satisfactory Answer be given, Or that You find they are like to Insist that the Acknowledging the Duke of Anjou should precede any such Negotiation, You are then to forbear making any Instances from Us in this matter untill Our further Order.

DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH VISCOUNT TOWNSHEND

1709-10

IN March 1709 conferences were begun between the Dutch and their allies' representatives at The Hague, and President Rouillé, whom Louis XIV, greatly pressed by the results of the hard winter of 1709 and the failure of the Turks to promise a diversion in the East, had sent to negotiate a peace. On the English side there were nominated the Duke of Marlborough and the British ambassador in Holland, Viscount Townshend. At the beginning of May, the French Secretary of State, Torcy, came in person and granted practically all the extensive demands of the allies, except Alsace, though he was empowered to cede Strassburg, and the demands with regard to Philip V. The demands of the allies were drawn up in a document which was presented to Torcy on May 27 and bears the name of the "Preliminaries," although ultimatum would be a more appropriate term. The chief stumbling-block undoubtedly was the 37th article which demanded that Louis XIV, in the event of Philip V refusing to abandon the throne of Spain, should assist the allies in dethroning his grandson. Full accounts of these negotiations will be found in Torcy's *Mémoires*, Vol. II ; Klopp, Vol. XIII, pp. 215-44 ; Legrelle, Vol. IV, 470-98. The instructions here printed throw light on the aims of the Whig government, and display something of the mood in which the breakdown of the negotiations was received by the British statesmen.

INSTRUCTIONS TO JOHN DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH, AND CHARLES
VISCOUNT TOWNSHEND, APPOINTED AMBASSADORS EXTRA-

ORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY FOR ADJUSTING AND CONCLUDING A TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE STATES GENERAL FOR SECURING THE SUCCESSION TO THE CROWN OF GREAT BRITAIN IN THE PROTESTANT LINE AND SETTLING A SUFFICIENT BARRIER FOR HOLLAND, AND ALSO FOR AGREEING ON OTHER MATTERS AND THINGS RELATING TO A GENERAL PEACE.

St. James's 2nd May 1709.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 75, fo. 6v.*)

Whereas by Our particular Instructions to you John Duke of Marlborough bearing date the 21st day of March 1708/9, you were among other things to declare to the Pensionary of Holland, and such others of the States General as you should judge proper for Our service, that it was Our opinion that no Negotiation of Peace should be entred upon with France till the preliminaries were first adjusted between Us and the States General, in pursuance of which We did set forth several matters of the highest consequence to Us and Our Realms, and did insist that they should be agreed to as preliminaries previous to any treaty of peace; and at the same time you the said John Duke of Marlborough were directed in Our name to represent to the Pensionary and other Members of the States as might be proper how desirous We were that such further preliminaries should be adjusted, as should be requisite for the security and interest of the States, and as far as was possible of the rest of the Allys; and particularly you were to propose that without loss of time a sufficient Barrier for Holland should be settled, for the maintaining of which We were willing to become guarantee, not doubting in like manner but that the States would be guarantees to the succession to the Crown of Great Britain in the Protestant line; and these Our Instructions having been communicated to the Pensionary and some others of the States, and they having sent over a project of a Treaty for the security of the said succession, and also for securing a sufficient Barrier for Holland Which We having considered and agreed to with such alterations as are reasonable, We cannot doubt but they will give satisfaction, and are firmly perswaded that this Treaty, so desirable for the mutual interest of both nations, will be speedily concluded. You therefore the said John Duke of Marlborough, and Charles Viscount Towns-

hend, as soon as you have received these Our Instructions, are to repair with all possible diligence to the Hague, And upon your arrival there you are to communicate to the Pensionary and such others as may be convenient and necessary, how farr We have concurred with the project lately sent over by agreeing to a sufficient Barrier and providing for the interest and security of Our own and the Dominions of the States General.

And for the greater extent and strength of the intended Barrier, you are likewise hereby directed to insist that the towns and forts of Furnes, Knoque, Ipres, Menin, Lille, Tournay, Condé, Valenciennes, and Maubeuge be at a Treaty of Peace yielded up and delivered by France to Charles the Third King of Spain to be garrison'd in such manner as shall be agreed on by the Treaty concerning the said barrier to be forthwith made and concluded between Us and the States General.

And as in Our former Instructions to you John Duke of Marlborough, We thought it absolutely necessary that it should be made known to the French that in case the necessary preliminaries for the speedy conclusion of a peace were not agreed to before the opening of the Campaign, the Allys would take themselves to be at liberty to insist upon such further preliminaries as they should judge proper for their interest and greater security; So we do at present think it of the highest consequence in this critical conjuncture to haue it understood and resolved that in case the French do agree to the preliminaries demanded, there should be no cessation of arms till the Allys be fully satisfyed that the preliminaries so agreed to will be made good to them.

And as Our only view and aim during this just Warr has been to settle peace as soon as it could be obtained on safe and honourable terms; and as we do not apprehend that any of Our allys will be desirous of it upon any other conditions, so we are perswaded that nothing can more effectually conduce towards rendring the same good, firm and lasting, than that a grand alliance should be renewed before the general peace be concluded, and that all the allys should become mutual guarantees to one another of the several and respective conditions of the said Peace. You are therefore to make known our opinion in this matter to our said allys, and move them to consent to the speedy renewal of a Grand Alliance before any peace with France be concluded, in order to the preserving and securing in the best and strongest manner by a general and particular guar-

anty the great advantages of a well settled peace, and at the same time preventing and disappointing all intrigues and designs of the enemy for disuniting the present good correspondence among the confederates.

And as We think Our selves obliged to exert our zeal on all proper occasions in behalf of the Protestant religion, and as the sufferings and hardships of the French Protestants do particularly move Our Royal care and consideration, so We do hereby direct you to use your utmost indeavours in favour of the said French Protestants that they may be effectually restored to their Religious and Civil rights.

And you are further to indeavour by all possible means that an advantageous Treaty of Commerce between Us and France be set on foot and concluded, as soon as the nature of such an affair will admit, and pursuant to such particular Instructions as you shall receive from Us from time to time for that purpose. And although We have not thought fit to insert among Our Preliminarys mentioned in the Project of the Treaty about the Barrier any thing but what concerns the mutual safety of Our Dominions and those of the States General, Yet you are to give the Pensionary and such others of the States as shall be thought proper, to understand that We think Our just right to Newfoundland and Hudson's Bay to be of so great and necessary importance to Us and Our Realms that We cannot give Our consent to a Peace unless the aforesaid countrys and places be agreed to be restored to Us.

You shall from time to time communicate to the Pensionary and such other persons as may be proper, such part of these Our Instructions, and of all others which you may hereafter receive, as may be convenient for Our Service, and tend to the promoting the negotiations you are employed in.

You are likewise from time to time to observe and follow such further instructions and directions as you shall receive from Us or one of Our Principal Secretarys of State, with whom you are constantly to correspond and give us an account by him of all your proceedings in these important affairs; and of all other material occurrences, which may come to your knowledge during the course of this your Employment for Our service abroad.

PRIVATE AND ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS TO JOHN DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH AND TO CHARLES VISCOUNT TOWNSHEND, APPOINTED AMBASSADORS EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARYS [&c.].
St. James's 2nd May 1709.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 75, fo. 9.*)

Whereas it is expected that several towns now belonging to and in the hands of France should be given up and yielded by the Treaty of Peace, to be garrisoned by the forces of the States General for the security of their Barrier ; if therefore the revenues of such towns, their dependencys and territorys so delivered up and garrisoned, be not found sufficient to answer the necessary expenses to be made for that service ; in such case you have liberty to consent to the adding such further summ or summs, as shall be thought requisite and reasonable for that purpose, out of the incomes and revenues arising in general from the Spanish Low Countryrs.

HENRY BOYLE, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO MARLBOROUGH AND TOWNSHEND.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 75, fo. 19.*)

Whitehall 18th May 1709.

Last Sunday night I had the honour to lay before the Queen at the Cabinet Councill your Excellencys letters of the 19th and 21st instant, and am commanded to acquaint you with her Majesty's great satisfaction at the concurrence you have met with from the Ministers of the States, and particularly from the Pensionary, to joyn with you in making such demands to Monsieur de Torcy on the part of Great Britain, as her Majesty has thought absolutely necessary for the security and advantage of herself and her people. Her Majesty is very well pleased that you have insisted that the restoring of Newfoundland and Hudsons Bay should be an Article in the Preliminariys. But She hopes it is understood that the whole Island of Newfoundland should be given up, and the Islands belonging to it, and that it be agreed that Placentia be put into the possession of the English as soon as possible. The condition expected by Monsieur de Torcy upon this head, that we should restore what we may have taken from the French during this warr in the West Indies is thought to want some explanation. Hitherto we have not been very fortunante in those parts, but if her Majesty's arms should prove successfull in the present expedition, her Majesty

will very unwillingly consent to forego the advantages She shall have obtained. As to the matter of Hudson's Bay, it is very true that the damages the subjects of England sustained by the piratical expeditions of the French in 1682 and 1683 are matters of account as well as what the Company suffered in 1686, but it is as clear that the Crown of England has an undoubted right of title to the whole Bay and Streights of Hudson ; and therefore her Majesty can never relinquish that claim, and does not doubt but your Excellencys will take the proper measures to obtain immediate satisfaction in that particular and not suffer it to be postponed till the General Treaty. The Queen thinks it proper that it be made known to the French Ministers at the first opportunity that her Majesty will not own or countenance the Pretender so farr as to allow him a support out of the revenue of this Kingdome, but leaves it to the French King, when he has removed him out of his dominions, to do in it as he shall think fit.

I transmit to your Excellencys by the Queen's order the inclosed Memorial of Count Briançon, and am to acquaint you that her Majesty thinks herself every way engaged to support his R.H. pretensions to a sufficient Barrier for the security both of Piedmont and Savoy ; and her Majesty hopes that they will be agreed to as a preliminary, and that the States will joyn with your Excellencys in making that demand.

The inclosed Memorial of Monsieur Spanheim in favour of the French Protestants I am likewise ordered to transmit to your Excellencys, but as her Majesty has already expressed her compassion for those distressed people, and given you the necessary directions on their behalf, She does not doubt but that you will pursue your Instructions in that particular with all imaginable zeal.

I must add that if the Negotiations now on foot should advance so farr by the concessions of France that a cessation of arms should be under consideration, and that the French were willing to give up cautionary towns as a security for the performance of what they shall have agreed to as Preliminaries to a General Peace, in that case her Majesty thinks it for her interest that among others some considerable maritime towns both in Spain and France be put into the hands of the Allys at the same time, but even such a security is not thought here of equal advantage to the allys in this juncture at their taking the field.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 75, fo. 21.*)

Whitehall 24th May 1709.

..... The Queen is extremely pleased that such a foundation is laid for a general and lasting Peace. And though the restoring of Hudson's Bay is not an Article among the preliminaries, yet her Majesty's right to it is so evident and so fully set forth in the petition of that Company, and expressed in the report and resolution annexed to it made in the year 1687, that her Majesty will insist at the Treaty of Peace that this Kingdome have full satisfaction in that demand, and that all the places and Colonys possessed by the French in the Bay and Streights of Hudson be delivered up to the English.

Her Majesty is likewise very intent that the Duke of Savoy should have full satisfaction at the ensuing peace, and will expect that for the sake of his Allies, as well as his own security, the Barrier he demands in his Ministers Memorial, which I had the honour to transmit to your Excellencys in my letter of the 18th, be made good to him; and it is very much to be wished that the States may be induced warmly to espouse his R. H. interest in conjunction with your Excellencys and not to consent to the conclusion of the peace till the aforesaid Barrier be agreed to. Count Briançon was acquainted with these her Majesty's sentiments in relation to his Master this morning at a meeting of the Lords.

As soon as the French have signed the preliminary Treaty, it is supposed they will make no difficulty to send orders to Newfoundland to give up the possession of what they hold there to such persons as shall be authorized by the Queen to receive it, and it is thought they should be pressed upon this point as soon as possible and that notice should be sent over here of the time appointed for their leaving that Island.

As there should be no time lost after this Treaty is signed in demolishing the fortifications and ruining the Harbour of Dunkirk, so her Majesty thinks it very necessary that your Grace should appoint some proper persons, and that the States should do the same, to repair to Dunkirk, and be present at the execution of the Treaty, and see that it be performed to the satisfaction of her Majesty and the States.

Some Merchants applied to the Lords to-day to procure a cessation of arms at sea as soon as hostilitys should cease at land. They were told your Excellencys should be acquainted with their pro-

posal; at the same time I am ordered to inform your Excellency that it is apprehended that such an armistice as is desired might give the enemy an opportunity to recruit themselves with corn before the execution of the Preliminary Treaty were farr advanced.

HENRY BOYLE, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO MARLBOROUGH.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 75, fo. 22 v.*)

Whitehall 31st May 1709.¹

This afternoon I received the honour of your Grace's and my Lord Townshend's letters of the 7th and 8th of June giving an account of the French King's refusal to sign the preliminary Treaty, and what has since passed at the Hague upon it. I have laid those letters before the Queen at the Cabinet Councill, and am commanded to acquaint your Grace with her Majesty's great satisfaction at the firmness the States have shown upon this occasion; and her Majesty would have them informed how much she approves their resolution, and how ready her Majesty is to joyn with them in any measures that may express her resentment at this late treatment from France. To this end her Majesty is of opinion that it should be declared that the Aliys are no longer bound by the Preliminary Treaty, and are at liberty to make what new demands they shall think proper, whenever the negotiations are to be renewed again. It is supposed that before this time Monsieur Rouille has left the Hague, otherwise her Majesty thinks it proper he should be sent away. These proceedings of the French have put the Expedition that was first intended for the West Indies, and since to go to Cadiz, under great uncertainty.

HENRY BOYLE, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO TOWNSHEND.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 75, fo. 23.*)

Whitehall 3rd June 1709.

. I acquainted your Excellency in my letter of May 31st how much her Majesty approved the resentment the States expressed at the late proceedings of the Court of France in refusing to sign the Preliminary Treaty, which Monsieur de Torcy had made them expect would be agreed to. And it is no small satisfaction to hear how great a spirit it has raised among all sorts of people in Holland, and therefore her Majesty is confirmed in her opinion

¹ A duplicate was sent separately to Townshend.

that a Declaration should be made on the part of the Allys that they take themselves to be no longer bound by the Preliminary Treaty, unless it be ratified by the French King before the 15th of June N.S. for it is plain that the chief aim of the French at present is delay, and keeping a Negotiation on foot at a time when her Majesty does agree with the States that the warr ought to be carried on with greater vigour if possible than ever.

It is very probable that you may hear from Monsieur de Rouille again very soon with the offer of some expedient relating to the 37th Article, and very likely it will be the proposal of Monsieur Petkum mentioned in your letter of the 8th of June, that France should oblige itself at the expiration of the two months in order to continue the armistice, to deliver up to the Allys the towns of Valenciennes, Thionville and Cambray, as a further caution or security, till the Spanish monarchy be wholly evacuated. This expedient is thought here very insufficient, and indeed no cautionary towns are of much significancy in this case, unless such as are maritime, and essential towards reducing Spain by force. It seems very plain that the French King does not intend to give up the whole Spanish Monarchy, and that is the bottom of almost all the chicanes that have been made upon other points; and therefore it ought to be very well considered before the cessation of arms be continued beyond the time stipulated in the Treaty; since the apprehension of hostilitys being renewed at the end of two months is like to be the strongest tie upon the French to act sincerely in evacuating the Spanish Monarchy. However if any Expedients are offered by France upon this point, which is of so great concern to the interest of Great Britain, Her Majesty will expect that they be sent over to her with all dispatch, and then your Excellency will receive her Majesty's further directions.

[In the winter of 1709-10 the conferences were resumed at Gertruydenberg, but neither Marlborough nor Townshend were present, the conduct of the negotiations being abandoned, not without qualms, to the Dutch. No agreement could be reached on the vexed question of what should be done if Philip refused to leave Spain. As will be seen, considerable jealousy was displayed towards the Dutch by the Whig Ministry, which continued to urge that stringent conditions should be imposed on the French, and suspected the Dutch of sacrificing British interests in order to

obtain a peace satisfactory to themselves. In the summer, the gradual revolution in the ministry at home, led to further ill-feeling and suspicion between the allies, a suspicion that was not allayed by the events of the year 1711.]

(*Foreign Entry Books 77, fo. 2 v.*)

Whitehall 10th Jan^{ry} 1710.¹

On Sunday I received the favour of your Excellency's letter of the 14th, and yesterday that of the 17th; by the first you were pleased to send me the French King's last proposal for peace as transmitted to Petkum by Monsieur de Torcy;² and in the latter is contained the answer which the Pensionary thought proper to be made to the said proposal. The Queen very well approves of the opposition you made to the last part of the answer, by which

the States do consent to enter into a pour-parler desired parler for settling an Expedient in relation to about an Exped^t. the 37th Article of the Preliminary Treaty, for 37th Article. in case the French King will give authentick assurances of signing all the other Articles, without any other alteration but that which is become necessary by the terms being elapsed, which were fixed in them for the execution of the several particulars. To this your Excellency urged with a great deal of weight that the 37th Article being the great security for the execution of the main point in the Treaty, there was at least as much reason to insist upon having the expedient for that Article settled previously to the admitting any Minister from France, as there was to have the other Articles signed. And without doubt, as your Excellency observes, since we have so often declared that we would not enter into any conference with the French till the expedient should be first agreed upon, to recede from that Declaration now, would only encourage the enemy to expect further concessions. It is a great concern to her Majesty to observe that our enemies gain ground in the negotiations, though they continue to lose it in the field, and it is to be feared that the New Proposal of Peace worse than the former. most solemn Declarations of the States will be but little depended upon for the future, since they are so lyable to change without any visible reason for that alteration. On the

¹ i.e., 1709 O.S.

² See G. de Lamberty, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire du XVIII^e siècle* Vol. VI. The Hague, 1728, p. 3.

contrary the proposal sent by your Excellency in your letter of the 14th, is so much worse than the answer brought by Petkum, as it contains a demand that the late Electors of Cologne and Bavaria be restored to their dominions, and also the substance of the 4th Article of the Preliminary Treaty, which is so essential, is omitted in this Proposal, as well as the most material part of that Article, which concerns her Majesty's security against the Pretender. The French cannot fail to reap great advantages from the Conferences propos'd to be had with any Minister they shall appoint and the Ministers of the Allys; they will use all their artifices to disunite the members of the Confederacy, and increase the coldness and jealousy that appears but too much among some of them already. And after all, when such a Congress is settled, we are not at all nearer a good Peace, since the French will have it in their power to retard or conclude the Treaty, or the execution of it, as shall best suit with their interest. And I must further take notice to your Excellency that the first part of the Pensionary's answer, which is the only reason and ground pretended for admitting of the pourparler, is very uncertain, since it is mentioned that the French King should give authentick assurances of signing all the Articles in the Preliminary Treaty, except the 37th. It is not very well understood here, what is meant by authentick assurances of his signing, and whether by those words without any further explanation of them, the French may not expect to renew the Conferences without being really any more tyed to the performance of the Preliminary Treaty, than to the 37th Article. But that which is most extraordinary in all this proceeding, and which gives her Majesty very just reason of complaint, is, that the States should return States answer an answer of this nature, and of this consequence not liked. and so very different from their late resolution which they had communicated to all the allys and which was so well received and applauded by them, without the participation and concurrence of her Majesty, which might have been had in a very little time. The Queen does therefore require your Excellency to lay this whole matter before the Pensionary in the most proper and effectual manner, that her Majesty may receive full assurance for the future, that no essential steps shall be made towards a peace, without her Majesty's concurrence, who is so much concerned in the consequence of such proceedings and who as heartily intends the speedy conclusion of an honourable and lasting Peace as the States can desire.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 77, fo. 14 v.*)

Whitehall 14th Feb^r 1709/10.

..... Since I wrote this I have received the favour of your Excellency's letter of the 21st, which was laid before the Queen this evening at the Cabinet Council. The granting of the passports for the French Ministers seems to have been unavoidable since the French King's Declaration concerning the preliminaries as expressed in Monsieur de Torcy's letter is conformable to what was required in that which Petkum wrote with the approbation of the States. Her Majesty thought that whole letter very loose, and the proposal contained in it very uncertainly expressed, but as it was sent away before her Majesty could be informed of the contents of it, there was no remedy. The Queen does not doubt but that you will repair to Moerdyk at the time appointed, and that you will be very watchfull while the French Ministers are among you that no Conferences be held but in your presence. The negotiations about the 37th Article ought to be as short as possible, and it is very probable that the French will affect delay and gaining of time as much as they can; but it is the business and interest of the Allys to press a speedy conclusion of these pourparlers that the whole Preliminary Treaty may be signed without loss of time, and be putting in execution in the manner intended last year. In relation to the 37th Article, her Majesty expects that if any Expedient is entertained that shall be insufficient for the recovery of the Spanish Monarchy, you should send her an account of it by express before it be agreed to. I have only orders to add upon this head at present that her Majesty would have you press the States very earnestly to hasten their preparations for an early Campaign, since it is very probable that one of the views the French have in renewing the negotiations, is the hopes of putting us backward in our measures for a vigorous prosecution of the Warr.

HENRY BOYLE, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO MARLEBOROUGH AND TOWNSHEND.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 77, fo. 20.*)

Whitehall 28th Feb^r 1709/10.

I have received the favour of my Lord Townshend's letters of the 4th and 7th of March, both which have been laid before the Queen, who is very well satisfied with his Excellency's reasons

for not going to the Conferences at Gertruydenburg, notwithstanding his former orders, which were sent before it was known here upon what foot the States Deputys were to go, and what instructions they would carry with them. But since they are so restrained, and that his Lordship has had such full assurances from those Deputys that they would not only comply with their instructions, but likewise not give the least encouragement to any proposal that should be made on the part of France inconsistent with the Preliminaries; and since the Pensionary, as well as those gentlemen, has declared that the States would not agree to any expedient proposed, without the Queen's participation and concurrence, her Majesty thinks that affair is in a right situation, and that your Excellency's presence will be more necessary at the Hague to influence the measures and resolutions that may be taken there.

The Hudson's Bay Company have deputed two of their Members, who are already gone for Holland, to attend the negotiations of Peace in order to promote their interest and pretensions. I send your Excellency a copy of their petition by her Majesty's Order, as also the Report of the Council of Trade which I mentioned in my last.

(P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 77, fo. 21 v.)

Whitehall 7th March 1709/10.

I have laid before her Majesty at the Committee of Council your Excellency's letter of the 12th giving an account of the Conferences held at Gertruydenberg between the French Ambassadors and the Deputys of the States, by which it appears probable that the French King will offer to conclude the Peace upon our terms, provided that Sicily be yielded to the Duke of Anjou; and as your Excellencies are of opinion, that the inclinations of the States seem very plain and positive for putting an end to the War at once by giving something to the Duke of Anjou, and as you are desirous to receive her Majesty's positive Orders for your guidance in a matter of so great consequence, I am ordered to acquaint your Excellencies that her Majesty will expect some authentick offers from France, and that sufficient security be given for the Duke of Anjou's acquiescing in them, before she will signify her pleasure upon this matter. For if her Majesty should think it proper to communicate to her Parliament any alterations that may be proposed relating to the Peace different from the Addresses of both

Houses and her Majesty's Declarations upon them, it would be impossible to determine any thing in that point till the opinion of the Parliament be known, and it would be of dangerous consequence to bring the matter there with an expectation of the Houses' receding from any part of their former Addresses till there be some certainty that such a step would immediately procure a General Peace. Her Majesty does therefore think it reasonable and what she ought to expect, that when any expedient is offered by France to obviate the difficultys that have hitherto retarded the conclusion of the Peace, if it be such as the States shall judge to be reasonable and a sufficient security for the Allys to accept of, such proposal be immediately sent over here that her Majesty may take her measures upon it.

HENRY BOYLE, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO TOWNSHEND.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 77, fo. 41.*)

Whitehall 30th May 1710.

The French Ambassadors at Gertruydenberg still insisting at the last Conference upon a guaranty against the ulterior demands that may be made on the part of the Allys, the Ministers of Portugal and Savoy are apprehensive that their masters may be precluded from their just pretensions, if such a Proposal were agreed to, as you will see by the inclosed Memorials which I am ordered to transmit to your Excellency, that all due care may be taken for the satisfaction of those Princes.

Your Excellency cannot but be sensible that such a Guaranty in the utmost extent would be equally prejudicial to the interest of this Kingdome, and would debarr her Majesty from making her claim to the Islands and Banks belonging to Newfoundland, to the Restitution of Hudson's Bay, and to our keeping possession of the whole Island of St. Christopher ; besides, we should thereby be foreclosed from having redress upon several encroachments made by the French in those parts, which are particularly taken notice of in the Report of the Councill of Trade of the 2nd of June 1709. And if such a stipulation were made, we should be deprived of the future advantages which we might reasonably expect from the superior strength of Her Majesty's subjects in those parts both by sea and land. Whatever the French may mean by making such a proposal, I hope there is no reason to suspect that the States can

ever close with France upon terms so destructive to the interest of all their Allys; and her Majesty intirely depends upon their promise mentioned in your Excellency's letter of the 1st of November last, that at the renewal of the Negotiations of Peace, they would use their hearty endeavours that France should renounce their right to that part of St. Christophers, they formerly possessed and make an entire restitution of Hudson's Bay. Besides, upon your Excellency's declining to go to the Conferences at Gertruydenberg, Mrs. Buys and Vanderdussen promised that they would not give the least encouragement to any proposal that should be made on the part of France inconsistent with the Preliminary Treaty, and the Pensionary engaged as well as those Deputys that no new Expedient should be agreed to by the States without the participation and concurrence of her Majesty. I wish the negotiations of peace were come to that maturity and the foundations of it so well laid, that there was nothing remaining to be adjusted but the pretensions of the allys beyond what is contained in the Preliminaries. When that time comes her Majesty depends upon it that your Excellency will take all possible care of the General Interest and Trade of the Kingdome, and will particularly insist that her Majesty and her subjects have full satisfaction in their several demands in the West Indies.

The difference of time and the alteration of circumstances make it absolutely necessary to new model some parts of the Preliminary Treaty; and since her Majesty and the nation have been at so great an expence in carrying on the warr from that time, and making many considerable conquests upon the enemy, she thinks she is in right to expect that at least the Islands and Banks belonging to Newfoundland, concerning which your Excellency has here a late Representation of the Councill of Trade, that part of St. Christophers the French formerly possessed, and the whole Bay and Streights of Hudson be yielded to the Crown of England, and comprised in a new draught of Preliminary Articles.

This seems the more necessary because it is much to be doubted that all or most of the pretensions of the postponed to a General Treaty,¹ will run great hazard of being laid aside by the impatience of the States to conclude and sign the Peace, when all that concerns

¹ The text is reproduced as written. Presumably the sentence should run somewhat as follows: "the pretensions of the Crown of England, if they should be postponed."

their interest and security is comprehended in the preliminaries. It is left to your Excellency's discretion how farr you will enter into a discourse of this nature with the Pensionary and whether it may not be proper to desire him to explain in what method he proposes a Treaty of Peace should be carryed on, when the French come to make any offers that shew more sincerity towards concluding the present Warr in all parts than they have done by the proposals they have hitherto made.

MATTHEW PRIOR

1711

MATTHEW PRIOR, the poet, who had been secretary to the embassies of Portland, Jersey and Manchester, and had been sent on a secret mission to Paris in November 1700, was employed by the Tory ministry, on account of his knowledge of the French court, to open direct negotiations with France in July 1711. The whole mission was wrapped in great mystery, and the only instructions Prior received was this famous "power" or credential, undated, and "in three lines." Prior was not authorised to negotiate or conclude any agreement, but an account of his proceedings written by him may be found in *Hist. MSS. Comm.* Portland Papers, Vol. V, pp. 34-41, while another report, written by Torcy, has been printed in *English Historical Review*, July 1914, pp. 525-32, from the *Archives des Affaires Etrangères, Angleterre*, Vol. 233, fo. 43 *et seq.* Prior returned in August to England, accompanied by a French agent, Nicolas Mesnager, who negotiated the preliminaries of London, which were signed on Sept. 27, 1711.

(*P.R.O., Treaty Papers, 15.*)

Anne R.

Le sieur Prior est pleinement instruit et autorisé de communiquer à la France nos demandes Preliminaries, et de nous en rapporter la reponse. A. R.

VISCOUNT BOLINGBROKE
MATTHEW PRIOR
1712

HENRY ST. JOHN, Viscount Bolingbroke, Secretary of State, was sent in August 1712 to prepare and approach as near as possible to a conclusive agreement with France and Spain. Difficulties having arisen in the negotiations for peace, he was to discover the ultimate terms of the French, to renew the armistice concluded between Britain and France in May, to secure Sicily and a Barrier for Savoy, restore the Elector of Bavaria, who was to receive Sardinia as a *douceur* for his misfortunes, and after agreement, fix a time by which the general peace is to be signed by all the Allies, failing which Great Britain would make peace on her own terms with France and Spain. The essential part of his mission was accomplished, when, on August 22, he signed the treaty agreed on August 19 giving Savoy its security, and a suspension of arms by land and sea. On September 7 he returned to England, leaving Prior, who had accompanied him, in Paris.

INSTRUCTIONS TO HENRY, VISCOUNT BOLINGBROKE, appointed to go to the COURT OF FRANCE. Windsor, 31st July 1712.

[Printed in *Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, London, 1715, Appendix, p. 63.]

WILLIAM, EARL OF DARTMOUTH, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO PRIOR.
(*P.R.O.*, *Foreign Entry Book* 25, p. 234.)

Whitehall 27 August 1712.

. To remove all difficultys which the Court of Madrid may raise on that occasion, care will be taken to avoid the naming

of the Duke of Anjou, for the preamble will run only thus: *Cum Rex Christianissimus conditiones quasdam ex parte Hispaniæ peragendas promiserit, and quæ ad Hispaniam spectant &c.* When the renunciation is over and approved by the Cortes in the manner agreed, and that the Duke of Anjou likewise gives assurances he will perform all the conditions stipulated by his Grandfather in his behalf, my Lord Lexington will acknowledge him for King of Spain and the Indies with an &c^a, which I suppose are all the titles hee values or desires. However it is convenient you should know the sentiments of the French Court upon these points as soon as possible, that the course of his Lordship's negociation may not be interrupted by disputes in matters of form when we are agreed upon the Essential; My Lord is likewise directed to insist that the King of Spain when acknowledged as such, shall himself acknowledge the Protestant Succession in the House of Hanover exclusively of the Pretender as France has done, and grant an Amnesty to all Spaniards in General who adher'd to the Emperor, particularly the Catalans, the former of these two demands her Majesty will not upon any conditions whatsoever depart from, and it is what she conceives to have been the sence of the Court of France as well as her own. The latter has already been consented to by the French King.

WILLIAM, EARL OF DARTMOUTH, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO PRIOR.
(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 25, p. 251.*)

Whitehall 25 Sept^r. 1712.

. The Arguments Mons^r. Torcy has furnished you with against naming persons who shall succeed to the Crown of France in case of the death of the Dauphin have been duly considered, yet none of 'em are of that weight with the Queen as to encline her to recede in the least from that point which she looks upon as the most essential part of the renunciation Act. As to the first objection, *That Philip a foreign Prince does actually take upon him &c^a.* it admits of a very clear answer, viz^t. That Philip is not a foreign Prince, at least does not appear in that capacity in this Act, which he executes only in quality of a Prince of the blood of France so nearly allied to the Crown that it is thought necessary for the repose of Europe that he should disclaim any pretensions, nor can the second objection have any more force than the former, when you shall reflect that by the general words which follow, he yields his right to

all others the most remote branches of the Bourbon line. King Philip cannot be said to nominate Successors to the Crown of France when he only resigns to the next in blood the right they would naturally have in case he and his posterity were extinguished. The Court of France is engaged to give the Queen full satisfaction in it ; her Majesty declares this to be the satisfaction she desires ; and her Council are unanimous in their opinions that we ought not to depart from it.

BISHOP OF BRISTOL
EARL OF STRAFFORD
1712-13

OF Bishop Robinson it is unnecessary to say much here. It is enough to refer the reader to the account of him which is to be found in Mr. Chance's *Diplomatic Instructions, Sweden, 1689-1727*, and to the *Dictionary of National Biography*. In spite, however, of his long career, it had not originally been intended that he should serve as plenipotentiary, for that honour was reserved for Prior, as a reward for his services in connexion with the Preliminaries of London. Lord Strafford, however, who according to Swift was "as proud as hell," refused to serve with a man of Prior's mean birth, and Robinson was sent instead.

Strafford, an account of whom may be found in the *Dictionary of National Biography*, was chosen plenipotentiary as he was ambassador at The Hague, and his Tory propensities made him acceptable to the ministry. In January 1712, therefore, he and Robinson obtained their instructions for the Congress, and these may be seen in the *Report of the Committee of Secrecy*, App. pp. 18-23, dated December 23rd 1711.

The instructions here printed, dated a year later, illustrate the gradual development of the ill-feeling of the British government towards the Dutch, and though referring primarily to Anglo-Dutch relations, are so intimately bound up with the fortunes of France that it has been thought of advantage to print them here.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR JOHN BISHOP OF BRISTOL KEEPER OF THE PRIVY
SEAL AND THOMAS EARL OF STRAFFORD AMBASSADOR EXTRA-
ORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY TO THE STATES GENERAL

OF THE UNITED PROVINCES OF THE LOW COUNTRY, PLENIPOTENTIARYS FOR THE TREATY OF A GENERAL PEACE.
Windsor, 11th November, 1712.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 26, fo. 56.*)

As soon as you Thomas Earl of Strafford shall be returned into Holland, whither you are to repair with all possible diligence, you are in Our name to let the Ministers of the States General know that the Overture made by them for entring into the measures of the Peace contains one point which as they have been already informed We are under engagements contrary to, and some others, which will at present meet with difficultys perhaps insuperable, however easily they might once have been obtained. At least they will occasion greater delay than we can, for many reasons in the present circumstances of affairs, permit. You will represent to those Ministers in plain but friendly terms, how many evil consequences have flowed from their Irresolution and you will earnestly intreat them to fix in some proposition reasonable in itself and even at this time of day possible to be obtained.

Having in Our Name made this general answer to what has been lately communicated to Us in the name of the States ; you are in your own name to say that you can give them particular and certain assurances that Wee shall insist upon and obtain the cession of Tournay by France in order to fortify their barrier with the addition of so important a place ; but you will add that as you know this to be at present Our firm intention, so you likewise think yourself obliged to inform them that Our conduct will entirely depend on theirs ; and that if Wee make so considerable a step in favour of them We shall expect on their parts an immediate and absolute concurrence with Us in concluding the Peace without starting any new objections or making any further demands.

Thus much you may venture to advance upon your own knowledge of Our Councils and designs, adding that when they shall have declared themselves authentically and satisfactorily upon the conditions which Wee expect from them, Wee shall be ready publicly and in open congress to declare the yielding up of Tournay by France, to be a condition *sine qua non*.

It will be necessary at the same time that you should acquaint the Minister of the States with the pressing instances made by His most Christian Majesty in favour of his ally the Elector of

Bavaria, and you will let them know that the least which this prince intends to demand for the said Elector is, that he continue in the possession of Luxembourg, Namur and Charleroy, subject to the terms of their Barriere, till such time as he shall be restored to the electorate of Bavaria, exclusive of the Upper Palatinate, and placed in the Rank and Dignity of Ninth and Last Elector : besides which it will be further proposed that the Kingdom of Sardinia may be given to him, and that in this manner the title of King may efface and wipe out the stain of his degradation in the Electorall Colledge.

When you shall have made these communications to the States you will add that Wee think them points of such a nature as may very well be agreed to, and thereby not onely the possession of Tournay but the conclusion of the Peace be rendred secure.

As soon as you perceive these assurances from Us, and communications from yourself to have made their due impression, you are further to represent in Our Name how desirous Wee are, not only to restore but maintain a perfect Union between Us and them, to which end Wee think and firmly hope they will be of the same opinion that it is indispensably necessary without any further loss of time to remove whatever may appear to have been gained by them either immediately grievous or remotely dangerous to the interests of Our Kingdoms. You will upon this occasion inform them that you have brought with you a project of a new treaty of Succession and Barier, and that you are ordered to insist on their signing the same before the conclusion of the Peace. After this you, Our Keeper of Our Privy Seale, and you Thomas, Earl of Strafford, are to proceed to the examination of the particular Articles of this Project, and to shew the Dutch Ministers that several things are left even in this Draught, such is Our desire of pleasing them and living in the strictest Unity with them, which are looked upon here as disadvantageous to Our subjects, and which are certainly neither warranted by the letter nor intention of the Grand Alliance, nor agreeable to any principle upon which the present Confederacy was formed and the present Warr begun. You will further show them that the alterations, additions and omissions which are made are only such as are necessary to rectify mistakes and explain things doubtfull in the former Treaty ; to adjust certain conditions referred by that Treaty to a subsequent Convention, which Convention was never made ; and lastly to cure those hardships which have

been already actually brought on the British commerce and those far greater evils which there is but too just reason to apprehend. You will conclude by shewing these Ministers that the mutual guarantys of the Succession and Barrier thus explained and amended, will not only prove an additional security to both nations and be executed cordially, if at any time hereafter the cases should exist, but must likewise unite them more closely than ever in friendship and affection. Whereas on the other hand they can at best expect but a lame execution of a Treaty which the sense of the nation has declared both dishonourable and disadvantageous, and the insisting to keep us under obligations of this kind can have no other effect than to nourish jealousies and ill will, which may one time or other break out into open rupture.

You will close all your representations to the Ministers of the States by this solemn declaration: That Wee have, notwithstanding all provocations to the contrary, for their sakes and in hopes of their recovery from those mistaken notions which have misled them, hitherto kept the negociation open; That Wee have now delayed long enough, longer than perhaps in reason or in good policy Wee ought to have done; That the offers made to them by you Our Plenipotentiarys are Our ultimate and this the last time Wee shall apply to them; That they must either agree without further negociation, or expect that Wee proceed, as it is Our firm and unalterable resolution to do, immediately to conclude Our Treaty with France and Spain, in conjunction with such of the Allys as may think fit to adhere to Us.

You are to take the first opportunity of letting the Ministers of the States know, that Wee think ourselves obliged not only in good policy, but in consideration of the great services which the Duke of Savoy has done and the great Sacrifices which he has made, as well as of his firm adherence to the common cause, to provide not only for his security but his aggrandisement in the ensuing Treaty; you will apprise them of what has been done to this purpose, and you will acquaint them with those further measures necessary to be taken which are contained in the memorials presented by his Minister the *Sieur de Mollarede*, Copys whereof are together with these Our Instructions delivered to you. You will insist that the States do concur with Us in the general scheme relating to the Duke of Savoy, and you will particularly demand of them that they joyn with you in the instances which by the

following Article you are directed to make for the neutrality of Italy, shewing these Ministers, how certain it is that the Emperor will endeavour at least to take from his Royal Highness those towns and places, which have been yielded to him by virtue of the Treaty of 1703; how easily this design may succeed now that part of His Royal Highnesse's Dominions is entirely open; how fair an opportunity the return of the Imperial troops from Spain will afford for the execution of such projects; how necessarily Wee must be involved and they too, if they come into Our measures, in this Quarrell; and therefore how much Our common interest is concerned in taking early and effectual care to prevent it.

You have herewith put into your hands the copy of the answer given by Our order to the Imperial Resident, wherein you will observe that Wee renew Our offer of contributing to the transport of the Empress and German forces out of Catalonia and of securing their quiet continuance there till the transport can be made; but that Wee purpose at ye same time that the Emperor consent to cure the apprehensions and calm the minds of the several Princes and States of Italy by agreing to the neutrality thereof. You therefore are in pursuance of this overture to call on the Ministers of the States Generall to joyn with you, and together with them, or, in case of their refusal, singly by your selves to ask a conference of the Imperial Ministers. At this Conference you are to represent that We have contributed so much to the restoring the tranquillity of Italy, and Wee are so much concerned in maintaining the same, that Wee think Ourselves obliged to prevent as far as in Us lyes any accident which might disturb the same, or even to cure the jealousies and fears, which several princes and states have entertained, and to awaken which, there has in our opinion been but too much reason given. On those considerations Wee can not doubt of his Imperiall Majesty's agreing to the demand Wee make that an absolute neutrality be establisht and observed in Italy till the conclusion of the general Peace, and to this purpose that the Imperial forces now in Spain, as well as those which are now in Italy, shall go into Germany and continue there during the term aforesaid, except such as are necessary for garrisoning the towns and fortresses belonging to His Imperial Majesty. You will shew the Imperial Ministers that if the Emperor has no design to attack any of the Princes or States of Italy, what is here demanded can be no ways inconvenient to him; that if he has any such design

Wee are obliged to insist upon this demand in order to prevent it ; that if the Emperor shall think fit to conclude his Peace with France and Spain at the same time as Wee do, the neutrality of Italy is of course included and absorbed in the general peace ; and that if he shall think fit still to prosecute the Warr, this neutrality can be of no prejudice to his military operations. On the contrary, what Wee now demand becomes in this case necessary for him to do, and as it is impossible to attack France on the side of Italy, it will be for his service to draw all his forces to another part where nothing will interpose between him and his ennemy. You will conclude by letting these Ministers know that unless the Emperor consent without loss of time to this neutrality, Wee can not transport or suffer to be transported the Imperial troops from Catalonia. If these Ministers enter into treaty upon this proposition you will take care particularly to concert with those of His Royall Highness upon every occasion ; as also with those of the other Princes and States of Italy, when you find it necessary or expedient.

Along with these Our Instructions you will receive several papers relating as well to expedients for reconciling the difference between Us and France on the Article of North America, as to several points in the Treaty of Commerce which Wee desire should be otherwise adjusted than the French have yet shewn an inclination to agree them. These you will manage to the best advantage for Our service, and Wee can not persuade Ourselves, that when the conclusion of the Treaty shall appear to depend on such concessions as these, you will find the Plenipotentiarys of France inflexible.

MATTHEW PRIOR
1712-1715
DUKE OF SHREWSBURY
1712-1713

PRIOR at first had no official character, but in November 1712 he carried over a letter from Louis XIV to Queen Anne, and returned to Paris with credentials as plenipotentiary. His magnificence in France was eclipsed in December 1712 by the arrival of Charles Talbot, Duke of Shrewsbury, who, after the signature of the peace of Utrecht, took on the character of an ambassador extraordinary, and was the chief negotiator at the actual time of the signature of the peace. He however only stayed until August 1713, when Prior resumed his position as the chief representative. The chief problems which Shrewsbury and he had to negotiate were those of the north-eastern frontier of France, and especially the possession of Tournay, the barrier of Savoy and the neutrality of Italy, the renunciations of Philip V to the French throne and of the French princes to the Spanish, and the policy to be adopted in the event of the Emperor refusing to adhere to the treaty of Utrecht. Most of the private correspondence between them and the home Government is to be found in the *Bolingbroke Correspondence* and the Hardwicke State Papers, Vol. II, and should be compared with the official correspondence, preserved with some pretence at completeness, in the P.R.O. Foreign Entry Books, from which the present selection is taken.

After the peace, the Tory ministry had to deal with Europe more sharply divided into two main centres of interest, viz. the northern question, and the southern. As regards the north, it is clear that

the British policy was to try and save Sweden from the impending ruin, and the despatch of Bolingbroke to Prior of May 6, 1714, should be compared with the instructions sent to George Mackenzie and Jackson at this time (Chance, *Dipl. Instr. Sweden*, pp. 66 and 67). The southern question was more complicated. Two points of danger appeared. It was feared that the Emperor would seek to avenge himself for the treaty of Rastadt by helping himself to lands in Italy, and the persistence with which the matter appears in the despatches to Prior, shows how serious the ministers felt the danger to be. Eventually, a defensive alliance between Britain and France, to which Spain was to be asked to adhere, was drafted, and powers were sent to Prior to sign it, but the death of Queen Anne ended the project, and British diplomacy went back to its accustomed hostility to Louis XIV. The Tory policy was not entirely consistent in itself, for the other point of danger was Spain, which was to be one of the parties to the defensive treaty. The Tory ministry was never satisfied with the sincerity of Philip's renunciation of the French throne, and at the very time when it was constructing the alliance, it anticipated the later Whig policy of a *rapprochement* with Orleans to preserve his rights under the Treaty of Utrecht (see despatch of July 29, 1714).

Subordinate matters were the Catalans (see despatches of November 19 and December 19, 1713) the commercial treaty (*ibid.*), the Pretender, whose expulsion from Lorraine is demanded (April 27, 1714); but no hint is given in these official despatches of the important negotiations on the subject that were being conducted through Gaultier. Lastly there is the question of "these cursed sluices at Dunkirk." The correspondence does not entirely bear out the charge of Tory slackness in this matter, and indeed, though their language was more forcible, the Whig diplomats cannot claim any greater success in this matter than the Tories until the necessity of France in 1717 put the desired weapon in their hands.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR MATTHEW PRIOR, APPOINTED PLENIPOTENTIARY
AT THE COURT OF THE MOST CHRISTIAN KING. Windsor,
17th November 1712.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 26, p. 49.*)

When you have received these Our Instructions, you shall with all possible Diligence repair to the place where you shall be informed the French Court resides and take all proper occasions to assure

His Most Christian Majesty & his Ministers of Our Sincere Desire to see the publick Tranquillity of Europe restored and the ancient Friendship renewed between both Nations. And since to Our great Grief the Negotiations for the peace have been so much obstructed that probably they can not be brought to a happy and final Conclusion before the Expiration of the present Truce, You are to propose the Renewal thereof for Four Months longer to commence from the Day on which the present Agreement determines, and to conclude it on Our part.

You are to acquaint the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs or whoever else shall be appointed to conferr with you, that the Duke of Savoy having expressed a good Disposition to come into Our Measures, Wee have thought fit to propose a Neutrality for Italy; and that His Royal Highness may be effectually secured against the Violences he conceives he has reason to apprehend from the Emperor's Resentments on that account, Wee have suspended the Orders Wee had formerly given to Our Admiral of Our Fleet for retransporting the German Forces from Catalonia to Genoa till the Success of this Negotiation is known. As Wee have taken these Resolutions with no other view than that of facilitating the Peace, Wee hope His Most Christian Majesty will readily concurr with us therein.

His Royal Highness has represented to Us in so strong a manner the Dangers to which his Country will always be exposed unless the Alps are the Frontiers of his Dominions, as you will see by a paper which accompanys this No. 1,¹ that Wee think Our Selves obliged

¹ The memorandum is as follows (*Foreign Entry Book* 26, p. 51.).

Memoire concernant les Barrieres de S. A. R. de Savoye.

S. A. R. de Savoye, qui a recu de la generosité et de la puissante Protection de S. M. la Reine son Soutien pendant la Guerre et son Aggrandissement dans la Negociation de la Paix, en espere avec une entiere confiance l'establissement de sa Seureté et de ses Etats en Italie du côté de France.

Quoyque ce que S. A. R. avoit demandé du côté de Savoye fust necessaire pour prevenir dans la Suite les Inconveniens du passé et de mettre à ce Sujet des Rivieres pour Limites, et que ce fust de sa Seureté de ne pas laisser une Garnison Francoise concentrée dans le Comté de Nice par Monaco, ce nonobstant S. A. R., qui ne cherche qu'à recontrer les Intentions de S. M. la Reine et d'entrer dans tout ce qui les peut faciliter, a remis à Sa Royale disposition les Demandes qu'Elle a faites du côté de Savoye et de Nice et s'est reduite aux Barieres du Mont Genevre et autres Alpes indispensables pour la Seureté du Piemont et de ses autres Etats en dela des dites Alpes.

S. A. R. se conforme entierement par là au Traité d'Alliance qu'elle a eu

to support that Demand, in confidence that the Court of France that has consented so much to his Aggrandisement will not refuse what is absolutely necessary for his Safety.

In Order to give you a perfect knowledge of Our present Resolutions and Councils in relation to the present Treaty of Peace, Wee

l'honneur de faire avec S. M., ou l'on a considéré combien il étoit nécessaire pour la Seureté du Piemont qui les dites Alpes lui servissent de Barriere du côté du Dauphiné et que la France n'eut rien en delà des Alpes pour n'avoir plus de pied en Italie.

C'est aussi ce que l'on crût indispensable en 1709, et qui engagea les Ministres de S. M. d'insister alors à la Barriere des Alpes.

C'est enfin ce que S. M. a jugé et qu'Elle a déclaré dans toutes les occasions ou il s'est agi des dites Barrieres.

En effet les sommités des Alpes sont des limites naturelles, dont le passage est d'autant plus difficile si l'on y est a tems pour s'y opposer, et l'on ne peut y etre à tems sans avoir la pente des Montagnes de son côté.

D'autant plus en ce cas que le Roy de France a au pied du Mont Genevre du côté du Dauphiné la ville et la forteresse de Briançon où il peut tenir une nombreuse Garnison et faire occuper par un Detachement d'icelle, non seulement les Hauteurs du Mont Genevre, mais des Monts et Postes qui sont dès le Mont Genevre jusques aux Forts d'Exilles et de Fenestrelles qui ne sont soutenables qu'autant que l'on peut soutenir les susdits Monts et Postes, ce que S. A. R. ne pourroit pas faire dans des cas d'irruption inopinée, par des Detachements des Garnisons desdits Forts, qui n'en peuvent contenir que de très petites de 4 à 500 hommes ; Et il n'y a d'autre ressource que d'avoir le Mont Genevre et d'autres Alpes pour Frontieres pour que lorsque l'on sera menacé de Guerre l'on puisse cantonner des Troupes dans les Villages qui sont dès le Mont Genevre au Pragellats et à Exilles, afin qu'elles soient à portée de s'assembler pour s'opposer que les Francois ne se saisissent dès Hauteurs, ce que l'on ne pourroit pas faire si les entredeux du Pragellats et du Mont Genevre et par consequent lesdits Villages restoient à la France, laquelle l'étant des Hauteurs le seroit dans peu de jours d'Exilles et de Fenestrelles et auroit l'entrée libre en Piemont :

1°. Par la vallée de la Perrouse et Pignerol et encore par la Vallée de St. Martin ;

2°. Par la Vallée de Suse dont les Fortifications ne peuvent être finies de longtems ;

Et par la Vallée de Chateau Dauphin Elle auroit un passage aisé pour penetrer dans le Marquisat de Saluces et de là dans la Plaine de Piemont qui est ouvert de ce côté là ; les places de Turin, de Suse et de Coni ne le couvrant en aucune manière. C'est ce que les Francois ont verifié le Mois de 7^{bre} passé par l'Irruption qu'ils ont faite dans le Marquisat de Saluces, le Marechal de Berwick ayant été surpris lui mesme (comme il a dit) de trouver un passage si aisé pour descendre en Piémont.

Toutes ces facilités de la part de la France et les craintes du côté du Piemont cessent par les Barrieres des Alpes, que la France ne sauroit s'obstiner à refuser sans découvrir qu'Elle retient des veuës sur toute l'Italie, puisqu'Elle veut conserver un pied de son côté en de là des Alpes ; car ce n'est pas

have likewise thought fit to annex hereunto a Copy of Our last Instructions to Our Plenipotentiarys at Utrecht that as occasion shall require you may act in all Things conformable to Our Intentions therein expressed.¹

INSTRUCTIONS FOR CHARLES DUKE OF SHREWSBURY, APPOINTED
AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY TO THE MOST CHRISTIAN KING.
Windsor, 29th November 1712.

(*P.R.O., S.P., France, Vol. 154, fo. 194.*)

As soon as you receive these Our Instructions and your other Dispatches, You shall go with all diligence to Paris or wherever else you are informed the Court resides. Upon your arrival you shall immediately give notice thereof to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and acquaint him that you are come thither to promote a good understanding and cultivate a sincere Friendship between Us and the most Christian King, but that you are not to take upon you the Character of Our Ambassadors Extraordinary till the Peace is signed and the Ratifications exchanged.

You shall however in the mean time desire to be admitted to a private audience, at which you shall present to His Most Christian Majesty a Letter under Our Private Seal herewith delivered to you accompanying the same with Expressions of Our Esteem for his person, and Our hearty desire to see the Publick Tranquillity restored.

The King of Spain having executed an Act of Renunciation to le revenu que produisent les petites Vallées qui y sont, puisqu'il est si peu considerable, qu'il ne peut pas ny faire l'Attention du Roy T. C. ny celle de S. A. R. non plus que son Aggrandissement, mais simplement sa seureté et sa seureté necessaire et indispensable.

Que si lorsque S. A. R. demandoit Briancon et le Brianconnois l'on se recroit en France, que ce seroit lui ouvrir l'entree dans le Royaume en lui donnant ce pied en deca des Alpes dans le Dauphiné ; a combien plus forte raison ne doit on pas craindre qu'une Puissance aussi grande et aussi redoutable que celle de France retienne un pied en delà des Alpes du côté de Piedmont et par ce moyen l'entrée en Italie.

L'on doit donc conclure par ces Demonstrations, si ce que la France voudroit retenir en delà des Alpes ne fait qu'une petite difference d'avec ce qui avoit été demandé en 1709 pour S. A. R., puisque la difference consiste dans la necessaire seureté du Piemont d'avoir les Alpes pour Barieres, et c'est une difference bien considerable et bien contraire aux Intentions de S. M. la Reine qui ont tousjours été d'establir la seureté de S. A. R. tout comme de procurer son Aggrandissement.

¹ See above, pp. 29-33.

the Crown of France, which has been since ratified by the Cortes of that Kingdom you are to represent that it is now the proper time for the Dukes of Berry and Orleans and the other Princes of the House of Bourbon to quit their pretensions likewise to the Crown of Spain, pursuant to the form seen and approved by Us and the Conventions agreed by France, a Copy of which is hereunto annexed. You are likewise to desire that you may be allowed to be present at the Solemnity of the Renunciation as the Lord Lexington was at Madrid.

When the Renunciation is performed, the Peace concluded, and the Ratifications exchanged, you shall take upon you the character of Our Ambassador Extraordinary, and as soon as you are ready for it, you shall ask Audience . . . our respective Dominions.

You shall likewise desire Audience of the Princes of the Blood according to the Practice of that Court, whom you shall compliment in Our Name, taking care at Your Audiences . . . Spain and other Crowned Heads.

You shall carefully observe the Motions . . . Peace so happily established in Christendom.

You shall entertain a good Correspondence and Intercourse with the Ambassadors and Ministers of all Princes and States in Amity with Us residing at the French Court.

You shall on all occasions protect and countenance Our Merchants . . . as they formerly enjoyed but as to the particular conditions on which We expect the Commerce of Our Subjects should be re-established, We refer you to particular Instructions which shall be hereafter sent you on that head.

Whereas Our Royal Uncle . . . in your own house.

Of all matters you shall be informed of . . . which you are to observe accordingly.

At your return from your Embassy . . . Government and Kingdom.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR CHARLES, DUKE OF SHREWSBURY, AMBASSADOR
EXTRAORDINARY TO THE MOST CHRISTIAN KING. 11th Decem-
ber, 1712.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 26, p. 92.*)

Whereas the most essential Dispute that remains between Us and the French Court in the Project for a Treaty of Peace, whereof you have herewith a Copy, consists in fixing the bounds of their fishing and drying their Fish on the Coasts of Newfoundland, and

in the possession of Cape Breton ; Now Wee having maturely weighed the several Representations that have been laid before Us on that Subject, and being willing to go as great Lengths as possibly Wee can, with due regard to the Interests of Our Kingdoms in facilitating the great and good Work of a Peace between Us and his Most Christian Majesty, do hereby authorise and empower you to propose as Our last Resolution, that Wee will consent to give and yeld up to his said Most Christian Majesty the entire possession and propriety of the Island of Cape Breton, but with the express Condition that His said Majesty shall on his part in Consideration of the same relinquish to Us all manner of Right to Fishing & Drying Fish on the Coast of Newfoundland or any part thereof reserved to the Subjects of His most Christian Majesty by the Articles, signed at London the ^{27. Sep.}_{8. Oct.} 1711 by the Sieur Mesnager.

This you will set forth to the Court of France as the most likely method to keep up a firm Friendship and good Understanding between Us, and hinder the Interests of the two Nations from interfering with each other ; since either the possessing the Island of Cape Breton in common, or the reserving a joint Right of Fishery on the Coast of Newfoundland which is yelded to Us, may occasion frequent and dangerous Disputes. And if the French Court should insist on that Right as already granted, you may at the same time shew them that Wee likewise looked upon Cape Breton to belong to Us, and reckoned that Island as part of Our ancient Territory of Nova Scotia which is by this Treaty restored to Us. Wee hope that this easiness on Our part will induce His Most Christian Majesty to forego the Pretension hitherto made on his side, since Wee cannot see how the aforesaid Difference can otherwise be composed to Our Satisfaction, And Wee should be very sorry to find that after all Our most hearty Endeavours for promoting peace Wee should not be able to conclude the same by reason of the above mentioned Difficulty.

WILLIAM, EARL OF DARTMOUTH, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO PRIOR.

(*P.R.O.*, *Foreign Entry Book* 26, p. 70.)

Whitehall 21 Nov^r. 1712.

Her Majesty having received advice that the Court of Madrid start new difficultys about the yielding of Sicily, which they pretend

should still remain feudatory to Spain, I am to acquaint you, that his most Christian Majesty having already agreed, that the Cession of that Kingdom should be clogg'd with no other restrictions than barely that it should neither be alienated nor exchanged without the consent of the Crown of Spain, her Majesty expects that a point so fully settled, shall not now be unravelled nor laid open to a tedious negotiation with the Marquis de Monteleon.

By my Letter of the 7th instant to my Lord Lexington, whereof I enclose a Copy for your better information, you will see the Queen consents, that Sicily should revert to Spain in case of failure of heirs males of the House of Savoy, but then she expects it should be granted absolutely to such heirs without any dependance on the Kings of Spain. This France has agreed to on the part of King Philip, & is therefore obliged to see it performed. When you are in discourse with Mons^r de Torsi upon this Subject, you will at the same time urge the reasonableness of the Duke's being at liberty to fortify his Frontier, which can be liable to little objection, since he is willing to give private assurances that it shall not take place in respect to Pignerol.

The Article in favour of the Elector of Bavaria specified in my Lord Strafford's Instructions, should naturally arise from the most Christian King with whom he is in alliance, & cannot properly be moved by the Queen, whose Ministers are however directed to support it, when those of France shall formally have made the proposition at Utrecht.

If France does not come into any of the three Expedients already offered for settling the Boundaries of North America, a fourth project will be communicated to you by my Lord Bolingbroke which you are in that case to agree to.

Her Majesty having very much at heart the prejudice which the Protestant Interest has suffered by the fourth Article of the Treaty of Ryswick, you are to press very earnestly in her Majesty's name that France consent to revoke it.

Since the Court of France has yielded the great point of Tournay, you may assure them, the Queen will proceed to the signing of the peace as soon as her own Interests are settled, tho' the Tariff between that Kingdom and Holland in relation to the four species of Merchandises should happen not to be fully adjusted. You are further to acquaint Mr. de Torsi, that the Queen's Ministers at Utrecht are instructed to favour the Interests of the Duke of Lorrain in

respect to the advantages which he claims by the Peace of Ryswick.

WILLIAM, EARL OF DARTMOUTH, SECRETARY OF STATE TO
SHREWSBURY.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 26, p. 115.*)

Whitehall 19 Jan^{ry} 1712/13

As soon as I received the honour of your Grace's Letters of the 11th & 19th I laid 'em before her Majesty who expressed no small surprize at the difficultys started by the Court of Madrid in relation to the *Priviledges* of the Catalans. Her Majesty immediately ordered me to prepare an Instruction to my Lord Lexington on that head, directing him to represent to the King of Spain that it is a point already stipulated on his behalf by France, that she never imagined he could have a thought of taking away the lives of a whole people, & therefore when she insisted upon a free pardon for 'em without reserve, nothing could be meant but the preservation of all their rights & priviledges in as ample a manner as they enjoy'd 'em at the death of King Charles the 2nd; that she thought herself obliged by all sorts of ties to see this Article have it's effect, in which she conceived the Interests of his Catholick Majesty very much concerned, least that province of Catalonia should be driven by despair to form themselves in good earnest into a commonwealth, which is a thought that has long since been suggested to 'em, & perhaps in that case the French themselves would look on with satisfaction. I have writt upon the same subject in very strong terms to the Marquis de Monteleone, who answers me the matter is too delicate for him to meddle with & that he is not empowered to enter into the discussion of it; but I hope your Grace will take an opportunity to discourse it with the French Ministers to press it there, as Lord Lexington is to do in Spain.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 26, p. 142.*)

Whitehall, 14 March 1712/13

. The Queen has commanded me to transmit to your Grace the enclosed copy of a memorial delivered at Utrecht by the Plenipotentiarys of Savoy, & at the same time to acquaint you that she thinks the three principal points therein mentioned are very well founded. As to that of his Royal Highness's fortifying his frontiers,

nothing is more plain than that it was intended he should have that power, since it is expressly declared the places which compose the frontier are yielded to him for his Security not for his aggrandisement, & that all objections were removed by his giving a secret promise not to fortify Pignerol. The 2nd Article relating to the yielding of Final as an Equivalent for the Vigevano is privately oppos'd by the Genoese out of a jealousy that the House of Savoy may by the accession of Sicily become powerful at Sea and consequently interfere in their Trade, but tho' it is the Interest of that Republick that there should be as little naval force as possible in the hands of a Prince who is so near their Gates & their harbours, it is undoubtedly the advantage of Great Britain that some other Maritime Power beside that of France should become considerable in the Mediterranean. 3. The difficultys about declaring the house of Savoy next heirs to those Countrys that have been dismembred from the Spanish Monarchy in this war can be started with no prospect of immediate advantage; therefore as any views of that kind must be very remote, & can only serve as matter for contention hereafter, her Majesty's pleasure is that Your Grace favour the demands of Savoy in all these particulars as far as lies in your power. It has been objected that the Duke of Savoy's Title is founded upon the will of Philip the 4th, which being destructive of the claim of Philip the 5th it would be absurdity for France to allow it, but his Royal Highness's Plenipotentiarys answer very plainly that the will of Philip the 4th is only declaratory of their Master's Title & does not give him a new Right which he had not before: however, that objection may be obviated by a Declaration that the Succession shall devolve on the house of Savoy without specifying by what Title.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 26, p. 171.*)

Whitehall April 1st 1713.

Though Our Treaty at Utrecht may in all probability have received the last hand before the date of the letter I am now writing, I must however acknowledge to your Grace that the satisfaction which the Queen would otherwise have in the conclusion of that great work will be much abated, if we hear that the Imperial Ministers have not sign'd at the same time with those of her Majesty and the rest of her Allys. Her Majesty's concern on this occasion will be the

greater, because she had employed all her endeavours to bring the Emperor into the General Plan, and had succeeded so far that a few points only remained to be adjusted, & those not of extraordinary importance, when opposed to the honour & advantages that would accrue to the whole Confederacy from a perfect unanimity in their resolutions. But as there is little room to hope that the Imperial Plenipotentiarys have yet been sufficiently authoris'd to conclude upon the foot the negotiation stood as it was reported to her Majesty in the Cabinet last Munday night, we must labour to retrieve that inconveniency as far as the nature of the Case will allow, that if their day of signing was not the same with ours it may be as near it as possible.

Least your Grace should not be already informed where those difficultys lie which retard the Peace between the Emperor & France, I am to acquaint you that Count Sinsendorf has declared he is fully empowered to conclude upon the three following conditions:

1st That his Master should not be obliged to make a renunciation of his pretensions to Spain & the Indys, as he on his part will not expect that King Philip should renounce any claim he may have to those Dominions that are dismembred from the Spanish Monarchy.

2^{ndly} That the Elector of Bavaria shall desist from his demands of satisfaction on account of any infractions of the Treaty of Ilmersheim.

3^{dly} That the Territorys which the Emperor now possesses in Italy, and the places on the Coast of Tuscany which are to be yielded to him, be left in his hands without any restrictions whatsoever.

The first condition is so well suited to the humour of the House of Austria and the Spanish Nation that it seems to have been immediately approv'd of by the two Partys concern'd & therefore I need not trouble your Grace with any thing on that head.

As to the 2^d. article, Her Majesty commends me to tell your Grace she is engaged to support the Elector's demand, & that the Sovereignty of Luxembergh shall be left him as a security for it, provided he consent to admit into it such a Garison as the Allys shall think fit at the conclusion of the Peace, and that he submit himself to the decision of Arbitrators, whereof the Queen offers to be one.

Now I am come to the third point I must freely acquaint you that the Queen can't help taking umbrage at the manner in which France has treated the Emperor on this occasion. The Emperor only desires

that his possessions in Italy be left to him without restrictions, which seems no very extravagant proposal ; however France rejects it, without descending to specify what those restrictions are with which she would clog his power on that side the mountains: this looks as if she had a view on some acquisitions there for herself, rather than a friendly care to preserve the liberty of those Princes & States, for which the Queen has expressed a very tender concern during the whole Course of the Treaty, when nobody else shewed the least regard for that part of Europe. The late convention for their Neutrality was originally started by her Majesty & has since been brought to perfection by her care ; she would have been glad that during the Congress, which has been long enough open, any further steps had been taken for their security ; but it never was her intention that the Cause of those who had no merit in the Course of the War on either side should come in to protract the Treaty or hinder the Peace from being General ; neither can the Queen bring herself up to think that the danger of the Imperial Power in Italy which have no being but in speculation, & at worst must be allowed to be very remote, should so far deserve consideration as to ballance with the imminent hazards of a present war this Summer on the Rhine. What I have said may perhaps suggest some arguments which your Grace may not think improper to urge to the Court of France in order to prevail with 'em to withdraw these new obstacles. I may add to your Grace in particular that it is not thought disadvantageous to her Majesty's Kingdoms, that the Emperor's power should become more formidable than it is in Italy, after the partition made by this Treaty.

The Queen is not without jealousy that France may have a design to gain some advantages by keeping the Emperor singly in the War, in which case it would be no difficult matter to impose any hardships upon him. Your Grace will therefore let 'em know the Queen does not approve of any projects of restriction, & that you are to cut off all expectation the French King or his Ministers may have conceived that they shall be supported by her Plenipotentiaries in these new demands.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 26, p. 179.*)

Whitehall 13 April 1713.

I am to acknowledge the honour of yours of the 26th inst. which brought us the propositions of the French Court in relation to the

Emperor's affairs in Italy ; I laid 'em before the Queen last night at a Committee & received her Majesty's directions to acquaint your Grace that she understands the four places on the Coast of Tuscany are to be given up immediately after the conclusion of the peace between the Emperor & King of Spain, and that the delivery of 'em is by no means to be postpon'd, till the demands of the several powers of Italy are adjusted, for as those Princes and States were no partys to the War, their Pretensions cannot be admitted to have any relation to the General Peace.

Her Majesty looks upon this point as a matter very essential to the quiet & safety of the Imperial territorys on that side ; & is therefore very desirous the french Court should explain themselves clearly upon it. Your Grace seems to think his most Christian Majesty in so good a disposition for preserving the Peace he has so lately concluded, that I hope to hear by the return of the Messenger, he agrees with her Majesty as to the time of evacuating the four places already mentioned.

HENRY, VISCOUNT BOLINGBROKE, SECRETARY OF STATE,
TO PRIOR.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 28.*)

Windsor, 29th Aug^t. 1713.

. The Queen will be very glad to hear that the Overtures, which the Duke of Shrewsbury writes that the Elector Palatin has made to the Marshal de Villars, succeed. The Queen neglects nothing which may contribute to dispose the Germans to Peace, and little doubt is to be made but that the Princes and States of the Empire are already enough tired of a Warr no longer fed by the Treasury of Britain, and into which they were forced by the prevalent Interest that one way or other the House of Austria maintains in almost all their Courts. It should seem therefore a measure not to be neglected, at the same time as the Court of Vienna is directly treated with, to entertain Correspondences with the other Princes and States, whose views, being more moderate, are more easy to be satisfyed ; and I do verily think that if the four Circles could be a little better secured, Expedients would easily be found concerning that Point of honour of readmitting the Elector of Bavaria, wherewith the Imperial Ministers have so much inflamed the minds of men. Such Insinuations as these are proper to be

made where you are, and You will please as farr as possible to discover what lengths the French would be willing to go, if by them their Peace might at once become general. When You speak to Mo^r. de Torcy of the Queen's earnest desire to perfect the publick Tranquillity and of her readiness to promote all measures which tend to this purpose, you may give him a fair occasion, if his Court thinks fit to trust the Queen so farr, of communicating to you their intentions with respect to the several Partys, with whom they are still at warr.

It is to be hoped that the Jealousies, if any such were really entertained, concerning the delay of the Demolition of Dunkirk are extinguished, since all the orders necessary on the Queen's part are gone out of my hands, and since the Persons, who are to supervise this work, will I suppose in few days be upon the spot.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 28.*)

Windsor Castle, Sep^r. 15th 1713.

. You know, Sir, in general, what reasonable grounds of being jealous of their designs, the Conduct of the States General, ever since the Reduction of the Spanish Netherlands, has given her Majesty. You know what large strides the Dutch have boldly taken, and have been tamely suffered to make, towards the absolute Sovereignty, of at least a great part of these Provinces, what insufferable burdens they have lay'd by their single authority on the Trade of her Majesty's Kingdoms, and what unjustifiable facilitys they have given to that of their own People. You know particularly how much they insisted several years ago, to have the Town of Ostend yeilded in their Barrier, and how carefully they have kept a Governor and Garrison of their own, in this Place, from the hour that it was taken. You may perhaps have heard, that they would not even consent to the Siege thereof in 1706, till they had first received assurances that they should keep the possession.

These Considerations, and many others of a like nature, made her Majesty not a little cautious how She proceeded with the States, in reference to the Spanish Netherlands. And the true reason of her being not over hasty to press the Demolition of Dunkirk was this, and only this, That She judg'd her hold on that Town would, sooner than anything else, determine the States to give her Satisfaction in regulating the Trade of these Countrys, and in settling

those other measures which are necessary to be taken, for the effectual Security of the Interest and Commerce of Britain, as far as either of them are herein concerned. As soon as the Provisional Regulation of Commerce was signed, by which Our Grievances are to a great Degree redressed, and a foundation layed of settling Our mutual Interests in the ten Provinces finally to common content, the Queen thought it was time for her to show the clear and candid manner in which She proceeds, and thereby to encourage the States to continue in those fair and amicable Dispositions, which they professed with great earnestness and the most solemn assurances, to have taken up ; She gave immediately all the Orders which were on her part requisite, for the Demolition of Dunkirk, and She sent such of her officers, as are to inspect the performance of this work, over. At the same time the Earl of Strafford was instructed to acquaint the States, that they could not wonder, if her Majesty had been cautious how She let go the hold She had of Dunkirk, whilst the Trade of her Subjects to the Spanish Netherlands continued on so precarious a bottom, and laboured under so many hardships, but that on the very first appearance which they showed, of removing these hardships, the Queen had resolved no longer to defer the fulfilling the Treaty by the Demolition of that Place ; that her Majesty made no doubt but the States would go on to cure such Jealousys as might still remain, and to that end agree : first to evacuate Ostend and place therein a Walloon Governor and a Walloon Garrison, secondly to oblige themselves to concurr bona fide with the Queen in doing every thing necessary for the repairing, improving and preserving the Harbour of this Town, and thirdly, to stipulate that Ostend should at no time, nor under any pretence whatsoever, be alienated from the Prince to whom the new Provinces might belong.

To these Overtures an Answer has been received, and by Mr. Secretary Bromley reported to her Majesty in Council, the Substance whereof is, that there can be no reason for the Jealousys entertained of their designs on the Spanish Low-Countrys, That the Garrisoning of Ostend, and the Demolition of Dunkirk, have no relation to each other, that when the last of these has been finished, they will concert with the Queen about the former, and that as to the Alienation of Ostend, they can say nothing till they have consulted his Imperial Majesty.

You will take it for granted, as soon as you read this Account,

that her Majesty looks on such a return to what her Ambassador proposed, as a direct refusal in the nature of it, and more offensive than a direct refusal would have been, in the manner of it. She has ordered Mr. Secretary Bromley to let the States know her surprise & concern at this Proceeding, and her Resolution to enter into other, into any measures rather than see her self thus treated, and the Trade of her People thus exposed.

. France has an opportunity, without any charge, prejudice, or danger, to her Self, of doing Us the most national good. Her Majesty despises indeed the clamour, which ignorance, and malice, combine to make in this country ; but She would be much concerned to have any real Jealousy arise where You are, as if She intended to evade what is stipulated in the Treaty of Peace, and to keep that for her own use, which was only trusted as a Pledge in her hands. You are therefore, Sir, to take the first occasion of stating to Mo^r de Torcy, our present dispute with the Dutch, frankly and naturally. He will see at the first Glance, and if he did not, You would be abundantly able to show him, that train of mischievous Consequences which must follow, if the States General should carry all that they have in view ; and he will as easily perceive, that the fear of Dunkirk remaining to the Queen, is the only effectual Expedient that can, at this Conjuncture, be fallen upon, to oblige the States to depart from those immoderate Schemes, which their own ambition, and Avarice, nursed up by our Follys, have prompted them to form.

When You shall have opened to this Minister all that you are now instructed in, her Majesty foresees he will of course ask in what Proposition You conclude, what it is the Queen desires his Master should do, and in what manner She would make use of Dunkirk to carry her point in Holland. You are, when he speaks to you in this Style, to say, that the Queen is so sensible of the Jealousys which have been fomented on account of the Delay of the Demolition, and that too perhaps, in some degree, from the very quarter from whence Our present difficultys proceed, that She would not charge you with any particular Overture. She will not in this Case think for her self ; she represents to the King as her Kinsman & Ally, without any Disguise or Affectation, a distress brought upon her by her own goodness, and by the ingratitude of others ; and She desires the means, of warding off the National mischief which, She apprehends, may arise from him.

You will add, that when you know his Majesty's Sence upon these overtures, You will communicate them to the Queen, who will look, You are assured, on any facility he may give in this matter, as the greatest instance of his Friendship for her. You will take care, both to M. de Torcy, to the other Ministers, and to the King himself, if a proper opportunity happens, to repeat that the Queen's Orders are given in every respect as was desired for the Demolition of Dunkirk, that the Officers appointed by her to be present at that work are on the spot, and that She will on her part contribute to the dispatch thereof as much as they can wish.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 28.*)

Ashdown Park Oct^r. 11th, 1713.

. The Colours which M^r. de Torcy puts on the refusal of the King to leave Dunkirk any longer in the Queen's hands are valued here just as much as they ought to be. The Queen is willing enough that the French Ministers should be let feel that she thinks the turn given to the denial civil in as much as the King expresses an inclination to contribute to the Queen's end, though he cannot consent to her expedient for bringing this end about; but her Majesty would neither have the King nor any of his Ministers imagine that the reasons alledg'd are very much tasted here, or that She looks on the offices which France offers to employ as Equivalent to the Proposition which She made. This general account of the Queen's Sence is sufficient for Your Instruction on a Point which is to be no further treated.¹

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 28.*)

Whitehall 6th Nov^r 1713.

Her Majesty having repeated to the Duke of Lorrain the instances which you know have been so often made to the most Christian King for removing the Pretender to her Crown out of his Dominions, I am directed to acquaint You therewith, that You may speak to the Minister of Lorrain, and to any other Minister whom You shall think proper, and let them know, that it is absolutely inconsistent with the Amity and good Correspondence that is between the Queen and their Masters to receive into their Dominion, or to protect a Person who disputes her Majestys most

¹ See the private addition in *Bol. Corr.* II, 525.

undoubted Title, and thereby endeavours to disturb the Peace and Quiet of her Kingdoms. That You may be able to show them that this is the collective Sence of the whole nation, as well as the Queen's Command to You, I herewith send You the Address of both Houses of Parliament.

(P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 28.)

Windsor Castle 19th Nov^r, 1713.

. The Spaniards pretend to have intercepted orders from his Imperial Majesty, and Letters from his Ministers, to the People of Catalonia and of Majorca, importing incouragement to them to defend themselves to the last, representing the Treaty for the Evacuation of this Province and of this Island as an agreement which for some reasons he was obliged to come into, but which for others he will not think himself obliged to keep, promising to send and relieve Barcelona, and in the mean time letting them know that the Duke d'Uceda has orders to remit to them, I think, one hundred thousand Crowns of the money arising by the sale of Final to the Genouese. Communication of all this has been given to the Queen; and I question not but heavy complaint will be made to you upon the same head. When you are spoke to, it will be proper for You to say that You have received no Orders from her Majesty on this occasion, neither indeed could you expect any, since Your Letters inform You that the Queen has hitherto had no account of this matter but from an Extract of a Letter written by the Duke d'Ossona to M^r. Lawless; that his most Christian Majesty knows full well how much weight the Queen lays on the strict observation of the Convention for the Evacuation of Catalonia and the Neutrality of Italy; that She has always esteemed this Convention as a good step towards completing the general Peace; that the willingness which those, who are so earnestly bent on protracting the Warr, shew to set this Treaty aside, is no small proof how rightly her Majesty has judged; that you are confident in general that the Queen will do all which can be expected from her to preserve the effect of it, and to enforce the execution of all its Articles. You will add that You cannot take a more proper occasion than this to represent, as you have had orders very seriously to do to Mo^r de Torcy, and to desire that he would represent to the King his Master, how much it is the common

Interest, and the King of Spain's in particular, to close as soon as possible the Treaty of Commerce between the Queen and him, and the Treaty of Peace between Spain and Portugal. I cannot swell this dispatch by entring into the Detail, but you may assure Mo^r de Torcy, and he very probably knows the same himself, that the Differences on both these heads are such as, if we were to treat with him, would not detain us half an hour from concluding.

What stops the Treaty of Commerce at Utrecht, it is as much the Interest of Spain to grant, as it is Ours to ask, was understood so by the Count de Bergeick at Madrid, and will be understood so by all those who know any thing of Mercantile Affairs.

What chiefly obstructs the conclusion of the Portugal Treaty is, the Interest of several private Persons, in favour of whom the Court of Madrid would hold the other to very hard conditions. The King cannot do a thing more gratefull to the Queen, nor at the same time more usefull to his Grandson, than effectually to induce him to cut off at once these little difficulties which ought not to be put in the Ballance against the danger which the consequences of these delays may produce. Nothing can incline the Emperor to think of Peace in earnest so much as seeing all other Interests perfectly settled; but as long as these Interests are unsettled, he still entertains hopes, and not without reason, that something or other may happen to keep the Warr alive, and even to rekindle it where it has been extinguished; at least he knows that whilst the Queen's Treatys with Spain are in some sort open, and whilst the Portuguese, whom no consideration whatever can make the Queen abandon, are by the hard usage of the Spaniards kept out of the Peace, it is impossible for her Majesty to act in the manner She would otherwise do in the affairs of Europe. These are matters that the Queen has so much at heart, that I am ordered to quicken Mr. Worseley's Departure, and he will set out in very few days for Lisbon. At the same time another Minister will be dispatched to Madrid; and her Majesty is determined to bring these matters to such an issue, that She may be at a certainty concerning them before She meets her Parliament. The necessity of this is evident, because her Majesty's Demands, and the Supplys of Parliament must be proportioned to that State of Affairs which will probably take place in Europe another year. In all events, that we may be the better prepared to assist, defend, protect, or even attack, as her Majesty's Engagements, her honour, and the Common

Good of Europe may require, a fresh Squadron of Frigats will be ordered forthwith to the Mediterranean. The general Peace must not hang at this rate in the last act of it, and it will be the fault of France and Spain if effectual measures for its conclusion are not taken. When you talk to Mo^r de Torcy upon the hints which I have now given you, and which your own knowledge of publick affairs will enable you to extend to advantage, You will do it in such a manner as to let him see that however they may have thought we withdrew ourselves this year from foreign affairs, yet our Eyes are not taken off the Continent, but with the meeting of a new Parliament we shall renew the prosecution of our former measures. This Minister will be too candid at the same time not to own that this manner of proceeding on the Queen's part is frank, is generous, is friendly, and deserves a suitable return.

(P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 28.)

Windsor 2nd Decemb^r 1713.

. Having now informed you that the Queen has passed a Commission for constituting Commissarys, & having said as much as I suppose is necessary, on the nature of this Commission, I am to let you know her Majesties pleasure that you take the earliest opportunity of acquainting the most Christian King, either at an Audience, which, if I may interpose my private opinion, would be the best way, or else through Mons^r de Torcy, that her Majesty, who is desirous that as little time as possible may be lost in improving into a Friendship between the two Nations that Peace which has been so happily concluded, & who judges that the only effectual method of compassing this great end is by opening to the Subjects on either side as free a Communication of Trade as the present Circumstances on each side respectively will admit, had ordered a Commission under the Great Seal to pass for constituting Commissarys to treat on her part with such as his Majesty shall think fit to appoint on his, in pursuance of what is stipulated in the Treaty of Commerce signed at Utrecht; that the Queen hopes his Majesty will immediately nominate, empower and send over hither such persons as he shall think fit to entrust on his part in this Negotiation; that it will be extremely happy, if all those points at least, which may require to render them compleat, the interposition of the Legislative Authority in this Kingdome, can

be prepared before the meeting of Parliament; and finally that the Queen does not doubt but that these matters & all others may be soon adjusted to mutual satisfaction, if this Negotiation is not managed with views purely mercantile, & if the same Spirit prevails in treating of Commerce, as was exerted in treating of Peace.

Whether you speak directly to the King himself upon this Subject, or through the Secretary of State, you are to take the first & every opportunity, of making Mons^r de Torcy sensible how important it is that no new Construction be put on any part of the Treaty signed; that the plain sense of the words, which is evident enough on the face of the Treaty & can never be controverted by those who were witnesses to the progress of it, be *bonâ fide* pursued; You will shew him how impossible it is, that we should proceed, (& you will let him know that you have orders to say we shall not,) to any subsequent discussion, if we find Our selves disappointed at setting out, if we find that the time elapsed since the signing of the Treaty of Commerce, & perhaps some occurrences which have happened during that time, have in any instance made the French alter their minds, & rendred those points disputable upon which we had reason to think all dispute was over.

Thus much the Queen gives me command to say to you by this Express, & on this subject, your answer to which cannot be dispatched too soon. ¹

Another Extract which you will herewith receive, is that of a letter to M^r. Secretary Bromley from those Officers of the Queen's, who are at Dunkirk, appointed to inspect the Demolition of that place. When you read this Extract you will be of opinion that we are at least as much surprized as Mr. Le Blanc pretended to be, & with a good deal more reason. The Ninth Article of the Treaty of Peace is too express to admit of the least doubt: *Portus compleatur, aggeres aut Moles dicto Portui eluendo inservientes diruantur*: the Harbour is to be filled up, & as a condition without which this cannot be effectually done, the Sluyces which serve to cleanse that harbour, are to be destroyed. It is true indeed there was some discourse at Utrecht, & elsewhere, whilst the Treaty was

¹ See the private addition in *Bol. Corr.* II, 544-5.

² See H. Vast, *Les grands traités . . . de Louis XIV*, Paris, 1899, Vol. III, p. 76.

on foot, of certain Sluyces, which, though they might be reckoned to belong to Dunkirk, were however of no use either to the cleansing of the Harbour, or to the Fortifying of the Town ; but were erected & maintained purely to preserve the Country about Winoxberg¹ from Inundations. I remember it was then urged as a proof of this, & as a specification of the Sluyces, which it was desired might be preserved, that the Sluyces meant had been sett up by the people of the Country either before Dunkirk came into the hands of France, or at least before that King fortified it in the manner he has since done ; that as the works of this place were extended, these Sluyces were included within them, but that they were still repaired at the Expence of the adjacent Country, to whom, & to whom only, they were usefull. I state this at length to you that you may see the utmost indulgence, which the French Court has ever desired in relation to this Article. And even this Indulgence was never promised by the Queen, though her Majesty then showed, & I believe would still have great Commiseration for the people, if this appear'd really to be the case, & if their safety, & the effectual destruction of the harbour of Dunkirk were clearly distinct. Had the French, I do not know for what reason, unless they could be supposed to take their measures from Dutch Prints or the Insinuations of private Men, entertained hopes that Dunkirk might, notwithstanding the Treaty, be left in their hands without the entire ruin of the Harbour, those orders which you received from the Queen in my letter of the 29th of September might have insufficiently undeceived them. You will find in that her Majesty as much in haste, as they were to have this worke proceeded upon ; & that it might be so according to the tenour of the Treaty, you was at that time instructed to press for the immediate removal of the Ships out of the Bason ; since till the Ships were removed, it was not to be supposed that the Harbour could be destroyed ; & since the destruction of the harbour was one principal part of the stipulations of the 9th Article, You are, Sir, upon the first occasion to speak to the Ministers in this Affair, & to insist that positive orders be without delay sent to M^r. Le Blanc, if he has not already had them, to proceed immediately on the Demolition of the great Sluyces on the Canal of the Moer, & in a word of everything necessary to fulfill to the least

¹ Bergues.

title what is promised in the 9th Article of the Treaty of Peace.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 28.*)

Whitehall 19th Dec^r 1713.

. The secret which Mons^r de Torcy exacted has been inviolably kept, and the Paper containing Prince Eugene's Propositions, and the Answers of the Marshall de Villars has passed into no hands besides my own, except those of her Majesty, and of the Lord Treasurer. Neither side appears very much in earnest in this Negociation by these Accounts; and yet I believe the French truly desire a Peace; whereas perhaps the Emperor is so much a Stranger to this desire, that the thing, which You wonder he does not apprehend, is the very Event, which he waits for; and on the prospect of which his scheme of Politicks is raised. The House of Austria owes a great deal to the blending of her Interests with those of other States. Had she stood more by herself, had she had only her own Merit to recommend her, and her own Strength to support her, She would neither have come off so cheap under Misfortunes, nor have gained so much in prosperity, as She had done. In short other People have generally had the honour alternately to suffer, and to conquer for the *Augustissima Casa*. In the former case are the four Circles, and the other Princes and States of the Empire at this time; whilst the Arms of France are kept at bay, these People are harassed by the Imperialists, and the Court of Vienna protracts a Warr, the Scene of which is not their own Country. If the Barrier of Germany is broke and the French penetrate into the heart of the Empire, these unhappy People only change their Tyrant and have the Contributions demanded from them in a different language. But then here opens a Scene from whence so wise a Court, as that of Vienna, may, for ought I know, conceive great hopes of raising a new ferment in Europe; and a scramble will always be desired by those, who never lay down any Stakes themselves. The Circles overrun, the Country of Wirtemberg, and the Imperial and Protestant Citys subdued, may perhaps alarm those Powers who would sit quiet, if the Emperor was alone concerned, and leave him to pay the Price of his Obstinacy. The Result of all I have been saying is this, that whilst nothing is neglected to induce his Imperial Majesty to conclude his Peace, and

while France prepares, if he does not conclude, to carry on the Warr, some Expedient should be thought of to distinguish the Interests and the Cause of the House of Austria, and to separate them from those of all other People.

Though the Savoy Ministers are not satisfied with what has been declared by those of France concerning the Guaranty of the Treaty of 1703 ; yet the Queen is of opinion, and I have told the Marquis de Trivié very plainly as much, that instead of being dissatisfied, they ought to be contented, and thankful. His most Christian Majesty acknowledges himself equally with the Queen and the States General engaged to procure to the King of Sicily the full effect of his Treaty, and promises to insist hereupon in that Treaty which he shall conclude with the Emperor. The Catholick King must and will no doubt for the same reason come into the same measure. This surely is to be looked on as a very considerable additional Security, and form such a Confederacy of Power as can never want means to accomplish their Ends. The Means proposed by the Sicilian Ministers are indeed lyable to the objections, which you make in a former Letter, and to many others. We must wait to hear from my Lord Peterborow. In the mean time, whenever You speak to the French Ministers on this Subject according to what is above written, You will take care to make them at the same time understand that these Instances of the Queen's are not purely *par manière d'acquit*, but that She takes the matter very much to heart, and, though She will not follow precipitate measures, that She will however at a proper Season be ready to pursue such as shall be effectual. It will be proper that the Baron Peron should know You speak in this style.

M^r Whitworth, M^r Murray, Sir Joseph Martin, and M^r Frederick Herne are appointed Commissarys of Trade on the Queen's part, and their Instructions are ready, so that we only wait for those from your side to set to work. Mons^r Delafaye, a Gentleman recommended to me by Mons^r de Torcy, as being in his Confidence, goes hence on Monday. He had the other day the honour of being presented to the Queen ; Her Majesty desired him to make her Compliments to the most Christian King ; She told him She was so perfectly satisfied of Mons^r de Torcy's good Dispositions towards compleating the Union betwixt the two Nations, that She had commanded me to acquaint him for that Ministers Information with such matters as She judged necessary to render the Treaty of

Commerce effectual ; and her Majesty was pleased to add that the only way which She knew of confirming the Peace, and of establishing a durable Friendship between the two Nations was by opening an easy and beneficial Communication of Trade. What I told Mons^r Delafaye was in effect this, that having found by Letters of yours writ after the arrival of Mess^{rs} Anisson and Fenelon in Paris, as well as by Conversation had with those Gentlemen a little before their departure hence, that some Propositions were advanced contrary to what had been always understood, and to the plain meaning of the Treaty, her Majesty would direct her Commissarys, before they proceeded to the Consideration of any of the Points referred to, settle with those of France whatever may have been insinuated to be dubious, since it would be a vain thing to talk of matters built upon and subsequent to the Treaty till we understand one another on the Treaty itself ; that therefore the Text must in the first place be purged from all pretence of Ambiguity, that if this be fairly done, her Majesty hopes the Bill required by the 9th Article may be passed early, and the Commissarys may afterwards proceed to other Considerations, many of which we apprehend to be very important, and are perswaded that much advantage may accrue to the Subjects of both Crowns by an amicable Negotiation of these Commissarys on the foot of that part of the 9th Article by which their Meeting is stipulated, and on the Principles therein contained.

Inclosed You will find three Propositions which the Lords Commissioners of Trade are apprehensive have been called in question, and which must be settled in the first place. If we get over them, we get over all our Difficultys. If we do not, we can upon no Point break so properly as on these. But the Queen is willing to promise her self better things ; since we understand these Matters no otherwise than the plain and genuine Sense of the Treaty imports ; and since the Advantages of this Treaty to Great Britain, which the French have vaunted so much, would be considerably diminished, were some modern Constructions of the Treaty to take place.¹

I have at present neither time to say more to you on this Subject, nor on any other, but will endeavour in the beginning of the Week to explain a little more fully to you that which must determine

¹ These were subsidiary questions as to the position of the commercial relations of the two countries now that the Bill for the commercial treaty had been thrown out.

whether there shall be any Commerce or no between the British and the French Nations.

(P.R.O., *Foreign Entry Book 28.*)

Windsor Castle Dec. 29th 1713.

. We are not quite satisfy'd with the Behaviour of the French on the Subject of Dunkirk. They are much deceived, if they imagine themselves able to impose on us by such gross Artifices as they have put in use. Experiments of this Sort can only end in their own Shame. I spent some time, more than the matter deserved, in going over the other night with Mor. d'Iberville, every Point relating to the Demolition of this Place which we had to speak upon, and I am now to state to you what he represented, and what you are to say on each.

First he affirm'd that several Sluices, no matter how few, how many or which, were erected and maintain'd to preserve the Country from Inundations and did only serve *par accident* to the cleansing the Harbour of Dunkirke. That these Sluices were therefore not strictly within the Letter of the Treaty, and that the Demolishment of them would be so great a Cruelty to the poor People of the adjacent Country as he was confident the Queen did not design.

The answer to this, which you must give, and which the Queen will certainly insist upon, is, That by the Treaty all things are to be destroy'd which *cluendo Portui inserviunt*. No distinction is therein made of what contributes accidentally and what directly to this purpose. The French Ministers, when this Article was debated at Utrecht, did insist to have an exception made in the Treaty, as they would now make an exception in fact. It was positively refused them, and they submitted. Right therefore there is none on the part of France, and if the rigour of this Article was to be softned it could only be asked as an act of free Grace and Indulgence. The Queen did then, has since, and still continues to order her Servants to say, that if any Sluice, not sufficient on one hand to keep the Harbour of Dunkirk open, and of the other hand of such consequence to the People of that Neighbourhood that the Sea would break in or other waters not go off, and a Track of Country be entirely drowned on the Demolition of it, should appear, her Majesty would be far from insisting on unnecessary

ruine, and in compassion to the poor Inhabitants would perhaps let such a Sluice remain. But this is far from being the Case, and therefore as the Queen is not obliged by Treaty, so neither is She induced by Charity to allow any of the Sluices to be spar'd. Her Majesty's officers at Dunkirk, who are every way to be depended on, do assert that, after the Strictest Examination and most exact Survey, having taken the Levels of the Country and of the Waters, they find these Sluices, every one of them, of use to the Preservation of a Harbour, and that all the Water, which it is apprehended will drown the Country, may be carryed off either by Gravelines, as it anciently was, or by the way of Nieuport. This they are ready to demonstrate on the spot to the French Ingeniers, or any others appointed for that purpose. As Your Court does not really intend what they profess to mean, but under the charitable pretence of having¹ the Country would save the Harbour, it is not likely they will submit to any Demonstration so far as to own a conviction. But let that be as it will, upon this state of the matter Mo^r de Torcy will, I persuade myself, be too reasonable to expect that We should depart from insisting on the entire Destruction of all the Sluices. You will do well to let him feel, and through him the King, that the Queen sees very plainly the Correspondence between his Officers and the People of the Town, who are unwilling to lose their Harbour, and that She looks on the Preservation of his Majestys Country, for which She would have all possible regard, to be out of the Case.

The next thing Mo^r d'Iberville insinuated was, that Our Officers would insist on the Destruction of the Houses built for Officers, and of the Cazernes. To this it is sufficient to answer that Coll: Clayton, who is just come from Dunkirk, assures me they neither have ask'd nor intend to ask any such thing. This officer makes another matter plain to me which, as Mo^r d'Iberville explain'd himself, I did not very well understand. The French Envoy said he hoped the Queen would leave at least a *Cloture de Jardin*. Now, Sir, it is necessary you should know that, by agreement with the Intendant, Mo^r le Blanc, as fast as they proceed'd in demolishing the works, so fast the vacant space was pallisado'd, to prevent the mingling of our Soldiers with the French, and other disorders. The Ingenier of France did indeed propose, but the Queen's officers

¹ *Sic.*

absolutely and justly refus'd to suffer it, that instead of Pallisadoes a Wall might be erected, and this is the *Cloture de Jardin*.

Another Point which Mons^r d'Iberville touched gently, and indeed I believe he was ashamed of it, was this, that the Fort Louis being in the country of Bergues ought not to be deem'd to belong to Dunkirk, nor by consequence to be demolish'd. It was answer enough to reply, as I did with some warmth, that Fort Louis is within the *Camp retranché*, that they put it into the Queens hands as part of Dunkirk, and that as such it must be lay'd in the Dust. There is another Point which you will not mention unless you are spoke to of it, till further order, because We are a little doubtful and M^r Secretary Bromley writes to Coll: Armstrong to have it explain'd. The French agree to destroy the Jettées, cut off the Piles, and take up the Chests of Stones, but think that it is unnecessary to pull away the Fascinage, or Bed of Fagots, which lyes under, and is the Foundation of the whole Work. If you are spoke to you will say you expect orders, but certainly that the Foundation is part of the Edifice, and therefore comprehended within the Terms of Our Stipulation.

(P.R.O., *Foreign Entry Book* 28.)

Whitehall 11th January 1713/14.

. The Queen sees very plainly by the Emperors insisting not to have the King of Sicilies Treaty mentioned in the Preliminaries, that he continues in the design of attempting to divest him of that Kingdom, & that he will not only refuse to make good the unexecuted articles of the Treaty of 1703 but will even try to wrest from him those Territories which by Virtue thereof have been yielded to him; & her Majesty from the knowledge she has of the Emperors Temper, takes it for granted, that he is encouraged in these views by France's acquiescing to leave the King of Sicilys Treaty & the Princes of Italy out of the Preliminaries; & from these considerations She judges that it will be very difficult to prevent a War in Italy.

But on the other hand She observes with Satisfaction, that the Negotiations at Rastat are not Definitive, but that, before the conclusion of the Peace, a publick congress is to be held which will afford an Opportunity of bringing the Emperor to an *Eclaircissement* & She makes no doubt, but that the most Christian King is fully determined to perform the Engagements which he lies under

to the King of Sicily, & to bring his imperial Majesty to terms of agreement concerning that Kings interests, or else that he will Join in forming such a concert, as may in all human probability render any Attack which the Emperor can make ineffectual.

Lord Bingley, who will set out immediately to Spain, has orders to demand of the Catholic King an acknowledgment of this Guaranty to the King of Sicily, as has been already made by his most Christian Majestie, & without doubt he will meet with no difficulty in obtaining it.

Lord Strafford who goes this Week to Holland, is likewise instructed to tell the States General in plain terms, that if they expect the Queen should make good those engagements which she has entred into in favour of them, they must no longer hesitate to execute a Guaranty which She has undertaken in conjunction with them, & which She is determined to support. And perhaps it would have a good Effect if Mon^r Chasteauneuf at the Hague had directions to call upon the States at the same time.

When you communicate to the King her Majesties Sence & the Orders She has given upon this head, you will please earnestly to press him, to take the utmost care that in concluding one War the seeds of another may not be sown, & to make up in the Treaty with the Emperor for the omission which has happened in the Preliminaries; & we hope you will find him inclined so to do, & to keep off if possible the Storm which threatens Italy.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 28.*)

Whitehall 21st Jan^{ry} 1713/14.

. What shall I say to you, Sir, on the subject of the cursed Sluices at Dunkirke? it is plain that under a notion of preserving the Country from inundations, the French drive at preserving some kind of Port; you must I think content your self to say in answer to all the plans that are shewn you, & lamentable representations that are made you, that if a Sluice erected by the Country, serving simply to secure the Country, & hemm'd into the Fortifications of Dunkirke by accident was only concern'd, her Majesty would not strictly adhere to the letter of the Treaty; but that they must give us leave to know that the Three Sluices they would save are capable of keeping a Channel always to the Sea. Mons^r d'Iberville proposed that the demolition of the Sluices might be deferr'd till the experiment has been made whether the waters

can be carried off as Mr. Armstrong & Sir James Abercrombie affirm they may; the Queen has Commanded me to answer to this that She has no objection to the beginning immediately the works necessary to preserve the Country when the Sluices shall be all destroyed, which it is the business & in the power of France independantly of her to take care of, But that her Officers persisting in their former opinion, & offering to justify the same on the Spot, the Governor is ordered over, & as soon as he arrives the Queen will insist, that every Sluice be destroyed which may serve to create or maintain an Harbour.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 28.*)

Whitehall 16 March 1713/14.

. The Marquis de Trivié has likewise again represented with very much warmth the scanty provision, which is made for his Masters security in the Treaty of Rastadt, & the little appearance that there is, of a real concern for his interest on the part of France; and as to the Emperor's designs, the messages which the King of Sicily's Ministers at Vienna & at Ausburg lately received, give but too much ground for the apprehensions which are entertained of them. You are therefore to press Mons^r de Torcy, according to your former Orders, & to let him know how much it is for the honour of all the Partys concerned in the Treatys made at Utrecht, & for the quiet & Repose of Europe, to perfect that System, & to secure the continuance of it, that therefore in the Congress which is to be held in Swisserland, it will be necessary either that his Imperial Majesty should explain himself more fully as to his acquiescence in what has been done for the King of Sicily, or else that measures should at that time without delay be avowedly entered upon to prevent any new Disturbance on the side of Italy; That to this effect the Queen is ready to contribute by sending a Minister thither on purpose, if that be thought necessary, as She will likewise do by a Minister at the Court of Vienna. Whenever the Court shall appear in Temper to give such a reception to a Minister of the Queens as is fit, (and in Confidence I may say to you, that the proper measures have been taken to sound them on this head, w^{ch} have yet awhile produced no answer), you will be able with a better grace & with more weight to press this concern for the affairs of the King of Sicily on the Ministers of France, since you may let them know that the Queen will this Spring have a

considerable Squadron in the Mediterranean; that Sir James Wishart the Admiral appointed to command, is just on the point of his Departure, & that among other Orders he is directed to be very vigilant in preventing any attack whatsoever upon the Kingdom of Sicily, & in supporting his Sicilian Majesty in the free & unmolested possession of that Island by affording him all manner of protection & assistance that is in his power.

Such a Communication as this will leave the French no room to say that they will be ready to enter into particular measures, when they know what share the Queen is inclined to take; they see what she has done; they know what her Resolutions are, & it becomes them who are under the same obligations as the Queen by virtue of their late Treatys to keep pace with her in fulfilling of them: the Ministers of Sicily, you know, are so importunate & so jealous in this affair, that you will do well to explain the substance of what you have received from me to the Baron Perron with the best grace, & in the most agreeable manner you can

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 28.*)

Whitehall 18th March 17¹³₁₄

. The French offer immediately to destroy all the Sluyces, except that of Bergues, on condition they are allowed at the same time to raze the Outworks of the Citadell. As to the Sluyce of Bergues they pretend to keep it entire till a new Channell is made to carry off the Waters.

This proposition her Majesty can by no means consent to. The Sluyce of Bergues is by much the most considerable of all, and therefore they must resolve to begin the Demolition of that too, before the Queen can think the compleat Execution of the 9th Article of the Treaty sufficiently secured. If the French will go to Work on all the Sluyces, that of Bergues included, no dispute will remain between Us; they may work on the Demolition of the Citadell as fast as they please, but till they consent to this we must insist, and surely after all that has passed it is highly reasonable that We should, that the Citadell remain untouched in the Queen's hands.

The new Channell which they propose to carry I think by Fort Mardyck may perhaps be twelve Months in making. I have heard that they own it will take up eight; if therefore they determine not to destroy the Sluyce of Bergues till this new *Ecoulement* is per-

fected, you see, Sir, how tedious this Demolition will prove, and how much longer the Queen will be obliged to keep her Troops at Dunkirk.

It is undeniably true that the Waters may be carried off by Furnes without so much as putting a Spade into the ground, and an Agreement might certainly be made to secure the free passage of them by that way in all times, in War & in Peace, but it is unconceivable why the French, if they mean nothing more than what they pretend, should refuse to trust to this Expedient, at least till the new Channell which they have projected is finished. To facilitate this matter the Earl of Strafford will joyn with Mons^r de Chateaufort the French Ambassador at the Hague, and it is not to be doubted but that the States Generall will concur in doing what common humanity requires, and what no political reasons can oppose.

Be pleased, Sir, upon these Instructions to apply to Mo^r de Torcy. You may depend on the Facts, as I state them, since the utmost care has been taken by the Queen's Officers, and I verily believe they are as well informed, if not better, than the French themselves.

(P.R.O., *Foreign Entry Book* 28.)

Whitehall 21st April 1714.

. The Marquis de Trivié gave in a Memorial on Munday, of which I send you a copy, that you may more fully see the Sense of the Sicilian Court upon the Point in Question. Her Majesty, having considered the matter, is of Opinion that the 30th Article of the Treaty of Rastadt is couched in such loose terms as to give very just grounds for the Apprehensions of his Sicilian Majesty. The Emperor is thereby bound to no more than to keep punctually the Engagements which he entered into by the Treaty of Neutrality made at Utrecht the 14th of March 1713. Now that Treaty was made *pro interim* for facilitating the negociations of Peace as appears by the Preamble to it, & in the 11th Article it is expressly said, *quod usque ad futuram Pacem cum Galliâ pangendam in universâ Italiâ &c. plena ac integra esse debeat cessatio omnium cujuscunque generis Hostilitatum*, the Expressions likewise in the 12th Article are *Res in Italiâ durante hoc Armistitio in statu, quo nunc sunt permanebunt, earumque compositio ad Pacis negotium remittatur*; from all which the Deduction seems very naturally to follow, that

if the Emperor has no other Tye upon him with respect to the quiet of Italy, than the Treaty of Neutrality, then, as this Treaty ceases to be binding at the Conclusion of the Peace with France, his Imperial Majesty may think himself at Liberty to act on that Side as he shall see good without breaking his Engagements with France ; and if no further & better Provision be made for the Affairs of Italy in the Negotiations of Peace, to which they are referred, it is plain that they are supposed to remain in the same Situation no longer than during the Term of the Armistice, which expires upon making the Peace between the Empire & France. That this has been all along the Aim of the Imperial Court appears pretty evidently from their management in the Transactions at Rastadt, & the stiffness they continually shewed in rejecting every thing that was offered, particularly with relation to the Security of the King of Sicily. This her Majesty is further convinced of by the Advices She receives, & those such as may be well depended upon, that the Imperialists continue to make warlike Preparations in Italy, & to take such measures as can have no other tendency than to disturb the Tranquillity on that side, and whom are they more likely to attack first than the King of Sicily ?

. You are therefore to insist with Mo^r de Torcy, & with the King himself, if it be needfull, that the French Plenipotentiaries at the Congress at Baden have the most express orders possible so to explain the Treaty of Rastadt in relation to the Peace of Italy, that the Treaty of Neutrality, if that term be proper in the time of Peace, or rather the cessation of Arms & Quiet intended thereby, be understood to subsist after the Peace in such manner, as that the Emperor shall not under any pretence whatsoever violate or disturb the same, nor make use of the force of Arms, nor of any other means to trouble the Italian Princes in the free & Quiet possession of what they enjoy at present ; and that the Cessation of Arms & the repose of Italy, or the Treaty for that Purpose be continued & reckon'd as a principal Part of the general Peace, & particularly of that between the Emperor & France.

This the Queen thinks to be so necessary, as well as so reasonable a proposition in it self that his most Christian Majesty will heartily & effectually concur in obtaining the Explication desired. But if you observe the least coldness or indifferency in this matter, you are to exert your self vigourously in the Queens name & to make the Ministers sensible that, if the King of Sicily in particular be not

secured in the Strongest manner by the Negotiations at Baden, her Majesty cannot but look upon him to be abandoned by France, & all that was stipulated for him in the Treatys of Utrecht to be wholly drop't, which her Majesty is hopefull will never be the case.

I am likewise directed to acquaint you that her Majesty intends forthwith to send a Minister on her part to the Congress at Baden ; & as She has extreemly at heart the abolishing the last clause in the 4th Article of the Treaty of Ryswick,¹ I am to put you in mind of the 21st Article of the Treaty of Peace with France, whereby the most Christian King consents, that in making the Treaty with the Empire, all things concerning the State of Religion in the Aforesaid Empire, shall be settled conformably to the Tenour of the Treaties of Westphalia, so that it shall plainly appear, that the most Christian King will neither have, nor would have had any alteration made in the said Treatys. This being the Engagements France is under to her Majesty on this head, you are to summon that Court to make good their promise, & to use that facility the Queen expects from this Stipulation in the negociations at Baden, where her Majesty intends by her Minister to press the Emperor with the greatest earnestness upon this Subject.

The Queen has already given assurances to the Protestant Princes & States of the Empire that She will to the utmost of her Power support them in this Point, & it must be your care that they find these made good in that part, which you are to transact.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 28.*)

Whitehall 27th Aprill 1714.

I am commanded to acquaint you that it is the Queen's pleasure that you speak again to the Minister of the Duke of Lorrain concerning the removal of the Pretender, and that you repeat what you were instructed by my Letter of the 29th of March last to say to him upon that head. You will add that as the Duke of Lorrain is a Prince in Amity with the Queen, one for whose Person She has always shown a very particular regard and a very distinguishing concern for his Interest, her Majesty cannot but expect a compliance with this reasonable desire of hers from him. In which case

¹ Religione tamen Catholica Romana in locis sic restitutis in statu quo nunc est, remanente (H. Vast, *Les grands traités . . . de Louis XIV*, Paris, 1898, Vol. II, p. 232).

She shall continue to have the same Sentiments for him as She has always had, and to keep up the same good Understanding with him. But if contrary to her Expectation the Duke of Lorrain should think fit to refuse to make her Majesty easy on this head, She must look on such a Resolution as inconsistent with the terms of Friendship which She has hitherto lived in with that Prince.

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(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 28.*)

Whitehall 6th May 1714.

. The ruin of the Kingdom of Sweden¹ has approached this long time by slow but sure steps, & is now become imminent. Finland is conquered by the Czar, & from thence this Prince is preparing to advance on one side, whilst the King of Denmark invades Schonen on the other. The Swedes can hardly assemble Troops sufficient to oppose one of these Enemys, much less will they be able to make head against both. One Defeat undoes them beyond retrieve. Stockholm is taken, & their Monarchy is no more ; whereas several Victorys would not reestablish their affairs, nor even drive the Muscovites & Danes out of the heart of their Country, since they are not able to equip such a Fleet as their Circumstances require, & are by Sea in as ill a plight as by Land.

The Heroism of the King of Sweden, & the absolute Resignation of his Subjects to his Will, are the original Cause of this distress : the inflexible obstinacy which this Prince has shewn, & the high terms he has insisted upon, even at the lowest ebb of his fortune, have made it impossible for his true friends to speak & act in his behalfe, as they might on several occasions have done with great probability of success, & do still continue to furnish those who are cooly in his interest, or who are avowedly his Enemys with very plausible pretences, the former to do nothing for him, the latter to do every thing against him.

The Congress appointed to meet, & I think now actually assembled at Brunswick, is not likely to be very favourable to him. The Emperor has old quarrells to the House of Gustavus, the Treaty of Westphalia are an Eyesore to him, the danger he ran when this King was in Saxony is hardly forgot, & in a word the aggrandizing the Czar, & bringing that Prince into the neighbourhood & affairs of these parts of Europe seems to be a principle of policy taken up

¹ Cf. *Diplomatic Instructions, Sweden*, pp. 66-7.

at Vienna within these few years. The Princes & States of the Empire in this & in all other instances appear to resign themselves to the influence of the Imperial Councils, & the Dutch are so fond of their Barrier that they would rather risque all their other Friends, the Interests of their Religion, &, which is much more valuable in their Eyes, the Interests of their Trade than expose themselves to the danger of having a Bicoque the less in the Spanish Netherlands.

These general reflexions, & such others as you will easily make on the State of Our Foreign & of Our Domestick Affairs account for the Queens remaining if not silent, yet hitherto unactive, with respect to the troubles of the North ; & perhaps if She continued so, She might have more to alledge in her justification, than many other Powers, who are tame Spectators of the destruction of Sweden. But her Majesty cannot determine to let this ever happen without making one effort against it ; & having therefore considered every circumstance relating to this business, She has directed M^r Breton to express to the King of Prussia of how great consequence She thinks it will be to hinder the Danes from invading Schonen ; with how much satisfaction She heard that his Majesty was resolved to attack the Danes in Holstein, if they should pursue their designs against Schonen ; & how absolutely necessary She thinks it for the preservation of Sweden that the King of Prussia should put these good Resolutions of his in execution. Stettin, you know, Sir, is the lure at which the Prince stoops, & her Majesty's Minister will make no difficulty of inducing the Swedes to let this be the price of the assistance they expect from him ; in giving of which M^r Breton will encourage him further by letting him know, that the Queen is determined not to be a tame Spectator of the destruction of Sweden ; that the Warr, & many other considerations drawn as well from the situation of Foreign affairs, as from the Circumstances of things at home, have hitherto hindred the Queen from interposing so effectually, as she wished to have done ; that She still labours under part of these difficultys ; but that She takes her measures, & hopes soon to be able to act in another manner, if the ruin which threatens Sweden, may possibly be suspended for some time ; that the putting off this evil day depends on his Prussian Majesty ; that the glory of this action, besides the particular advantage which he may reap by it, will, She hopes, determine him to make such a Declaration to the King of Denmark ; & finally that in case he is attacked for what he shall

do in pursuance of this design, her Majesty will take part with him & joyn in his defence against the Powers by whom he shall be invaded. M^r Pulteney is ordered to speak upon this occasion to the King of Denmark in such terms, as may convince that Prince that her Majesty does not now use this language purely *in terrorem*, or *par maniere d'acquit* towards Sweden; but that She is in good earnest to second the Declaration She makes. M^r Secretary Bromley has spoke, or will soon speak in the same manner to the Danish Envoy at Our Court.

I have troubled you with this long detail, that you may be the better able to press the French Court to take all the ways which are in their power to divert the Storm at this time ready to fall on their ancient Northern Ally; to detach if possible some of the Princes confederated against him; or at least to slacken their efforts, to gain time during which some effectual measure may be concerted for restoring the Peace of the North, which the circumstances of France, as well as those of Great Britain, will put us now every day more & more in a condition of doing. Among other things the Queen is of opinion, that it will have a very good effect, if the King of Prussia is immediately applied to on the part of France in the same manner, & to the same effect, as on the part of the Queen. She thinks such Representations made, & such Encouragement given from both would determine him.

(P.R.O., *Foreign Entry Book* 28.)

Whitehall 21st June 1714.

. The next point I am to speak of relates to the Interests of the King of Sicily. The French seem in all matters relating to this Prince to yield to the impetuosity of the German Court and to give way to the Resentments of the Emperor against him. At Rastadt he was in some sort given up, and there is little reason to expect that more care will be taken of him at Baden, if we may judge by what has lately happened in Holland. Mo^r de Chateaufort has been so far from encouraging the Ministers of Spain to insist or to make a feint of insisting on the States Recognition of the King of Sicily that he has rather hindred them from it, and has even expressed himself with dislike of the Endeavours used by the Earl of Strafford to obtain this Recognition. I have heard that he called these Endeavours *des mesures pour contrecarrer* those of his Master: be pleased, Sir, to explain this Riddle to Us. Can

France have any other Interest than that of perfecting the Settlement of Europe on the plan already begun ? or is the old Monarch still so fond of War that now he has removed it from his own Frontiers, he has a mind to be making it in Italy ? The Queen would have you expostulate very freely on this head ; whether the Scheme of Affairs shall be all unravelled, and Europe be exposed to new Confusions or not, is matter of so great importance that She must expect the French should speak plainly and categorically what their intentions are both as to the King of Portugal & as to the King of Sicily.

The Marquis de Trivié has made the same application here, which the Baron Peronne has made in France ; and I shall have Orders by the next post, I suppose, to write at large to you upon that head. In the mean while I may venture to say that the Queen will not I believe be averse to enter into a Defensive Alliance for preserving the King of Sicily in the quiet Possession of what he is at present possessed of. Since this goes no further than the Treatys lately concluded go, and not so farr as the Guaranty which She gave to the Treaty of 1703 may be construed to extend, the nature and Proportions of Succours for making these Engagements good will be matter of greater nicety with respect to our circumstances. Three things the Queen can certainly do, and has indeed already taken measures for doing : She can preserve the Communication between Sicily and the Territorys of that King in Lombardy ; She can cover the Coasts of this Island, and prevent any Invasion of it. She can keep the Pope in Awe, and perhaps hinder him from granting the Investiture of Sicily to the Emperor or from doing any thing else prejudicial to the Interests of his Sicilian Majesty. Her Fleet, by the Operation of which these Ends may be arrived at, is in the Mediterranean, but I know of no Step, which France or Spain have yet made, which looks like Assistance, or has the least favourable aspect towards the King of Sicily : the consequence from all which is that these two Powers are to explain themselves as to the succours they are willing to furnish before any thing of that kind can reasonably be asked of the Queen.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 28.*)

Whitehall 26 July 1714.

. In my letter of the 21th of last month I gave you an account of the Queen's Sense relating to the Interests of the King

of Sicily, and to the making a Defensive Alliance for the Security of his Dominions. The Marquis de Trivié's Memorial upon that Subject has been since further considered, & her Majesty being ready on her part to enter into such an Alliance, you will look upon what I wrote to you then as orders from her Majesty and Instructions for you to act upon. Accordingly you will receive by this Messenger a Power to treat and conclude on her Majesty's part, and you will please to let the French Ministers & Mons^r Peronne know that you have such a Power, and orders to make a Defensive Alliance between the Queen, the most Christian & Catholick Kings, and the King of Sicily to secure the latter in the Enjoyment of what he now actually possesses. As to the method and Proportions of Succours You will guide your Self by what I wrote in mine of the 21th of June. The Queen cannot come into any Stipulations for Subsidys, or for Assistance of Land Forces; You must therefore endeavour to conduct the matter so, that the Partys may content themselves that her share should be only the Maritime Force. These Instructions her Majesty looks upon to be sufficient to set this affair on foot; and upon such accounts as you shall send over concerning the first Conferences, which are held on this subject, you may expect more particular orders. Though it is not the Queen's intention to delay treating, nor even concluding this Defensive Alliance till the Catholick King comes into it; yet She would have you speak to the Cardinal de Giudice, who is at Paris, and let him know that her Majesty takes it for granted that his Master will joyn in this Alliance, since he is under the same obligations by Treaty to the King of Sicily, as the Queen is, and therefore naturally should enter into the same Agreement for making those obligations good.

Since I wrote thus farr her Majesty has on further Consideration thought fit to make some Alteration in the last mentioned Order. She considers the awkward,¹ and I may say unfair, Proceeding of the Court of Spain in their Treaty with the King of Sicily, and in their Cession of that Island. The Dismemberments of the Spanish Monarchy went very hardly down at Madrid, and it was no small Mortification to those Grandees and the other Courtiers to see so many rich Governments and beneficial Employments no longer in the disposition of their Master. It is therefore not impossible but the Catholick King may imagine that the Guarantys he has given

¹ *Sic.*

and the Engagements he is under to the King of Sicily will sitt lighter upon him if he avoids making himself a Party to a Defensive Alliance for the renewal, Confirmation and Enforcement of them. These Considerations, among others, have induced her Majesty to direct, that at the same time as you acquaint the Ministers of France and of Sicily that you have received Your Full Powers and Instructions, You should let them likewise know that the Queen takes it for granted the Catholick King will treat and conclude this Allyance jointly and at the same time with her Majesty & the most Christian King. To the same effect You will speak to the Cardinal de Giudice, who can have no pretence not to know the Sence of his own Court upon this head much longer, since it is now some time since you spoke to him, as I take it for granted the Baron Peronne did, and since there can be no doubt but the Sicilian Ambassador at Madrid has made the same instances as his fellow-Ministers at London and at Paris.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 28.*)

Whitehall July the 29th 1714.

. A Report has for some time prevailed here, that the King of Spain insisted notwithstanding his Renunciations, and all the other Securitys by which we hoped effectually to prevent any future Union of the two Monarchys, and to have (as he himself in his Act of Renunciation expresses it) secured the Succession of the Crown of France, at all times hereafter, to take place as if He and his Descendants had not been born, or been in the world, to be declared capable of succeeding to this Crown in his turn after the Dauphin ; and in order to this end to be immediately declared Regent in case of the King's Death and the Minority of the Dauphin. Advices have come to her Majesty pretty near to the same effect, that the Cardinal de Giudice has such Instructions, and that he is actually negotiating this matter at the Court of France.

You will see, Sir, by the enclosed Letter which I have writ to Mo^r d'Iberville, and by what I have writ by the Queen's Command to Mo^r de Torcy,¹ in what manner her Majesty takes this affair up. You will please to lose no time in delivering my Letter to the French Minister, & in letting him know, that you are instructed to speak to him on the same subject. I need not here enter into any

¹ *Bol. Corr.* II. 676.

detail, to show how scandalous, how infamous a violation of the publick Faith, and of all which we ought to hold sacred either as Christians, or as men, such an attempt as this would be, nor what fatal consequences must necessarily and immediately follow from it. Your own thoughts will suggest to you abundant matter upon these heads, and you are to deliver these thoughts to Mo^r de Torcy in the fullest, in the plainest, and in the strongest terms. After which you will observe to this Minister, that the very rumour of such a design having gone abroad, & prevailed in the world, renders it necessary for the Queen to insist on fresh assurances, that all the Engagements taken to prevent the Union of the two Monarchys shall be inviolably observed, That the King of Spain shall not in case of a Minority, be admitted to the Regency of France nor in any degree directly or indirectly have the least share in that Government, or be allowed to preserve the least appearance of the Rights or Pretensions of a Prince of the House of Bourbon. The Fate of Europe in general turns upon this Hinge, but the Queen must think herself more nearly concerned in Honour as well as Interest, than any other Power ; because She took the lead in accepting the mutual Renunciations that were made, and the other Securitys which were at the same time given, as sufficient Provisions for that great Point, which occasioned and continued the War, and which singly was of more importance, than all the other Articles of all the other Treatys put together. The Queen will therefore expect immediate satisfaction on this Point, or She will think herself obliged immediately to fall upon such measures as may enable her to oppose the attempt whenever it shall be made.

The War is ended, the Allyances by which it was carried on are dissolved, and the good Harmony which subsisted between the Powers engaged in it against France and Spain is extremely altered ; but such an alarm as this will call them all again together, a great and a common danger will soon unite those whom Pique, Mistake, and Differences of an inferior nature have disjoined.

I cannot but observe to you and you may properly enough insinuate that several things which have happened since the Conclusion of the Peace and particularly the treatment which we have met with on the head of Trade have not overmuch disposed us to a fondness for France ; and it is therefore easy to imagine what must follow unless all apprehensions of the least tendency towards an Union of the two Monarchys are instantly dispersed. Unless this

be the case the Queen must and will begin again to arm ; the extraordinary Expences incurred thereby must be a demand at the opening of the Parliament which it is intended shall sit early in the winter ; and when these expenses come to be demanded there the causes of them cannot be any longer a Secret.

Before I leave this head I must acquaint you that the Queen judges that if there be the least ground to suspect any design like that I have mentioned to be carrying on, some way should be found of applying to the Duke of Orleans who is in Interest so much concerned, and who has sence and spirit enough to know and to pursue that Interest.

The matter is delicate and must be handled accordingly, but it would be of great use that this Prince should know that he may depend on her Majesty's Friendship and on the utmost assistance which this nation can give to support him in that Rank and in those Rights which by the Treatys of Peace he has the justest Title to.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 28.*)

Whitehall 3rd August 1714.

. The Defensive Allyance which You were ordered to negotiate and for the concluding whereof her late Majesty's Full Powers were sent you, must be suspended, and you are to let the Ministers of France & Spain as well as of Sicily know, that although these Powers are in your hands, yet you can proceed to make no one step in this negociation till the King has had the matter laid before him, & till you have received new Instructions from him.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 28.*)

Whitehall 9th Aug^t 1714.

. There was nothing which the late Queen had more at heart than to put the People of Catalonia in the state in which they were before the War, and to oblige the Spaniards to conclude their Peace with the King of Portugal who had as it were thrown himself into the arms of the Queen, and resigned his Interest to her disposition. How far She was able to prevail in these two Princes the present state of things sufficiently shows. Can it be expected that his present Majesty should pursue those measures which have hitherto proved ineffectual, and content himself to make Repre-

sentations to those, who by experience he finds will not hearken to any ? You will do well to let Mo^r de Torcy know in very strong terms that this is not to be expected, and therefore that it is hoped his most Christian Majesty will, in order to preserve the good Correspondence lately established, and to compleat the Settlement & preserve the Peace of Europe, effectually (for that is in his power) and instantly interpose to save Barcelona, suspend Hostilities, and set an accommodation on foot.

WILLIAM BROMLEY, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO PRIOR.
(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 210.*)

Whitehall 31 Aug^t 1714.

Although it is probable you have received from Dunkirke the Same Complaints as are come to my Hands, yet for the greater Security I send you enclosed a Copy of a Letter of the 6th of September N.S. which I have received from Colonel Armstrong. In that you will see in what manner the Demolition of Dunkirke proceeds, and what Care is taken to supply by the new Canal what is or may in time be demolished, which their Excellencies the Lords Justices understand to be a plain Evasion of the 9th Art. in the Treaty of Peace, & therefore you are in the strongest Terms to represent to his most Christian Majesty & to his Ministers that there is nothing which the King and the Nation more expect to be strictly and justly performed as an essential Article of the Peace ; it being as necessary to the Trade and Commerce of Britain that there should be no Harbour at Dunkirke as the Renunciations are to the Tranquility of Europe.

P.S. This Letter is sent to meet his Majesty in Holland, & if approved by him will be forwarded to you, & by the Same Opportunity you will probably receive his Majesty's farther Commands.

JAMES STANHOPE, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO PRIOR.
(*P.R.O., State Papers, King's Letters 14, p. 17.*)

Whitehall Oct^r 11, 1714.

. I am further commanded by his Majesty to signifie to you that he apprehends that the 3^d, 35, and 38¹ Articles of the

¹ See Vast, *op. cit.* III, pp. 164, 165, and 177-9 for clauses 25 and 27, which seem to be those indicated.

Treaty each concluded at Baden between the Empire and France are plainly contradictory to the 21st Article of the Treaty of Utrecht,¹ by which Article all the Religious Concerns of the Empire were by the Consent of France to be settled according to the Treaty of Westphalia, whereas in the 3 Articles above mentioned, the Alterations introduced into the Empire by the 4th Art. of the Treaty of Ryswick² to the Detriment of the Protestant Religion, are not only confirmed in the strongest manner, but it is further expressly provided at the latter End of the 38th Article that no Protestation shall be allowed to be enter'd by the Parties aggrieved against so unjust an Imposition, his Majesty writes most pressingly into Germany to support the Protestant Interest on this occasion, and does command You to insist upon the offer made by that Court in the Answer given by M^r Torcy to your Memorial of the 8th Sept^r. *Que sa Majesté ne refuse pas aussi, lorsque les Ministres qui composent la Diette y seront retourné, d'ordonner à celuy qu'elle y enverra de declarer, qu'elle n'a jamais prétendüe rien stipuler au contraire des Traités de Westphalie.* His Majesty I say, does insist that the French Minister at Ratisbon doe make this Declaration, this You will represent in a Memorial, & solicit an Answer to it with all convenient speed.

CHARLES, VISCOUNT TOWNSHEND, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO PRIOR.

(*P.R.O., S.P., King's Letters* 14, p. 35.)

Whitehall 15th Nov^r 1714.

Tho' I have no particular Directions from His Majesty in relation to the Subject of your Letter of the 20th Inst. N.S. which I have in my hands, yet I am by his Majesty's Order to acquaint you with two Points which he judges to be of the greatest Importance to his Service.

The First is that by the last Mail from France Several Declarations of the Pretender's have been sent hither under Covers to divers of the Nobility & his Majesty's Servants of the highest rank ; This his Majesty looks upon as so daring and Insolent an Attempt and of so heinous a Nature that his Majesty judges it absolutely necessary for the Honour of his Crown and for the Peace & quiet of his Subjects that the Pretender should not be allowed to Continue

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

² *Ibid.*, III, p. 232.

any longer in the Territories of the Duke of Lorrain; and as his Majesty cannot but think that the Credit and Interest the French King has with the Duke of Lorrain must be effectual if he will employ his Good Offices for this End, You are therefore without any delay to present a Memorial to the French Court on this head, and represent in the Strongest manner you can the Indignity his Majesty thinks offered to himself and his Crown by this Declaration of the Pretender's, by the Countenance and Encouragement he receives from a Prince who has such a dependance on the most Christian King, that as his Majesty is resolved on all Occasions to give Proofs of his Sincere Intentions to live in a perfect good Correspondence with the French King so he can receive no greater proof of the same good Disposition in his Most Christian Majesty than in Complying with what his Majesty now desires of him and employing his Interest and good Offices with the Duke of Lorrain that the Pretender may not be allowed to Continue any longer in his Territories. You are likewise to make the same Application to the Ministers of other Princes at that Court whom You think may be any ways useful to procure their joint Instances with the Duke of Lorrain for that purpose.

The other Point, I am by his Majesty's order to acquaint You with, is, that by repeated Advices both from Spain and Portugal the Spaniards are making such Preparations of Warlike Stores and Provisions of all Sorts in Estramadura, as leaves no room to doubt of their having designs on foot very different from what has been proposed by the Steps that have been lately made to bring the Treaty on foot between the Crowns of Spain & Portugal to a Conclusion, and this receives a strong Confirmation from the last News We had of the Duke of Berwick's being stoped by Couriers from Madrid as he was returning to France.

His Majesty thinks himself Engaged by all the Tyes of Honour not to abandon so good an Ally as the King of Portugal, and therefore is resolved to leave nothing unessayed that may bring the Treaty depending between those two Crowns to the desired Conclusion, conformable to the Plan & Project concerted at Utrecht by the Intervention of the Earl of Strafford, & which indeed falls short of what was proposed in favour of the Portuguese by the Declaration which the late Queen ordered to be made in her Name of the Terms upon which She had Engaged to procure Peace for that Crown, and therefore ought to be the more firmly adhered to,

that the Portuguese did thereby give up the great advantages Stipulated for them by the late Queen's Declaration.

These being his Majesty's Sentiments of this matter, I am to signify to You his Pleasure that You represent the Same in the Strongest manner to the French Court, & that You use your utmost Endeavours to Engage that Court to concur with his Majesty to bring the Treaty of Peace between the Crowns of Spain and Portugal to a Speedy Conclusion upon the foot of the aforesaid Project concerted at Utrecht.

This his Majesty looks upon as absolutely necessary for the Peace & Quiet of Europe and therefore must Consider the Part the French King acts in it by the Influence and Authority he has with his Grandson to induce him to Consent to what is desired as the Strongest Evidence he can give of the Regard he has for the Perfecting the entire Settlement of Europe.

EARL OF STAIR 1714-1720

A FULL account of this nobleman's career will be found in the *Dictionary of National Biography* (s.v. Dalrymple), and in J. Murray Graham, *Annals of the Viscount and First and Second Earls of Stair* (Edinburgh, 1875), which contains copious extracts from the papers preserved at Oxenfoord Castle. Full use of these papers was also made by the Abbé Wiesener in his *Le Régent, l'Abbé Dubois et les Anglais*, Paris, 1891-9. Reference may be profitably made to M. Emile Bourgeois' *Secret du Régent, Secret des Farnèse*, and *Secret de Dubois*, and especially to Stair's Journal during the early years of his embassy, which is to be found in the *Hardwicke State Papers*, Vol. II, pp. 529-32.

Lord Stair was sent to France on the accession of George I, and his first duty was to lay hands as far as he could upon the papers of the Tory Government. In this he had little difficulty, but in his relations with the French Government it soon became clear that his duties, never likely to be very easy so long as Louis XIV was alive, were made yet more difficult by his own haughty temper. His quarrel with Torcy was the first of a series of personal disputes which marked his stay in Paris and occasionally jeopardized his own career and even the friendly relations between the two Governments. The most important event of his period of office was the conclusion of the Triple Alliance of The Hague in 1717, but from this, as he himself complained to Bubb at Madrid, he was excluded by the negotiation being carried on personally by Dubois and Stanhope at The Hague and Hanover.¹ But in other respects his orders from home are a good commentary on the policy of the

¹ See especially his letters of June 23 and July 7, 1716, in B. M. Eg. MS. 2172, ff. 98 and 121.

Government. The refusal to make any treaty of commerce with France (September 21, 1715) illustrates the jealousy of the Whig mercantile classes of foreign competition; the approaches to Orleans, his subsequent encouragement of James III until the failure of the 'Fifteen, and the consequent confusion of the French Government in the face of George I's representations, illustrate the flighty nature of the French Court's policy until Dubois became its weightiest adviser; the expulsion of the Pretender from Avignon and the tardy but real demolition of Dunkirk illustrate the price that Orleans had to pay for restoration to British favour and alliance.

After 1717 Stair's position becomes more important. The threatened danger to the Utrecht settlement from Spain, coupled with the tardiness of Orleans in making preparations to meet it, gave considerable work of importance to Stair, though even here, when matters were serious, he was liable to be eclipsed either by a journey of Dubois to London, or by the arrival of Stanhope in Paris. In British eyes, the most urgent need was to stiffen the Regent against Spain and to make him act against that turbulent power, and Stair was in no danger of minimizing the danger of the situation. Indeed, it is clear from his letters to Craggs that in 1719 he took a far more alarmist view of the situation than did the Government at home. His intelligence, however, was generally good, and he had secret relations with the Jacobites and Bolingbroke that gave his opinions real authority.

British policy towards the Central European Powers was largely dictated by the personal animosities of George I. Especially is this to be seen in the case of Prussia, where the family disputes between George I and his son-in-law prevented the inclusion of Prussia in the Quadruple Alliance, and, with the freakishness of the Tsar's whims, did not facilitate a settlement of the Northern question. In fact, in all the relations between Britain and the Northern Powers, the personal prejudices of George I, though they coincided with British interests in those lands, play a large part in the diplomatic instructions of the time, and so far as our relations with France were concerned, did not help the smooth working of the alliance. Mr. Chance has already pointed out how the treaty of The Hague formed an alliance, but not an *entente cordiale*, and the correspondence of the home Government to Stair concerning the northern question illustrates fully the truth of this. It is full of complaints of the insincerity of the French Government, and of the

indiscipline of its agents. In Holland Chateauneuf acts in complete opposition to the avowed intentions of the French Government; in Sweden, after the death of Charles XII, Craggs told Stair that the French "do not act openly and above-board" (March 9, 1718/19), and on June 7 Stanhope requested that La Marck should not be allowed to return as French ambassador to Sweden because he consistently acted contrary to orders. Lastly, Campredon, who was sent on a mission to Russia, displayed in 1720 the same discrepancy between his orders and his action, and although the ostensible explanation offered by the British Government was the mischievous influence of Huxelles and his clique, it is clear that in 1720 little real confidence existed between Stanhope and Stair on the one side and Dubois on the other. And when we bear in mind Stair's violent quarrel with John Law and his ruinous gambling debts, we need not be surprised at his anxiety to leave a court where his position was so equivocal.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR JOHN, EARL OF STAIR, APPOINTED TO GO TO THE
COURT OF THE MOST CHRISTIAN KING. St. James', 22nd
November, 1714.

(*P.R.O., King's Letters 14, p. 50.*)

1. As soon as You have received these Our Instructions to You with such other Dispatches, as We have directed to be put into Your hands, You are with all convenient Expedition to repair to Versailles or such other Place where the most Christian King shall reside.

2. Upon your Arrival at the Court of France, You shall take the first Opportunity to procure an Audience of his most Christian Majesty at which you shall deliver our Letter to him & accompany the same with assurances of the great Esteem We have for his Person, & of our Earnest Desire to Cultivate and improve that Friendship which is settled between Us, & to establish in the most lasting manner a mutual good Understanding between our People & Dominions respectively. You shall particularly declare to the most Christian King in Our name and by Our special Command that We are fully resolved to observe faithfully & religiously the Treaties concluded at Utrecht between Our late dear Sister the Queen of Great Britain & his most Christian Majesty not doubting

but that our said good Brother will likewise concur on his part in doing everything that is necessary to strengthen this Alliance, and to make it in all respects perfect & Compleat ; And in order to attain this good End We persuade our Selves that the most Christian King will not fail to execute with the utmost Punctuality whatever has been stipulated in favour of our Kingdoms, and that he will carry his Love of Peace so far as to contribute his most hearty Endeavours towards rendring the same more universal than it is at present & finishing the great & good Work of establishing a general Tranquility throughout all Europe.

3. Upon this Head you may put our said good Brother in mind of the impatient Expectation We are in to see the 9th Article of the Treaty of Peace relating to the Demolition of Dunkirke exactly and satisfactorily executed. And in speaking upon this subject & that of the new Canal or Port which is making near Mardyck and which joyns to Dunkirke, You may regulate your self according to the Terms of the Memorial which was lately sent by Our Order to Matthew Prior Esq^r Our Plenipotentiary at the Court of France, and according to the reply which has been made to the last Memorial sent from thence, of both which You will have herewith Copies delivered to you. And it is Our Express Will and Pleasure that You continue to press the entire Execution of the Abovesaid Article according to the genuine Sense & Meaning thereof till the same be done to Our Satisfaction.

4. You will also let Our said good Brother know how desirous We are that the Peace between Spain & Portugal should have the last hand put to it as soon as possible. We doubt not but that his most Christian Majesty will concur with Us in Opinion that this is a very necessary Work not only towards perfecting the Entire Settlement of Europe, but more particularly for rendring the Peaceable Establishment of his Grandson in Spain more secure. We therefore hope that he will use the greatest Influence and Authority he has with that Prince to induce him to consent forthwith to conclude the Treaty with Portugal upon the Plan and according to the Term of that Project which was lately formed at Utrecht by the Intervention of the Earl of Stafford¹ Our Ambassador Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary to the States General, which We take to be very reasonable, and think Ourselves in honour bound to procure for Portugal. And for your better

¹ *Sic.*

Guidance herein We have ordered a Copy of the aforesaid Project to be delivered to You with these our Instructions.

5. The Clause relating to Religion at the End of the 4th Article of the Treaty of Ryswick has notwithstanding what was stipulated in the 21st Article of the Peace with Our late Dear Sister, received such new and strong Confirmations from the Treaties both of Rastadt and Baden ; that We are highly concerned to have Justice done to the Protestants of the Empire in that particular ; In order thereunto We have procured from the Court of France a Declaration herewith given You, that our said Good Brother will not give any hindrance to the full Execution of the Treaties of Westphalia, and that he will order the Person he shall send to the Dyet at Ratisbon to declare accordingly that he never pretended to stipulate any thing contrary to the said Treaties, & will therefore wholly leave that matter to the decision of the States of the Empire. Upon this You will remind the most Christian King of his repeated promises in this behalf, and continue to urge Our Orders herein till the Same are complied with, and the proper Declaration made on the Part of France at Ratisbon.

6. Our late dear Sister having had a Promise from the most Christian King that his Protestant Subjects who were put and kept in the Gallies on account of their Religion should be released, several of those poor People were set at Liberty in Pursuance thereof ; But it appearing to Us by the Papers & Lists which will be put into your hands by Our Order that great Numbers of Protestants, which We take to be included in that Promise, do still continue in the Gallies, We being moved with a tender Compassion towards their sufferings do hereby direct You to take all proper Opportunities of applying to the French Court for a full and generous Performance of that Promise, not only towards the Galerians, but toward such unfortunate Persons as have been thrown into prison and other places of Confinement in France on Account of a Conscientious Adherence to their Religion. This you will represent to our Brother as an Act of Goodness, which will in a particular manner oblige Us, and which is still owing to the Memory of Our said late dear Sister.

7. Whereas both Houses of Parliament did address Our late dear Sister to give orders to her Ministers at the Court of France to make Instances for removing the Pretender to her Crown out of the Dominions of the Duke of Lorrain, as what was absolutely

necessary for the Peace and Ease of her Subjects, but notwithstanding thereof the said Pretender continuing still in those Territories, & We being no less careful of the Quiet and Welfare of Our Kingdoms, and desirous to remove as far as possible from them a Person who is a known Enemy to Our Undoubted Right to these Our Crowns, and who by being protected in a Country so near to Us may more easily give Encouragement to ill designing People to Endeavour to create Disturbances among Our Subjects, have thought fit hereby expressly to Command You to make application in the most earnest manner both to the Ministers of the Court of France, and to all others who may be useful to that Purpose, to procure their joint Instances to the Duke of Lorrain not to suffer the said Pretender to remain in any of his Territories. We doubt not but the most Christian King may in this Affair have a very great Influence over the said Duke, and if he shall exert it on this occasion he will thereby give us a particular Mark of his Friendship and Esteem for Us.

8. You are to take Audiences of the several Princes and Princesses of the Blood, according to the Practice of that Court, and to deliver Our Letters with Suitable Compliments and Assurances of Our Friendship and Value for them.¹

9. Whereas the Electoral Prince of Saxony is now in France, and as We are informed very much Exposed to the Designs and Temptations which have been for some time put in Practice to

¹ The French draft instructions to Stair in *P.R.O. France*, Vol. 162, fo. 519v., contain the following important addition to this clause:

“Mais nous trouvons à propos de vous ordonner d’une maniere particuliere de tacher par tout moyen d’entretenir la plus etroite et la plus intime Correspondence que vous pourés avec notre Frere, le Duc d’Orleans; pour cette fin vous profiterés de chaque occasion qui se presentera pour l’asseurer en notre nom combien Nous sommes prêts à favoriser et soutenir son Droit à la succession de la Couronne de France, comme elle a esté établie par les derniers actes de Renunciation. Vous l’encouragerés à s’appuyer sur nous et sur nos Royaumes pour avoir l’assistance la plus efficace, lorsque le Cas arrivera. Et vous tacherés de Luy persuader par les motifs les plus pressans que vous pourés employer à vous faire ouverture de ses veües afin de concerter par avance un plan sur lequel on agira et l’on disposera les affaires en sa faveur. Et comme nous le jugeons etre d’une grande importance pour son service, aussi bien que pour le notre d’avoir connoissance du contenu du Testament que notre bon Frere a dernièrement fait, et envoyé au parlement de Paris, pour y estre gardé en seureté, vous aurés à employer toute votre habileté et votre sçavoir faire ou aupres du dit Duc, ou par quelque autre Canal que vous pourés pour parvenir à la connoissance de ce qui est contenu dans le dit Testament.”

seduce him from the Protestant Religion ; besides that it is Apprehended that Endeavours will be used to get him to marry in that Kingdom ; We having extreamly at heart the Welfare of our holy Religion, and the Honour of that Young Prince have thought it highly necessary to direct You to wait upon him, and to make him such Compliments, as are proper, in Our Name, assuring him of the real Affection We have for him, and of Our hearty Concern to promote his true interest. And as it is very probable that those who are set to pervert this Prince will be very watchful to hinder any Impressions to be made contrary to their designs, You are by the best Methods You can to insinuate Your self into a familiarity with him, and to lay before him as frequently as possible, and in the most persuasive manner You are able all the Arguments that are proper to prevent him from falling into the Snares which are laid to deprive him of his Religion and his Honour, by turning him Papist & marrying him in France. We hope it will weigh much with this young Prince to think of his Ancestors, whose names are great and glorious for protecting the Reformation in it's Infancy, and for rescuing thereby the pure Doctrines of Christianity from the Errors and Superstitions of Rome. This gave Lustre to his House, and set them at the head of the Protestant Interest in Germany, and We persuade Ourselves that he will have so lively a Sense of the Glory of his Family as to keep stedfast to the Religion he has been Educated in and never comply with those dishonourable Views, which the Papists, the Ancient and Inveterate Enemies of his Predecessors, Religion and Country, are now endeavouring to throw him upon.

10. If the Ministers at the Court of France should make mention to You of the affairs of Sueden, and sound You as to our Disposition towards Assisting that Kingdom in their present ill Circumstances, You may let them know the Part that Great Britain has all along acted with Respect to Sueden, and that nothing has been wanting that was proper & Seasonable to procure their Welfare. That our late dear Sister concluded a Treaty of Neutrality for the Empire with a View principally of preserving the Swedish Territories and Troops in Germany, that she sent Forces in order to support that Neutrality ; that by her Continual Exhortations & good offices she Endeavoured to bring Matters in the North to an Accommodation but that all her Efforts and Instances were in vain, the King of Sweden could never be brought to hearken to any practicable

proposals that were made to him, and persisted always to act in a manner so contrary to the Advice of his best Friends as rendred it impossible to save his Dominions from that Ruin and Desolation which has since fallen upon several of them. However if that Prince on his return changes his former Methods of acting & give way to Measures which may with reason be put in practice for his Reservation ; We have so great a Desire to Contribute thereto, that We shall on all occasions shew our Readiness to do him the best Service We can.

11. Whereas Jaques Frederic de la Forest Susannet, Son of the late Marquis de la Forest has humbly represented unto Us his Case with respect to his Estate, which has been seized in France, We thinking his Claim to be just & well founded, and having a particular Consideration for him, have ordered a Memorial relating to his Pretensions to be put in Your hands, and You are accordingly to make the proper Instances in Our Name at the Court of France for obtaining the Estate in question to be restored to the said Jaques Frederic de la Forest.

12. As soon as it shall be for Our Service that You take upon You the Character of Our Envoy other Crowned Heads.

13. You shall carefully observe the motions & Intentions prejudiciall to the established Peace.

14. You shall entertain a good Correspondence to the Welfare & Advantage of Our Dominions in particular.

15. You are likewise to correspond in your respective Posts more successfully.

16. You shall protect & Countenance Our Merchants duly & punctually observed.

17. And Whereas Our Royal Predecessor not to insist to have the hand from any Ambassador in his own house, &c., &c.

18. Of all matters which you shall learn observe accordingly.

19. At your Return present condition of that Government and Kingdom.

(P.R.O., King's Letters 14, p. 62.)

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR JOHN, EARL OF STAIR. St.

James's 24th Nov^r. 1714.

Whereas by Our Instructions to You bearing date the Two and Twentieth Inst. You were directed to make Application in the

most earnest manner both to the Ministers of the Court of France, and to all others who may be useful to that Purpose, to procure their joint Instances to the Duke of Lorrain not to suffer the Pretender to remain in any of his Territories; And Whereas since that time there has appeared here in Print a Declaration of the said Pretender's transmitted from France under Cover to Divers of our Nobility and Servants, highly reflecting upon Our just and undoubted Right and Title to these our Crowns and tending to the Alienating the minds of our Subjects from Us, and to the Disturbance of their Peace & Quiet, We judging it highly necessary that so daring and insolent an Attempt should not pass unregarded, have therefore thought fit again to require You to press that Court without any delay to joyn their Endeavours and Efforts with Ours to prevail with the Duke of Lorrain that the said Pretender be not any longer allowed to continue in his Territories.

You are to make use of the aforesaid Declaration as a Motive to justify Our urging and pressing this, as at the Same time it will give the French King an Opportunity of convincing Us the most effectually that may be of his sincere Intentions to live in a good Correspondence with Us by complying with this which We propose as absolutely necessary for that End.

(P.R.O., King's Letters 14, p. 64.)

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR JOHN, EARL OF STAIR. St. James's
24th Nov^r. 1714.

Whereas the Resident of Our Dear Son the King of Prussia at our Court has represented to Us in his Master's Name, that though by the Treaty between him and the most Christian King the Title of the former to the Principality of Neufchatel is acknowledged, and the Subjects thereof are entituled to the Same Rights and Immunities in France as are enjoyed by the Subjects of the Swiss Cantons, yet in the Article of inclusion, in which the French Court comprehends the Helvetic Body, & enumerates it's Allies & Co-allies, there is no mention made of Neufchatel, and the French King refuses to the Inhabitants of that Principality, the Privileges they formerly possess in France, and which are at present enjoyed by the Swiss, We having a sincere desire to promote the Interest of our said Dear Son the King of Prussia, have thought fit to require You as soon as You arrive at the Court of France to confer fully on this head with the Minister of the King of Prussia residing

at that Court, and to give him all the Assistance You can by your good offices in our Name that the aforesaid Nomination be rectified and the Principality of Neufchatel included and the Subjects thereof allowed the same Rights and Immunities as are granted to those of the Swiss Cantons.

JAMES STANHOPE, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO STAIR.

(*P.R.O., King's Letters 14.*)

Cock-pit Feb. 2nd, 171^½

. Monsieur d'Iberville who was with me this morning, will, I dare say, confirm to his Court the Account I give you of our Elections, by his discourse I find your behaviour there hath extremely embarrass'd them, especially they are very uneasy to know whether you are to stay there or not. Monsieur D'Iberville told me frankly that they were alarmed upon Insinuations that fell from you as if you were to return, which they should look upon as a plain proof that We intended to break with them ; all the answer I made him was, that as you went without any Character, no time had been fix'd for your stay there ; he then asked whether it had not been resolved that after you had acquitted yourself of that Commission you should remain there with a Character. I told him with great frankness that no Resolution of that kind had been taken, but that it would very much depend on your Lordship, whose representations here would certainly govern Us as to the disposal of your own Person ; he then asked me whether it was not the Kings intention to keep a minister there ; I told him I believed it was, and that We certainly were desirous by all means possible to cultivate a good understanding with them, and hoped they would encourage this Disposition of the King's. Since writing what goes before, I am told that your messenger Gordon was ill us'd at Calais, himself will give Your Lordship an account of it, upon which you will best judge how farr it may be proper to mention it to M^r Torcy. The Dutch have agreed, and which is more, have settled a fund for equipping a Squadron to joyn with ours in the Baltick. I hope the account of our Elections will likewise influence the Ministry of Vienna, I say the Ministry, for 'tis certain the Emperor does himself desire to be well with his old friends.

[For an extract from a despatch from Stanhope to Stair regarding Dunkirk, dated February 17, 1715, see *Annals*, I, 261.]

(*P.R.O., King's Letters 14.*)

Whitehall March 4th 171⁵.

I acknowledged by last night's post the receipt of all your Lordship's Letters to the 8th March which have all been laid before his Majesty who is so well satisfied with your whole Conduct, that he thinks no better Instructions can be given to your Lordship than to continue in the same manner you have begun. His Majesty approves of your giving in a new Memorial and the Accounts your Lordship will have received from Dunkirk will enable you to make it appear more fully than before how insincere their proceeding hath been in this whole matter; but for fear Sir James Abercrombie's Letters to your Lordship should have miscarried I send you his Letters to me of which I am sure you will make a good use. If the Ministers in France, who are against giving satisfaction to the King, have built upon any Intelligence from hence, I dare assure your Lordship that they will find themselves mistaken since there never was in this Island a more promising prospect of a perfect good understanding between King and Parliament. The Step which the King now commands you to make in relation to Majorca is a most convincing proof of two things, first that We are not at Vienna upon the foot they would have it imagined, and secondly that the King is sincere in his Endeavours to promote peace everywhere, he hopes and wishes that France by an exact Compliance of the Treaty of Peace on her side will encourage in His Majesty this good Disposition. The Emperor's sending Troops to Majorca, in hopes of engaging Us to take part in the Quarrel, the instances which I may say to your Lordship he hath made with the King to support that Island with his Squadron, are convincing Proofs that if we had a mind to quarrel we should not want Allies. Your Lordship sees what Turn the King hath given to this affair, and you will, I am perswaded, take particular Care to make that Court sensible that the only way to engage the King to continue his offices whenever it may be necessary for preserving peace, is an exact Compliance with what We are entituled to by Treaty, from which it is not to be expected his Majesty will depart. . . .

(*P.R.O., King's Letters* 14.)

à Whitehall ce 4^e Mars. 1715 $\frac{1}{2}$.

. [Le Roy] prévoit que l'Engagement que pourroit prendre l'Empereur et le Roy d'Espagne, l'un de Soutenir et l'autre de forcer l'Isle de Majorque, Seroit une occasion qui pourroit avoir des Consequences tres prejudiciables au Repos de l'Europe. Il n'a pas manqué de le représenter à une des Parties intéressées, et Il vous ordonne, avec plaisir, d'annoncer a[u] Roy Tres Chretien, que Ses Offices ont produit à la Cour Imperiale tout le Succes qu'Il en pouvoit attendre ; l'Empereur accepte le Roy comme Mediateur de ce Different, et le Roy vous ordonne d'en faire part au Roy Tres Chretien, Souhaitant que, par l'Entremise de sa Majeste Tres Chretienne, le Roy d'Espagne vüeille aussi finir cette affaire par voye de negotiation. Quant aux Conditions, le Roy se fait fort d'obtenir que l'Empereur fera evacuer ladite Isle, apres quoi Il croit que l'Espagne auroit mauvaise grace à refuser que l'on voudroit Stipuler pour des Gens qui par cette Convention deviendroient incessamment Ses Sujets. Si la Cour de France agréee cette Proposition, on pourroit, il nous Semble, pour gagner du tems, faire en Sorte que la Negociation Se passe entre vous, Milord, et tel ministre du Roy tres Chretien qui seroit autorisé par le Roy d'Espagne.

[An extract from a despatch dated March 31, 1715, on the subject of Lord Bolingbroke's conduct in France will be found in *Annals*, I, p. 262.]

(*P.R.O., S.P. France, Vol. 160, fo. 78.*)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR JOHN, EARL OF STAIR, MINISTER AT THE COURT OF THE MOST CHRISTIAN KING. St. James's, 30th April, 1715.

[*Copy*]

Whereas out of Our Sincere Zeal for the Peace of Europe, and out of Our Compassion for and tender regard to the present Circumstances of the Inhabitants of the Islands of Majorca and Ivica, We did propose to Our Good Brother the Most Christian King, the interposing of Our good Offices with the Emperour, and of his with his Grandson the King of Spain, that a Treaty should be set on foot for composing in an amicable way all differences in order to the evacuating the foresaid Islands as also for the more full Execution of the former Treaty Concluded at Utrecht for evacuating Catalonia ; And Whereas We understand that Our good Offices

on this head have had the desired effect, and that on the one hand Our Good Brother and Ally the Emperour has given you a full power and on the other hand the King of Spain was given the like power to such as shall be named by the most Christian King to treat upon and conclude the foresaid matter, We being willing on Our part to contribute to the promoting so Pious and laudable a work, have also vested you with Our full Power under Our Great Seal of the date hereof. And Whereas We have seen and considered the Instructions given to you by the Emperor, We have therefore thought fit, as We do by these presents, [to] direct and require you to regulate your self by these in the Management of this Treaty, and to use your utmost endeavours to procure to the People and Inhabitants of these Islands of Majorca and Ivica as many of the Conditions, Privileges and advantages desired by the Emperor as possibly you can, as also what he proposes as farther necessary for the more intire Execution of the Treaty for evacuating Catalonia, if you find it practicable.

You are however to take care that nothing be concluded in this Treaty that may be any ways prejudicial to the Correspondence and Commerce that has been between those Islands and Our Island of Minorca; You are on the contrary to endeavour that it be expressly stipulated in the Treaty, that the Inhabitants of Our Island of Minorca shall have the same access to, and freedom of Commerce with the Islands of Majorca and Ivica as they enjoyed before the late War when these several Islands were under the Joint Dominion of the King of Spain.

JAMES STANHOPE, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO STAIR.

(*P.R.O., King's Letters 14.*)

Whitehall 30th April 1715.

. Your Lordship is therefore directed to pursue this affair of Majorca as closely as you can, for which end your Lordship has herewith a full Power and Instructions from His Majesty.

Your Lordship will observe, that by the full Power you are only to treat with such Persons as the French King shall name on his part, this Treaty being only to be concluded between the two Kings of Great Britain and France, to avoid the Difficulties which must necessarily arise in the negotiating this matter if the Emperor and King of Spain were to be directly concern'd therein, their several Full Powers to the French King and yourself being only to be

considered as vouchers of their Consent to the Terms and conditions on which His Majesty and the French King shall agree for the evacuating the Islands of Majorca and Yvica, which was likewise the method observed, as your Lordship may remember in the Treaty for the evacuating Catalonia of which I have ordered Mr Pringle to send your Lordship a Copy, in case upon this occasion it may be of use to you, and you may not have it by you.

As for your Instructions your Lordship will observe they are general referring you to the particular ones you have received from the Court of Vienna, it were to be wished the Conditions and advantages propos'd for those poor people could be obtain'd, but as this is scarcely to be expected, your Lordship's endeavours must be to procure the best you can, and if there is any material difference between your Demands in their favour, and the offers made by the French Court, your Lordship will acquaint His Majesty with it, that you may receive his orders thereupon.

Your Lordship by your Instructions is directed in this Treaty to have regard to the interest of His Majesty's Subjects in Minorca, and indeed upon very good grounds, for the Island of Minorca has been so constantly supplied with several of the necessaries of Life from Majorca and Yvica, that if any stop is put to this Commerce, or any Bar laid upon it by Impositions of Duties or any such way it must be of very bad consequence to the Inhabitants of that Island, and therefore your Lordship is to have this under your special care.

As to the affair of Mardyke I am to tell your Lordship, as I have done at other times, that His Majesty does entirely approve of your Lordship's Conduct in relation to this matter, but His Majesty having had all that has passed on this head from your Lordship's first application, to your last Conversation with Monsieur de Torcy, under his Consideration, does not think it consistent with his honour that you should so much as make any further mention of it, leaving it wholly in the situation which it is, and residing at that Court as if your only busines was the negotiating the affair of Majorca, and if they shall think fit upon this Conduct of your Lordship's, to make new overtures, your Lordship is not to listen to them unless they will make them specifick, and give them in writing, which you will receive and transmit hither, in order to Your Lordship's having His Majesty's Direction upon them. The present situation of affairs both at home and abroad We hope is such as to engage that Court to study, more than they have done hitherto, His Majesty's

satisfaction in this matter, not doubting but the affair of the Barrier will be soon concluded as we wish, the Emperor having freely agreed to what His Majesty thinks reasonable to be accepted by the Dutch, the Difficulties now being only on their side, which We hope will be soon removed. And as to the Brouilleries in the North, I hope we have not much to apprehend from them, when I tell your Lordship the King of Prussia is now wholly on the foot we would wish.

(*P.R.O., King's Letters 14.*)

Whitehall August 10th 1715.

. Your Lordship needs not doubt but with the same art and industry as hitherto, our Enemies continue to give out that all the Precautions His Majesty and the Government have taken for our Security have been grounded on false allarms, but as this does not at all lessen the vigour of the Government in pursuing the necessary measures in this Juncture, neither will, I hope, the appearance of the Pretender's Design being laid aside, cool your Zeal in procuring us the most particular Informations you can of what our enemies on that side may be contriving, since We have reason to believe their Friends and Correspondents here will not be wanting in pushing them on to renew their design, before the season of the year render it impracticable, but I am glad I can tell your Lordship, that our Levies here go on with all possible success, and I hope shall be compleated by the 1st of September and in the North all the well affected to His Majesty's Government have appeared with a surprising Spirit in a readiness to exert themselves, as there should be occasion, of which I doubt not but your Lordship will be particularly apprised by your own Friends in that Country.

As to the Malice and rage which your Lordship writes is pointed against you by the Pretender's Friends, I think that is what ought to give you the greatest satisfaction, since that can be only owing to the faithfull services you perform to your King and Country.

His Majesty approves very much of the Caution your Lordship has used in your Conversation with the Mareschal de Villeroy to make him observe, that in the King's Speech and in the Debates in both Houses of Parliament, France has not been touched, and I doubt not but your Lordship will think it proper to continue the same Caution, as you may have occasion to touch on these matters with any of the Ministers of that Court.

(*P.R.O., S.P. France. 160, fo. 101.*)

[*Draft in Stanhope's hand for cyphering.*]

Whitehall August 24th 1715.

J'ai reçu vos depeches a neuf heures ce matin du 28, 29, 31 d'Aoust et 1^{er} de Septembre¹ par Barton. Je les ay d'abord communiqué au Roy qui est tres content du detail circonstancie que vous donnez des affaires. Sa Majesté est tres satisfaite de l'accueil que vous a fait M^r le Duc D'Orleans et il tarde au Roy de recevoir la notification en forme de son avenement a la Regence afin de pouvoir luy meme luy marquer par escrit (?) la part qu'il prend a tout ce qui regarde S.A.R. et luy renouveler les assurances d'une veritable amitie et d'une resolution ferme d'appuyer ses interets toutes et quantes fois qu'il en sera besoin et qu'il en sera requis; en attendant, le Roy vous ordonne, my lord, de cultiver de votre mieux l'amitie de ce Prince et vous ne devez point craindre d'estre desavoué quelques avances que vous fassiez.

Le Roy m'ordonne de vous recommander les points suivants comme essentiels a la bonne intelligence que l'on souhaite ardemment de cultiver: satisfaction sur Mardyke, l'éloignement du Pretendant qui doit assurément estre au dela des Alpes, interdiction au sujets rebelles et declarez tels par nos lois pour le moins d'estre a Paris ou de paraitre a la cour. Comme vous avez dans plusieurs de vos lettres fait mention de quelques vaisseaux en France destinez au service du Pretendant le Roy croit qu'on ne devroit point vous refuser de faire visiter et aviser les dits vaisseaux. M^r le Duc D'Orleans pourroit aussi donner une preuve de sa bonne volonte envers le Roy, qui luy feroit grand plaisir et decourageroit extremement nos Jacobites icy, sans que pourtant ame vivante y peut trouver a redire; ce seroit d'éloigner les corps Anglois et Irlandois qui sont a present dans le voisinage et les mettre en quartiers dans les provinces éloignées. Nous autres, my lord, sommes tres persuadez qu'en peu de temps l'on suscitera bien des affaires a la Regence etablie. Le Roy n'a pu marquer sa bonne volonte que par des promesses et des assurances de soutenir M^r le Duc D'Orleans. Quand ce (*sic*) viendra aux estats, Je vous reponds que son A.R. aura lieu d'estre content de nous: mais quelque porté que l'on soit a le soutenir vous concevrez fort bien que de certaines demarches sont necessaires de son coté pour decourager nos rebelles

¹ On this day Louis XIV died.

et pour faire connoître a toute l'Europe qu'il veut bien vivre avec le Roy pour continuer et augmenter la bonne disposition que nous avons. Vous ferez valoir my lord ces raisons et plusieurs autres que vos propres lumieres vous fourniront pour engager S.A.R. a se declarer amy du Roy d'une maniere qui [puisse] imposer silence a tous nos seditieux icy . . .

(*P.R.O., King's Letters* 14.)

Whitehall September 19th 1715.

Since my last to your Lordship, I have received your Dispatches by Dr Lideldale, and by Barton the Messenger, which have been laid before the King, and I am to tell your Lordship that His Majesty does intirely approve of your Conduct and Address, by which you have brought matters to bear so, as to engage the Duke of Orleans to make such steps, as doe fully satisfy His Majesty of His Highneses good Disposition to live in a good Correspondence with him, and must necessarily deprive the Jacobites here of the hopes with which they have of late so much flattered themselves of having that Prince on their side, and of being supported from France, and though we have no reason to doubt of the Pretender and his Friends here continuing in their design, as your Lordship may judge by the accounts you receive from hence of what passes in North Britain, yet We doe not doubt, but these measures the Duke of Orleans has entered into, will have a very good effect here.

Your Lordship will continue your utmost application to cultivate and improve this good Disposition of his Highness, whom you may assure, in the strongest manner, of his Majesty's sincere Friendship for him, and of his readiness to enter into any measures that may tend to the promoting of his Interest, and for a proof of this His Majesty is willing that in pursuance of the proposition made to your Lordship by the Regent, your Lordship should immediately conferr with the Duke of Orleans, or such Minister as he shall appoint, upon the Treaty of Guarantee for the succession of the respective Kingdoms of Great Britain and France, which was propos'd to you, and what further Powers and Instructions may be necessary to bring this matter to a happy and speedy Conclusion, shall not be wanting from hence.

In the meantime to advance this matter as much as may be, your Lordship will proceed on it on this direction which I give you

by His Majesty's order ; I shall not trouble your Lordship with an answer by this Post to several Particulars in your Letters, resolving to do that fully by your Secretary, who I hope may be ready to go by tomorrow night, with all necessary Dispatches for your Character of Ambassador Extraordinary.

P.S. The two enclosed are from His Royal Highness in answer to the notifications he received.

I am further to tell your Lordship, that you may give the strongest assurances you possibly can to the Duke of Orleans, or any other you shall think fit, that there was never the least ground given for what is insinuated in your Letter of communing with the Marquis de Monteleone, but so farr otherwise that all the conversations of His Majesty's Ministers here with that Person have allways run upon heavy Complaints of the Court of Madrid, for their breach of faith, and for the Injustice and hardship done everyday to His Majesty's subjects in the Prosecution of their Trade.

(*P.R.O., S.P., France, Vol. 160, fo. 109.*)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR JOHN, EARL OF STAIR, APPOINTED AMBASSADOR
EXTRAORDINARY TO THE MOST CHRISTIAN KING. St. James's
21st September 1715.

[*Copy.*]

Whereas We have thought fit to appoint You to be Our Ambassador Extraordinary at the Court of Our Good Brother the Most Christian King, as soon as you have received Our Credential for that Character, and these Our Instructions, You shall take the first opportunity to demand an Audience of his Most Christian Majesty, and to deliver Our Letter to him, accompanying it with such Expressions of Condoleance on the Death of the late King his Great Grandfather, & of Congratulation on his Accession to the Throne, as you shall judge most suitable and proper for the Occasion.

You are then to demand an Audience of the Regent of France, the Duke of Orleans, and to deliver Our Letter to him accompanying it with the Strongest Assurances You can make in Our Name of Our entire Friendship for him, and Confidence in him, and of Our sincere desire to live in a perfect good Intelligence and Correspondence with him, and to enter into such Measures as may advance and promote his Interest and Secure a lasting and firm Peace between the two Kingdoms.

You are then to demand an Audience of the other Princes of the Blood you be treated with all the honour & Respect that are given to the Extraordinary Ambassadors of Spain and other Crowned Heads.

You are during Your Residence at that Court in the Quality of Our Ambassador Extraordinary whether with regard to Our Service or to the Concerns and Interest of Our Subjects, to regulate Yourself by Our Instructions to You, when We ordered You to repair to the Court of the late Most Christian King, and by such further Instructions as you may from time to time receive from Us or one of Our Principal Secretaries of State, with whom you are constantly to Correspond.

Whereas Our Royal Predecessor King Charles the Second not to give the hand to any Envoy in your own house.

JAMES STANHOPE, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO STAIR.

(*P.R.O., King's Letters* 14.)

Whitehall 21 Sept^r 1715.

. I did in my last acquaint you that his Majesty readily embraced the Overture made of settling an Alliance to guarantee the Succession to the two Crowns as they are settled by the Treaty of Utrecht. You may immediately enter into a Negotiation for this purpose, & I promise you no Delays will arise from hence. I foresee but one point of difficulty to your Transactions there, which, I was sorry to observe by your Dispatches, hath been twice mentioned by the D[uke] of O[rleans]; that is a Treaty of Commerce. I will tell your Lordship plainly that it is the Sense of every understanding man that no Treaty of Commerce with France can possibly be framed, that the aiming at it can produce no other Effect than to create Disputes and Animosities which we do sincerely desire to avoid. Your Lordship knows that during the Reigns of King Charles & King James, when there was an entire Confidence between the two Courts, there was no Treaty of Commerce in being, so that a Sincere and perfect Friendship may certainly subsist without such a Treaty. These are truly the Sentiments here which I am Commanded to let you know; and the King is so much for plain and open Dealing that he naturally inclines this should be told the Regent; however his Majesty depends so much upon your knowledge of that Court that he leaves it to you in what manner you shall govern your self

when this shall be mentioned again, either to state the Difficulties fairly and in such a manner as to put an End to any farther proposals, or if You shall think it more for his Service at present, to delay giving any answer and gain time, but you must carefully avoid to say anything which may encourage them to hope that a Treaty of Commerce can be made ; so tender is the King of suffering any thing to be advanced which he will not sincerely & religiously endeavour to make good.

(*P.R.O., S.P., France 160, fo. 118.*)

Whitehall 5th Oct. 1715.

[*Copy.*]

By the ordinary post of Monday last, I acknowledged the receipt of your Lordships dispatches by Gordon the Messenger and acquainted you in general with the satisfaction his Majesty received from them.

This goes by M^r Crawford with your Excellencys dispatches as his Majestys Ambassadeur Extraordinary to the Court of France of which character I wish your Excellency all joy and satisfaction.

Your general instructions, your Excellency will perceive are such as are given of course to all of that Character, and as to your particular management in what relates to his Majestys service you are directed to pursue your former Instructions, which you received when you went to that Court, excepting so far as the alteration of circumstances of affairs must necessarily occasion an alteration in them.

Your Excellency has also a full power for entering into and concluding such a Treaty as you proposed, and in pursuance of the particular instructions you have herewith for that end, as to which I shall only observe to your Excellency that the number of succours to be given by each Crown to the other is ascertained to 8000. Yet your Excellency will perceive that neither the value of the money to be sett upon these succours nor the time within which they are to be given after being demanded, nor within what time the Expence of these succours are to be repaid by the Crown which receives them, are specified in the instructions, this having been left to your Excellency to be adjusted as has been usual in Treaties of like nature when mutual succours have been stipulated of which I shall only suggest to your Excellency that of the Triple Alliance in the year 1688 and the Barrier Treaty with the Dutch.

Inclosed I send your Lordship a paper delivered to me by Monsieur Bernsdorf by which your Lordship will be thoroughly satisfied how groundless the jealousy was which was conceived by the Regent of engagements between the Northern Powers and the Emperor, and you may confidently promise the Regent that if we conclude Our Treaty with Him no engagements will be contracted with any Power whatsoever to his prejudice, the King's sincere intentions being no other than to maintain the peace of Europe upon the foot that things are now. As to the Instructions I send Your Lordship touching this Treaty, you will look upon them only as so many heads to which you will give such extension as you will judge necessary when the treaty is putt into form, and you are particularly directed to be very easy in whatever may be proposed by the Regent for effectually securing of himself in the quiet enjoyment of the Regency during the King's minority and for securing the Crown of France to him in case of failure of the present King.

It has been thought necessary to restrain this negociation purely and simply to securing the succession to both Kingdoms, least any propositions foreign to that view might begett difficulties which would delay the conclusion of it, otherwise your Lordship is sensible that we would have inserted an Article touching Mardyke which you know the King hath so much at heart, that there can never be a real confidence between the two Courts till that matter be adjusted according to the plain sense of the Treaty of Utrecht, but his Majesty is so desirous of giving the Regent a sincere proof of his friendship and of his readiness to comply with any proposal which may be for his personal interest, and his Majesty doth farther so entirely depend upon the repeated promises of his R: H: made before and since the late Kings death that he would procure satisfaction to Great Britain upon this point, that he will not insist that an Article for this purpose be inserted in this Treaty. This your Lordship will take a proper opportunity to represent and this behaviour of his Majesty will furnish you an irresistible answer to any proposals that Court might press upon you to have any Articles foreign to the point in view made part of this Treaty.

I must beg of your Lordship to lett us know how Torcy stands at Court, and at your leisure to give Us an account of that Court and who are likely to have the chief sway there. I am perswaded that notwithstanding the Regents kind assurances your Lordship will still continue to have a watchfull Eye upon our fugitives. It

would be of consequence if We could be informed certainly that Humphreville, I think his name is, was dispatched by any person from hence. Upon your Lordship's last dispatch Troops were ordered Westward and a Regiment gott very seasonably into Bristol which hath been preserved by My Lord Berkely's activity, tis to be hoped that the siezing of their chiefs and the motion of some Troops hath quashed their designs, and when the D. of Orleans's good dispositions shall be known and our Treaty signed and published we may expect this evil spirit will be quiet lay'd, in the mean time no precautions must be omitted.

(*P.R.O., S.P., France, Vol. 160, fo. 131.*)

Whitehall Oct. 20, 1715.

[*Copy.*]

. We are surpris'd to find the Regent shou'd start things which if comply'd with wou'd necessarily spin out the Negotiation to a very great length. Your Lordships answers to him are so full and pertinent that I hope they will have the weight with his Royal Highness which they ought ; but to convince him how frankly and sincerely the King is desirous to proceed in this whole matter, and how willing to comply with any desire of his which shall be consistent with the dispatch of this affair, you may in the Treaty to be made, insert an article obliging both partys to acquaint the Dutch immediately with this Treaty, to invite them to become partys to it, and to oblige each other to admit them to become Guarrantees to the Regency and Succession of France as they are already to that of England ; France becoming in like manner Guarrantee to their Barrier upon the foot of the terms settled by the King's Minister at Antwerp. If there be any sincerity at that Court I think this ought fully to satisfy them ; and certainly 'tis very much for the advantage of France as well as of the Regent to have such a security against the Pretensions of the King of Spain who hath a great number of friends in France, most of which are likewise well wishers to the Pretender. Our Treaty may upon this foot be finished in a few days, there is no reason to doubt but that the Dutch will gladly come into it afterwards ; and you may boldly promise the Regent that if there should be occasion, the King will earnestly employ his offices to engage them. If the intentions of France are really to maintain the Peace of Europe, I would gladly know whether such

a Treaty will not effectually do it, since 'tis ridiculous to imagine that France being thus secure of England and Holland, any other power can so much as think of attacking her, besides as Your Lordship has very truly suggested such a step is the only method of proceeding further, in case that should be judg'd necessary, for it cannot be suppos'd that the King will suffer himself to be amus'd by a tedious negotiation, which will give jealousy to all the world till he be really sure of the Regent's friendship: a defensive Alliance at present wou'd perhaps put the Regent under difficultys which he is not aware of. 'Tis hoped therefore that Your Excellency will be able to divert him from the thoughts of it at present. We must otherwise conclude, as you very rightly observe, that his drift is only to gain time, and wait for the event of the troubles here. . . .

(*P.R.O., S.P., France, Vol. 160, fo. 169v.*)

Whitehall 15 Dec^r 1715.

[*Copy.*]

. You need no other Instruction for your Conduct than naturally and without Affectation or Ostentation to let that Court know we think Ourselves perfectly Secure. Your Lordship may sometimes go to Court, but his Majesty will not have any Step made that should so much as look like asking any Favour or Friendship from them. If any Overtures should be made to you, you will tell them what is true, that the King had made all the advances which could possibly have been expected towards a Sincere Friendship with the Regent: they best know what Return he has met with. They may easily imagine that such a proceeding must discourage his Majesty from reposing any Confidence in future Promises or Assurances, but if they should seem pressing to be upon better Terms you may undertake to represent what they shall say to you.

(*P.R.O., King's Letters 14.*)

Whitehall 23rd Jan^{ry} 171⁵₆.

Inclosed I send your Lordship copies of the King's speech made this day to the Parliament and of the Addresses of both Houses upon it. I thought it necessary to lose no time in transmitting them to Your Lordship, because it is very probable M^r D'Tberville will dispatch this night, and that he may misrepresent what has

passed. Your Lordship will see there is not a syllable in the Speech which can give the least shadow of offence to the Regent, and care has been likewise taken in the Addresses to avoid any expression which he can take ill, unless he first will own that he intends to support the Pretender. It is true that in the Debates of the House of Commons a good deal of warmth was exprest against France, and some expressions were used by members who have no relation to the Court, nor dependance upon it, which might have been spared; it is as true that what was mentioned of this kind was received with great applause, and such a spirit was shewn, that it was the business of the King's servants, rather to moderate than to raise the passions of the House upon this occasion, for had they encouraged the temper which appeared, I do verily believe a war would have been voted before the rising of the House. The immediate result of these proceedings will be the raising sixteen battalions of foot in England, and some in Ireland. Having thus acquainted you with what past, I leave it to your Lordship to make the best use of it for the King's service, whose sincere intentions are to live in peace with all his neighbours, but to suffer no indignities from any. The Regent has told your Lordship that the bent and inclinations of the people of France are strong for the Pretender. I must tell your Lordship with as much truth, that the bent and disposition of the British Parliament is to resent the injurys of any who shall assist him. The King, thank God, can govern his Parliament, and we are willing to hope the Regent may govern the Subjects of France. Your Lordship will, I am sure, avoid saying anything which may look like menacing, but at the same time you will make that Court sensible, that the nation is resolved to maintain their King against all who shall oppose him.

[For the despatch of Stanhope to Stair of February 22, 1715/6, dealing with the conduct of the French in encouraging the Pretender, whom, it is urged, they must no longer protect, see *Annals*, I, pp. 309-11. A copy of this despatch is in *P.R.O., King's Letters* 14.

For a despatch from Stanhope to Stair, dated March 19, 1716, concerning the Pretender, and princes that may harbour him, see *Annals*, I., 392-4.

For other despatches, dated March 28 (though by misprint dated March 8) and April 16, 1716, laying down the conditions

upon which France will be admitted to alliance, see also *Ibid.*, I. 394. Copies of these despatches may be seen in *P.R.O.*, *State Papers, France*, 160, fo. 253 *et seq.*, and *King's Letters* 14.]

(*P.R.O.*, *King's Letters* 14.)

Whitehall 21st May 1716.

. It has appeared to His Majesty and to all his servants very extraordinary, that such an insolent liberty should have been taken by the Nuncio when there was not the least occasion given for it, and when the Article itself is so brought into the Memorial as it seems to have been only with the view of insulting His Majesty and your Excellency. And as your Excellency observes, that it has and may pass through so many hands, that it is in vain to pretend ignorance of it, His Majesty does not judge it for his honour, and the Dignity of your Character, that such an Insolence should pass unresented, and therefore your Excellency is directed as soon as you receive this, to present a Memorial to the Regent in the strongest manner, representing to His Majesty's very great Surprise, that His Highness should have received any memorial from the Pope's Nuncio, wherein the Pretender to his Crown, is barefacedly owned, and His Majesty's Title given to him and wherein His Majesty's Minister is so openly insulted and affronted by derogating from his Character, which has been so publickly own'd ever since his being at the Court of France, and by a false and villanous Insinuation of his concurring in and countenancing a Fact which was never once thought of, that His Majesty might justly have expected that His Royal Highness should have of himself taken notice, and shewn his Resentment of the Nuncio's extravagant and insolent liberty. That His Majesty has such Confidence in the Regent's Friendship, and is so assured of the sincerity of his Professions to live in a good understanding with His Majesty, that His Majesty is very willing to impute his overlooking this matter to Surprise and inadvertency, and therefore does not doubt but upon this Representation, his Highness will think fit, by a suitable answer to the Memorial of the Nuncio's, to give a publick Testimony of the regard he has to His Majesty, and of his disavowing and discountenancing whatever may be derogatory to the honour of His Majesty or his Ministers, and His Majesty hopes, that His Highness will think it very reasonable to use his offices with the Court of Rome

to have the Nuncio recalled, that the World may be convinced, that He who dares to affront His Majesty can never be acceptable to his Highness.

These are proposed, by His Majesty's order, as the heads of a Memorial Your Excellency will present, on which you will Yourself enlarge and enforce them with such arguments as you shall judge most proper and most suitable to the occasion, of which your Excellency will be able better to form a Judgment there than can be done here.

His Majesty cannot see any reason to recede from any of the Three points insisted upon hitherto.

(P.R.O., King's Letters 14.)

Whitehall 27 May 1716.

. . . . I am only further to acquaint your Excellency That on Friday last there was a Treaty signed here between his Majesty and the Emperor, and tho' it is not to be publick till after the Ratifications are exchanged, yet if you hear of it there, as I doubt not but you shall, your Excellency may very freely aver, that there is nothing in it that ought to give any Ground of Jealousie to the Court of France, and that it is an Alliance purely defensive, for a mutual Assistance in case of either of the Parties being attackt. I thought this Hint might be necessary for your Excellency, if you find this Point touched upon by the Ministers of that Court.

(P.R.O., King's Letters 14.)

Whitehall 31st May 1716.

By my last I acquainted your Excellency with what had passed between M^r d'Ibberville and myself on the subject of the Negotiation, and I have this Day let Monsieur d'Ibberville know that his Majesty does positively insist on the three preliminary points so often mentioned, viz^t That the Pretender shall be obliged to go beyond the Alps, that the Regent shall declare that none of His Majesty's Rebel Subjects shall be suffered to continue in, or to return to France on any Pretence whatsoever, and that Mardyke shall not be suffered to continue or be made capable to receive any Vessels of War. This Removal of the Pretender beyond the Alps, and the Regent's Declaration upon the other two points, the King must insist upon as Steps previous to any Negotiation. The minute

they are complied with his Majesty is ready to send your Lordship full Powers to negociate and conclude a defensive Alliance.

P.S. Mr d'Ibberville seemed much surprized at the King's adhering thus steadily to his Resolutions, and insinuated that His Majesty's backwardness to treat with France was an effect of the late Treaty with the Emperor, by which he seemed apprehensive some new Engagements may have been stipulated to the Prejudice of France, upon which I told him and very truly, that the Alliance with the Emperour was purely defensive. That His Majesty is too wise to suffer any Conditions to be imposed upon him by any Power whatsoever which shall engage him further than the interest of his Kingdoms will carry him. That during the time of our distress His Majesty has withstood the most tempting offers rather than suffer himself to be farther engaged than he should find it to be for the interest of his People. That his affairs are at present, blessed be God, in such a condition as to leave the King perfectly master of his Resolutions, and that he will not wantonly quarrel with any of his neighbours for the sake of any other power, but that whenever the Interest of Great Britain is so essentially concerned as it is in the Conditions which His Majesty does now require, nothing will ever deterr him from pursuing the good of his People, and that be the consequences what they will, I must tell him plainly there never would, nor could be any Friendship between the King and the Regent til satisfaction was given to His Majesty in these Particulars.

(*P.R.O., King's Letters 14.*)

Whitehall 7th June 1716.

Inclosed I send your Lordship a Copy of my Lord Townshend's Dispatch to Mr Walpole which will shorten mine to you, since by that your Excellency will be fully apprized of His Majesty's pleasure in relation to the Negociation with France and Holland. His Majesty hopes that by this Step all the world will be convinced of his Sincere Intentions to live peaceably with his Neighbours, and that a few weeks will finally conclude the Alliance which France has appeared so much to desire. His Majesty might certainly, with Justice, have insisted that the Conditions of the Treaty of Utrecht should have been complied with before he contracted any new Engagement. The removal of the Pretender from Avignon, which Place we shall always look upon as part of France, and an effectual

Provision that Dunkirk be not a Port, are Conditions which England must think itself entitled to by the last Treaty, nor do the French in effect deny this, but tell us plainly, that unless the King will come into a new Treaty which is to be an additional Security to France, we are not to expect the fruit of a Treaty so lately concluded. This way of proceeding, and the late behaviour of the Court of France during our Troubles are such that nothing but the Love of Peace and a Sincere desire to convince all mankind of this peaceable Disposition, could have induced the King so farr to comply with the Proposals of France, as to negotiate upon them. This your Lordship will not fail to represent to that Court in the strongest manner, and that His Majesty's advances in sending this Project of a Treaty are of a nature to deserve such a return as may bring this matter to a speedy and happy conclusion. Your Lordship will observe that France hath all along laboured, contrary to the King's Inclination, to avoid treating directly either with your Lordship, or with any of the King's Servants here, this method of proceeding might have given distaste & been a handle to avoid negotiating, but Since the French have chosen this way, even in this particular His Majesty is willing to condescend to what is agreeable to Them, & will send full Powers to Holland, so soon as you shall acquaint him that the Pretender hath passed the Alps, and that the French Court is ready to sign the Treaty herewith sent you, as it now stands, for I can assure your Lordship the King will not be brought to admit of the least alteration in this Project. The arguments made use of by the French Ministers to your Lordship against concluding the Treaty offered by the King for a mutual Guarantee of the Succession to the Crowns of Great Britain and France, have induced His Majesty to alter his Plan, and to model it into the only Shape they would then hearken to, that of a Defensive Alliance. This Dispatch is sent to your Lordship that you may be acquainted with the State of matters as early as is possible, but His Majesty's Pleasure is, that you take no notice of the Contents til such time as the Court of France Shall have received from Holland an Account of it by M^r Chateauneuf. Til then Your Lordship will be Silent, but as soon as They mention it to you, you will let Them see, that however fond they are of wresting the negociation out of Your hands, the King has an intire Confidence in your Lordship, and you will then make use of the arguments Suggested in this Letter, and of many others which will occur to your Lordship to

induce them Speedily to finish this matter in the manner which His Majesty has laid down; and you may very peremptorily assure them, that His Majesty hath so well consider'd of this matter, that 'twill be impossible he should be brought to make any alteration in his Plan.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR JOHN, EARL OF STAIR, APPOINTED AMBASSADOR
EXTRAORDINARY TO THE MOST CHRISTIAN KING. St. James's,
29th April, 1717.

(*P.R.O., King's Letters 13.*)

1. Having received these Instructions with your Letters of Credence, & such other Papers to which you are herein referred, you shall with all convenient speed between Us and Our respective Dominions.

2. You shall likewise desire audience of the Regent of France, the Duke of Orleans and deliver Our Letter to him, accompanying it with the strongest assurances you can make in Our Name of Our entire Friendship for him and confidence in him, and of Our sincere desire to live in a perfect good Intelligence and Correspondence with him, and to pursue all such measures as may advance and promote his Interest and secure the future Peace and Tranquility of the two Kingdoms, according to the late Treaty at the Hague concluded between Us, His Most Christian Majesty and the States General.

3. You are likewise to make suitable Compliments in Our name to the rest of the Princes of the Blood, according to the Stile & Practice of that Court Spain & other Crowned Heads.

4. Whereas by the Second Article of the late Treaty signed at the Hague between Us, His Most Christian Majesty, and the States General on the Fourth day of January and in the Year One Thousand Seven hundred and Seventeen, *The Most Christian King does promise and engage not to give leave at any time hereafter, to the person, who in the life of the late King James assumed the Title of Prince of Wales, and since his Decease that of King of Great Britain to return to Avignon, or to pass through any Territory of France under pretext of returning either to France or Lorraine or even to set foot upon any part at all of the Dominions of the said Most Christian King, much less to abide there by any name, or on any pretence whatsoever,* You are to take care that this Article be exactly and punctually observed, and to keep a Watchfull Eye on the proceedings of any

persons in the Kingdom of France, whom you may suspect to have any design tending to elude or infringe the said Article.

5. It being stipulated by the third Article of the Treaty above mentioned that *the said most Serene Kings and the Lords the States General do refuse all manner of Entertainment and Harbour to that Ally's Subjects who have been or shall be declared Rebels, as soon as a Requisition to this purpose shall be made by that Party contracting whose Subjects those Rebels are reckoned to be, and also to compell the said Rebels to depart their respective Dominions within the space of Eight Days from the time the Minister of the said Ally shall have made the above mentioned Requisition in the Name of his Master*, You are at all times to insist that none of those who have been attainted, or were engaged in the late Rebellion, or who have made their Escape from Justice upon that account, be allowed to stay in any part of the French Dominions. And in case you shall at any time be informed of the arrivall of any such person or persons in the said Dominions, you shall forthwith demand in Our Name, that they be compelled to depart the Kingdom within the space of Eight days from the time You shall have made such Demands.

6. Whereas it is agreed by the Fourth Article of the said Treaty that the Works at Mardyke shall be demolished according to a method described in a Memorial entituled *a Specification of what is to be inserted in the Fourth Article of the Treaty concerning the Chenal and Sluices of Mardyk*: and whereas by the Fourth Article of the said Memorial it is stipulated, *that immediately after the Ratification of the present Treaty a sufficient number of Workmen shall be employed to destroy the said Jettées along the new Chenal, that they may be razed, and this work finished within two Months after the Ratification, if it be possible. But it having been represented that because of the Season neither the narrowing of the Radier of the little passage nor the destroying of the Great Radier can be begun till the next Spring, it is agreed that this Work shall be begun the Fifth of Aprill Twenty fifth of March; and entirely finished in the manner above specified, if it be possible, by the end of June 1717*, You are to represent to His Most Christian Majesty that the day when this Demolition should have been entered upon is some time since elapsed, and that We have received no account from France, that they have yet begun to destroy any of the Works above mentioned; upon which you are to make the most pressing

instances that the Demolition of the said Works be no longer delayed, and that this Article be immediately put in Execution.

7. You shall also correspond from time to time with those Commissioners whom We shall appoint to be Eye Witnesses of the Execution of the said Article, and receive from them an account of what progress is made in that affair, in order to forward it, if it shall be necessary, by Your Representations to the Court of France, and by such Informations as you shall transmit to Us on that subject.

8. You shall declare the great satisfaction We have in observing the late Instances that His Most Christian Majesty has given of His readiness to make good those Engagements which he entred into with Us, and the States General in the said Treaty, particularly with regard to the removal of the Pretender from the French Dominions, and you shall give him the strongest assurances that on Our part We shall faithfully and punctually perform all those particular promises and Engagements in which We stand obliged by the said Treaty.

9. The Clause relating to Religion at the end of the Fourth Article of the Treaty of Ryswick has notwithstanding what was stipulated in the 21st Article of Peace with Our late Dear Sister, received such new and strong Confirmations from the Treatys both of Rastadt and Baden that We are highly concerned to have Justice done to the Protestants of the Empire in that particular. In order thereunto We have procured from the Court of France a Declaration herewith given you, that Our said Good Brother will not give any hindrance to the full Execution of the Treatys of Westphalia, and that he will order the Person he shall send to the Dyet at Ratisbon to declare accordingly, that he never pretended to stipulate any thing contrary to the said Treatys, and will therefore wholly leave that matter to the Decision of the States of the Empire. Upon this you shall remind the most Christian King of his repeated promises in this behalf, and continue to urge Our orders herein, till the same are complied with and the proper Declaration made on the part of France at Ratisbon.

10. You shall likewise represent to His Most Christian Majesty that We are very sensible of that Mark of his Friendship which he hath lately shown us, in releasing several of his Protestant Subjects who were kept in the Galleys or confined in other places or Prisons in France on account of their Religion ; And you are to press the Court of France very earnestly in Our Name, that all such other

unfortunate persons who suffer in the same manner for a Conscientious adherence to their Religion may also be set at Liberty.

11. You shall insist in Our Name that the French Naturalized English and their Children born natural Subjects of the Crown of Great Britain, may be entitled in the Dominions of France to the same Rights and Pretensions that are enjoyed in Great Britain by the Natural or Naturalized Subjects of his Most Christian Majesty, as stipulated in the Treatys of Peace and Commerce concluded at Utrecht the $\frac{31 \text{ March}}{11 \text{ April}}$ 1713, and more particularly in the 4, 5, 8, and 13th Articles of the said Treaty of Commerce. And for your further Information and Direction in this matter We refer you to a Memorial which shall be delivered to you with these Our Instructions.

12. You shall carefully observe prejudicial to the established Peace.

13. In speaking of Our late Proceedings with respect to the King of Sweden, you shall take care to set that whole matter in its true and proper light, by which it will plainly appear that His Swedish Majesty is the Aggressor, and Ourselves are the party injured. You shall therefore declare that upon this account We do very reasonably expect that the first Overtures and the Plan of an Accommodation should come from that Prince, and further that you cannot be fully instructed in this particular, untill such time as We can learn how far His Swedish Majesty shall disavow the Proceedings of Count Gyllenborg, and what satisfaction that Prince is disposed to give Us in doing justice on the said Minister, if he hath acted in this affair without the Consent and Authority of the King his Master. To which you may add, that We shall better know how to regulate Our Conduct in this matter when We shall learn what will be the result of the Embassy of the Count de la Marcq.

14. You shall press the Court of France, to enter forthwith into some agreement or Convention with Great Britain and Holland in order to hinder Swedish Privateers from fitting out in the Ports of any of these Three Powers and from carrying in any of their Prizes into their Harbours or disposing of them there by way of Sale, Gift, Exchange or any other manner whatsoever.

15. The Czar of Muscovy being now in France, you shall use your utmost endeavours to penetrate into his present Views and

Designs and to inform yourself of any Treaty or Negotiation which may be set on foot between that Prince and the French Court, in order to transmit to Us an account thereof, and to receive proper Instructions thereupon.

16. You shall entertain at the French Court and particularly with those of the States General of the United Provinces.

17. You shall protect and countenance Our Merchants trading to any of the Territorys belonging to France ; and use your best Endeavours to obtain relief for them upon any just Complaints they shall make to you, and on all occasions you are to see that the Treatys made with the Most Christian King be duly and punctually observed.

18. Whereas Our Royal Predecessor King Charles the Second did by an Order not to give the hand to any Envoy in your own house.

19. You are likewise to correspond with Our Ministers employed in Foreign Courts for carrying on Our Service in your respective Posts the most successfully.

20. Of all matters, you shall be informed of fit to send you, which you to observe accordingly.

21. At your return which may contribute to inform Us of the present Condition of that Government and Kingdom.

PRIVATE MEMORIAL GIVEN TO STAIR, SUPPLEMENTING HIS
INSTRUCTIONS.

(*P.R.O., S.P. France 161, fo. 78.*)

May 7 1717.

[*Copy.*]

1. Mylord Stair pourra dire au Regent et à l'Abbé du Bois dans le particulier, qu'ils ignorent pas quelle peine on a prise pour mettre toute l'Europe en repos et pour y retablir une tranquillité solide par le moyen du plan qui est sur le tapis et qu'on a mis en si bon train qu'eux mêmes sont tombés d'accord que pour parvenir à ce but on a besoin de l'Empereur, et que toute roule sur un parfait concert avec luy. Or tout ce projet est renversé si on admet le Roy de Prusse dans notre Triple Alliance et si on s'engage avec le Czar. Car l'Empereur ne pourroit regarder une telle Alliance avec des princes qui luy sont si suspects et avec tant de raison, que comme une Alliance faite directement contre luy. De sorte

qu'il faut renoncer à notre grand Projet, où modérer l'extreme vivacité avec laquelle M^r d'Iberville execute les Ordres reitérez qu'il recoit de nous presser de donner les mains à l'admission du Roy de Prusse dans la Triple Alliance ; où tout au moins il faut suspendre cette veüe jusqu'à ce qu'on scache ce qu'on a à esperer de l'Affaire du Plan. A quoi il faut ajouter que l'Alliance de l'Empereur et Sa Garantie jointe à celle de S. M. B. procureroit au Regent une plus grande Seureté par raport à la succession à la Couronne de France, que l'Alliance et la Garantie, je ne dis pas du Czar et du Roy de Prusse, mais de tout le reste de l'Europe joint avec eux, sur tout puisque la Cour de Madrit selon les derniers advis ne paroist pas portée pour l'Affaire du plan, ni disposée à se tenir à la Renontiation à la Couronne de France.

2. Pour ce qui est du Marechal d'Uxelles et du reste du Conseil, à qui cette grande Affaire est inconnüe, Mylord Ambassadeur se contentera de leur représenter en termes generaux, que comme les Engagemens que la Cour de France pourroit prendre avec le Czar et avec le Roy de Prusse ne manqueroit pas d'être envisagéz par la Cour Imperiale comme tres prejudiciable à ses Interests, il leur laisse à considerer, si on ne perdrait pas plus du coté de l'Empereur par les dits engagemens, qu'on ne gagneroit du coté du Roi de Prusse et du Czar.

3. My Lord Ambassadeur ajoutera en parlant au Marechal d'Uxelles et aux autres du Conseil, qu'on reconnoit chez nous que les raisons qu'on fait représenter icy par M^r d'Iberville sur une union avec le Czar et avec le Roy de Prusse meritent beaucoup de Reflexion, et que nous ne manquerions pas de suivre ces bons Conseils, si cette Union ne Nous plongeoit pas dans de trop grandes Difficultéz. C'est de quoi on ne pourra pas s'empêcher de conenir si on considère

(1) Le procedé de S. M. P. envers notre Roi, avec lequel apres en avoir tres mal agi depuis quelque temps comme chacun le scait, S.M.P. pretend à present le forcer en quelque façon à l'admettre dans son Alliance sans daigner luy en faire dire un seul mot directement. Il est à craindre, que si on accoutume le Roy de Prusse à de telles manieres d'agir, il se croira tout permis à l'advenir. Et il est visible que S. M. tireroit peu d'utilité de l'Alliance de ce Roy, s'il s'imaginait l'avoir forcée en quelque maniere à y entrer malgré elle.

(2) Il est à remarquer que ce Roy ne fait pas dire un seul mot

de ce qu'il veut faire pour S.M. en cas qu'il entre en Alliance avec elle ce qui pourtant en pareilles occasions est absolument requis. Enfin (3) la France elle même souhaite que S. M. B. vienne à un accommodement avec S. M. S. Or de tels engagements que le Roy prendroit avec le Roy de Prusse et avec le Czar sont tout à fait contraires à cette veüe ; ainsi il sera à propos de remettre tout resolution sur cette matiere jusqu'à ce qu'on ait certitude entière de ce qu'on a à attendre de S. M. S. et qu'on scache ce qu'aura produit l'Ambassade du Comte de la Marck.

4. A l'égard de la Paix avec la Suede on pourra dire au Regent, au Marechal d'Uxelles, et à ceux du Conseil, que notre Cour ne peut faire autre chose que d'attendre les Resolutions de S. M. S. et qu'en faisant de plus grandes avances, nous ne ferions que fournir à un Prince de l'humeur du Roy de Suede des Armes qu'il tourneroit contre nous-mêmes, sur tout puisque Nous scavons de toute certitude que le Czar est actuellement en Negotiation avec luy pour une Paix particuliere, quoyqu'à la verité, cette Negotiation ne nous allarme pas beaucoup par ce que Nous connoissons l'absolue incompatibilité qui se trouve entre le salut de la Suede, et les conditions que le Czar demande, la Suede ne pouvant pas subsister un An si elle laissoit au Czar un port tel que Revel, où il put tenir ses Vaisseaux de Guerre et aussi ses Galeres avec lesquelles il fait des Transports de Troupes dans la Mer Baltique.

5. Nous sommes surpris que la Cour de France continue à s'expliquer comme si S. M. devoit faire quelque chose pour adoucir l'esprit de S. M. S. et comme si elle lui avoit fait quelque grande offense. Il sera donc necessaire que Mylord Ambassadeur fasse comprendre aux Ministres Francois qu'un Prince qui fait tramer une Rebellion dans les Etats d'un autre est celui qui offense, et qu'il n'a aucun sujet de se plaindre de ce qu'on met en arret son Ministre. Il seroit donc fort estrange qu'on voulut regarder S. M. S. comme offensée, et fort facheux, que le Comte de la Marck eu porté en Suede de telles Idées. Toute la question est de scavoir si le Roy de Suede advoüe le Comte de Gyllenbourg, où s'il ne l'advoüe pas. Au second cas il ne peut pas refuser de faire justice à S. M. de cet Envoyé ; et au premier cas S. M. est prête de luy remettre ce Ministre entre les mains, pourvû qu'il fasse de même du Sieur Jackson.

Pour ce qui est du Baron de Gortz ; il est tout à fait dans un autre cas, n'étant ni Ministre de S. M. S. ni à son service, mais au

service de la Maison de Holstein Gottorp, ou il a été mis par la recommandation de S. M. et maintenû par sa seule protection, dans plusieurs Affaires facheuses, que sa mauvaise Conduite lui a attirées. Et comme il n'est aucunement autorisé, par la Cour de Gottorp dans ce qu'il a fait contre S. M., Elle ne peut le considerer que comme un Advanturier ingrat et scelerat, qui étant comblé de sa part de mille bienfaits attente à sa Couronne par la plus noire des trahisons. S. M. est persuadée que le Roy de Suede n'est nullement en droit de reclamer ce Baron et qu'Elle est au Contraire en droit de le faire punir comme il merite.

JOSEPH ADDISON, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO STAIR.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 29.*)

Whitehall June 9th 1717.

Your Letter of the 14th Inst. which came by Express, having been laid before the King, I am commanded to acquaint Your Excellency that, in relation to the Discourse you have had with the Czar and his Ministers, His Majesty is very much pleased with the great expressions of Civility & Friendship which have been made to him in the Czar's name upon that occasion; to which Your Excellency will please to return suitable answers on his Majesty's part.

The King is pleased in a more particular manner with the Order that is given for the Muscovite Troops to depart out of Mecklenburgh; and His Majesty hopes the Czar will compleat this mark of his Friendship towards him, in giving such further orders, as may most effectually oblige the said Troops to observe the strictest Discipline, that they may make no more exactions on the people nor commit any disorders upon their leaving that Country.

As to the Duke of Mecklenburgh, You may assure the Czar that the King never had it in his intention to do him any Hardship, and that therefore the Czar has nothing to apprehend on that Head, especially since that Prince is now become so nearly related to his Czarish Majesty.

I am further to signify His Majesty's pleasure to Your Excellency that you omitt no proper opportunity of representing how much the King is in the same disposition towards the Czar, in order to renew a good Correspondence with him: as an Instance whereof his Majesty will send proper directions to Sir George Byng to

facilitate the return of the Muscovite Troops & Gallies to Livonia and Rivel.

Your Excellency will likewise please to represent how kindly the King takes the Czar's readiness to enter into Measures with his Majesty in regard to a War or peace with the King of Sweden, as also to a Treaty of Commerce. And though it be difficult to concert any measures of that nature, till it be better known what disposition the King of Sweden is now in, Yet your Excellency may acquaint the Czar or his Ministers, that his Majesty will lose no time in a matter of this consequence ; for which reason his Majesty intends to send over a Minister on purpose to treat with the Czar, and has already given orders to prepare his Instructions ; I shall therefore give your Excellency no further trouble upon this subject ; only that you would prevail with the Czar to let you know where that Minister may find his Majestish Majesty during the present uncertainty of his Residence.

As his Majesty is very sensible of the confidence the Regent Reposes in him, and of his Friendship in having communicated to your Excellency all the Overtures which have been made by the Czar for any Convention with the Court of France ; so his Majesty expects You will treat the Regent with the same openness and Friendship on His Majesty's part and not only inform him of what has already past between you and the Czars Ministers but assure him that no steps shall be taken in any of these transactions, with which H. R. H. shall not be made acquainted. You will at the same time be pleased to let the Regent know, that the King is perswaded they were H. R. Highness'es good offices which have disposed the Czar to make these advances towards a right Understanding with His Majesty.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 29.*)

Whitehall 18th June 1717.

I have laid your Excellency's Letter of June 16th before the King whom Mo^r d'Iberville has acquainted with the Dispatches received by the Court of France from the Count de la Marcq, which agree in every thing with what your Excellency had written upon that head. His Majesty was pleased in answer to Mo^r d'Iberville to let him know that he could make no step in the affair of releasing Count Gyllenborg & Baron Görtz till the King of Sweden has dis-

avow'd in form their Practices with regard to the King and the British Nation ; and that his Majesty was very much surprized to find the King of Sweden had told the Count de la Marcq, that he would make no such previous Declaration : since it is not only a very reasonable but a very necessary Proceeding between States & Princes upon such an occasion.

However, the King (to show his great desire to have this matter brought to an accommodation and at the same time to give the Regent a proof of that confidence which he places in his Friendship, and of his Inclination to do every thing that may be agreeable to his R. H.) is pleased to order your Excellency to signify to him that his Majesty is willing to accept of a formal Declaration from the Regent, as a Mediator in this affair between the two Crowns, acquainting his Majesty that the King of Sweden does disown the Practices of his Minister against the King and the People of Great Britain ; and that upon such Declaration his Majesty will be ready to release and send back Count Gyllenborg, provided that his own Minister Mr Jackson be at the same time released and sent back hither. And that there may be no mistake in this mutual Exchange of the respective Ministers, his Majesty would be very glad if the Regent would suggest to you the Method in which this Exchange should be made after such a Declaration as that above mentioned. As for the Punishment of Count Gyllenborg for having engaged in Practices to which he was not authorized by the King his Master, his Majesty will leave that matter to the King of Sweden whose Honour is principally concerned in it.

Your Excellency will likewise represent to the Regent, that his Majesty is willing to concert proper measures with him for agreeing and settling with the States General what relates to Baron Görtz, who upon this occasion, you must observe, is in a quite different situation from Count Gyllenborg ; Görtz being neither a Subject nor a Minister of the King of Sweden, for which reason His Swedish Majesty has no right to demand his Releasement.

His Majesty (considering how much time will be lost in sending for a Declaration from the King of Sweden especially since his Swedish Majesty shows so unreasonable an aversion to the making of such a Declaration, which the King may with so great Justice expect from him) has thought of this Expedient to be proposed to the Regent ; not doubting but it will convince H. R. H. and

the whole World how greatly desirous his Majesty is to remove all obstacles towards entering into a Negociation for the Peace of the North, and consequently for the quiet of all Europe.

The King has directed My Lord Sunderland to acquaint his Minister in Holland with what I now write to your Excellency that he may give proper Intimations of it to the Pensioner and the Chief Persons there. His Majesty also hopes (as he would have your Excellency acquaint the Regent) that H. R. H^s. will insinuate to the States how much he do's desire and expect that no step should be taken by them in relation to Baron Görtz without His Majesty's Concurrence. For if they should do otherwise, it would not only be very disagreeable to his Majesty, but a kind of violation of the Treaties between the King and the States Generall, and consequently would tend very much to a weakening of those measures, which may be taken by the three Powers by vertue of the late Triple Alliance.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 29.*)

Whitehall 24th June 1717.

Since my last to your Excellency of the 18th inst. his Majesty has received Accounts from his Minister at the Hague of what has passed in a Conference with several Members of the States General, in relation to the affair of Baron Görtz : And as his Majesty is very desirous to make that matter as easy as may be to the States, without prejudice to his own Honour, his Majesty is therefore determined to go all lengths that the nature of such a Proceeding can possibly admit of, as well with regard to Görtz as Gyllenborg, notwithstanding that the Case of the one is so much different from that of the other. To this end the King has been pleased to direct his Minister at the Hague to acquaint the Pensionary & others in Holland with his Majestys being willing to accept of a Declaration from the Regent, as Mediator in this affair in lieu of one from the King of Sweden himself, disavowing the Practices both of Count Gyllenborg & Baron Görtz ; that immediately upon his Majesty receiving such a Declaration, He would exchange Count Gyllenborg for M^r Jackson, by sending the former in a Ship to Sweden, which should bring back the latter from thence ; and that his Majesty out of a singular regard to the very pressing instances of the States would consent, that Baron Görtz should be released at the same

time ; upon condition however, that he be not suffered to stay in any of the Dominions of that Republick, but that he be also forthwith put on board some Ship and sent away to Sweden. His Majesty at the same time desires of the States to make it a further Condition with the King of Sweden, that, considering the Character and Behaviour of Görtz and the troubles & difficultys he has brought them into, he may never be sent again by his Swedish Majesty into their Country either with or without a Character.

This being the Substance of what My Lord Sunderland writes this night by Express to Holland, I am commanded to transmit the same to your Excellency that you may let the Regent know how sincere a desire his Majesty has to do all that can be done on his part towards procuring the Quiet of the North, and likewise towards answering the Confidence his Royal Highness places in his Majestys Friendship : which together with his Majesty's Desire to satisfy the earnest Sollicitations of the States upon this head, and to decline all measures that may possibly involve his People in a New War are the principal reasons that could dispose his Majesty to give way to so great a piece of Condescension in a Case which, considered in all its Circumstances, is without Example. However, as the King has taken this resolution, his Majesty will give immediate orders for the release both of Count Gyllenborg and Baron Görtz, as soon as he shall receive from the Regent such a Declaration in form as is above mentioned.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 29.*)

Whitehall 25th July 1717.

I have laid before his Majesty your Excellency's letter relating to the Admission of the King of Prussia into the Triple Alliance, and the Mediation of the French King in the Peace of the North. As to the first his Majesty is very well pleased with the reasons You have alledged against it in your Conversation with the Abbé du Bois, which your Excellency will be able to enforce upon the perusal of the Minutes, which I lately transmitted to you by his Majesty's Order. To which I must further add that by advices received from Vienna, his Majesty is informed that the Emperor has declared he will not come into the Alliance in case the King of Prussia be admitted.

As for the second Point, that of the French King's Mediation

in the Peace of the North, his Majesty is no less pleased with the answer which your Excellency has made to that overture. However, as the King is ready to comply with every thing that may be reasonably expected of him by the Regent ; his Majesty having already admitted him as Mediator in the affair of Count Gyllenborg and Baron Görtz is willing this mediation should extend to all other matters in dispute between the Crowns of Great Britain and Sweden, which his Majesty thinks may be a means of preparing the way to his Mediation in the Peace of the North, nevertheless, since his Majesty cannot act in this particular, but in concert with the rest of the Allies of the Empire ; he is of opinion that the only Method which the Court of France can make use of in order to carry this point will be to induce his Swedish Majesty to make it his Request that the King of France should be joined with the Emperor in the Mediation.

Mons^r d'Iberville has spoken to the King's Ministers on this point, and in case it can be brought to bear, has mentioned something of a Place to be appointed by the Regent for treating the Peace of the North, which would doubtless raise a new difficulty, since it is certain the Emperor would not depart from the Nomination he has already made as to that particular. But it is thought this difficulty might likewise be got over by the Regent's naming Brunswick as his own Choice, without any regard to its being already named by the Emperor as the Place of Treaty.

I should not have troubled your Excellency upon this second Mediation which properly relates to the King's affairs in Germany, might not the prospect of it dispose the Regent to be more active and favourable in carrying on his mediation between the Crowns of Great Britain and Sweden to the satisfaction of his Majesty and the advantage of these his Kingdoms.¹

[For despatches from Addison to Stair dated September 2, 1717 (concerning the protection to be given to Bolingbroke), and from Stanhope to Stair, dated September 5, 1717 (concerning Spanish policy), see *Annals*, II, p. 24, November 9, 1717 (on the same), *ibid.*, p. 33 ; March 31, 1718 (on the policy of Huxelles), *ibid.*, pp. 349-51, and June 11, 1718 (on doubts as to Dubois' sincerity),

¹ Printed in part in *Annals*, II, pp. 23-4.

ibid. pp. 67-9. Letters from Stanhope to Stair of January 23 and February 17, 1717⁷/₈, on relations with Austria and France, are to be found in Lord Mahon's *History of England*, 1853, Vol. II, pp. lxiv-lxv. Letters from Craggs to Stair from March to June, 1718, may be found in *Annals*, II, pp. 362-66.

EARL STANHOPE

1718, 1720

JAMES, Earl Stanhope, who had become Secretary of State on George I's accession, was the mainspring of the Whig administration. He had in the past combined no small skill as a soldier with profound sagacity as a statesman, and until his death in 1721 he was George I's closest adviser, to the prejudice even of Bernstorff and the Hanoverians. His life is treated in the *Dictionary of National Biography*, but no monograph, based on the original papers at Chevening, seems yet to have been published.

He was, in June 1718, sent to France, as his instructions show, in order to obtain complete understanding between Britain and France and secure the acceptance of the "Plan" by all parties concerned. Subsequently he proceeded to Spain with a view to securing an accommodation, but in vain. He was probably fortunate in leaving Madrid before the news of the battle of Cape Passaro reached that capital.

WILLIAM STANHOPE, a kinsman of James Stanhope, had been employed from 1717 to 1718 as representative of the Court of St. James at Madrid, whence he had been expelled on the news of the battle of Cape Passaro. Although he was at the end of the year nominated to go to Turin, his knowledge of Spain was considered to make him more useful as an adviser and propagandist in the French army at the Pyrenees, then under Berwick's command. He was therefore despatched in May 1719 to the South of France, and mingled military enterprise with his diplomatic duties. On the conclusion of peace he returned to Madrid as British ambassador, and his work either in Spain or in connexion with Spain laid the foundation of his successful career which culminated in his being created Earl of Harrington.

For further details of his life see the *Dictionary of National Biography*.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR JOHN, EARL OF STAIR, AMBASSADOR EXTRA-ORDINARY AND JAMES, EARL STANHOPE, APPOINTED TO REPAIR FORTHWITH TO THE COURT OF FRANCE ON AFFAIRS OF THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE. Kensington 13th June 1718.

(*P.R.O., King's Letters* 13.)

1. Whereas We having much at heart the establishing the publick Tranquility of Europe, which appears to be in most imminent danger by the Warr which is broke out between the Emperor and the King of Spain, have together with the Regent of France concerted a Plan on the most reasonable and impartial Terms possible for making Peace between the Emperor and the King of Spain and Between the said Emperor and the King of Sicily : And Whereas the said Plan having been sent to the Court of Vienna has received there considerable alterations capable of delaying at least, if not of Frustrating Our good Intentions for the common benefit of Europe, unless some speedy method be found to put the finishing hand to this great Work, We therefore have thought fit to send you Earl Stanhope to Paris in this most Critical Juncture, that in Concert with you, Earl of Stair, you may by your united labours and joint Representations in Our Name the sooner remove the obstacles that retard the Conclusion of this great affair at the Court of France.

2. You therefore, Earl Stanhope are upon the Receipt of these Our Instructions and other Dispatches to proceed without loss of time to France ; and being arrived at Paris you are to communicate all Our Instructions and Orders to the Earl of Stair Our Ambassador there, and you are to consult together of the best means for compassing our Views and rendring your joint Instances in Our Name most effectual.

3. And Whereas upon receiving the Plan with the alterations as above mentioned, from Vienna, we did maturely consider the same, and made such Remarks and Determinations thereupon as we thought most proper, and likely to be satisfactory both to the Imperial Court and to that of France, you are in the first place to endeavour to adjust with the Regent the several alterations aforesaid upon the Foot of those Remarks, which we hope the said

Regent will the more readily do, since We had his Interests chiefly in View when We gave Our Opinions upon Several important Heads in those alterations.

4. And whereas the Emperor has inserted among the Secret and Seperate Articles, an Article providing against the putting Garrisons on the part of Spain in any places belonging the Dukedomes of Tuscany and Parma ; And whereas it is highly necessary that the King of Spain shou'd have some real Security given him for ascertaining the Reversion of those Dukedomes to a Son of his Present Queen, as stipulated in the Plan aforementioned, You shall therefore use your greatest application to settle with the Regent on this Nice and Important head an Expedient that may be reasonable and safe for Spain to accept, and at the same time give no Just Umbrage to the Emperor : and to this end We think the most proper and satisfactory expedient will be either that the three Mediatours named in the Plan should hire a Sufficient number of Swiss Troops, Which We are of opinion ought to be Six Thousand, and Place them in Garrison in the Dukedomes aforesaid, or if so many Swissers may not appear proper, we are willing to employ half the abovesaid Number of Our Own Troops of Great Brittain, as unsuspected Neutral Forces, & have them with a like number of Swiss made use of for Garrisoning the Places in Question. And as We are of opinion that this alternative of either all Swiss, or of half British and half Swiss Troops will most effectually answer the end proposed, you are accordingly to insist with the Regent that he do fix upon one of these offers as a sufficient expedient for the purpose aforesaid and which ever of these two shall be agreed to, you are to offer in Our Name that for the saving of time Our Troops be immediately placed there, and doe continue there till the Swiss shall be hired and be ready to releive them.

5. And whereas it is very likely that the States General, who are intended to be one of the Mediating Powers, will decline paying their Share for the Entertainment of the Garrisons abovesaid, you are therefore to propose that the Crown of Spain may take that Charge upon them, and pay the third part which ought otherwise to be allotted to the Dutch, who will probably not refuse to lend their Name.

6. When you shall be so successfull as to get thus far in adjusting the plan upon the Foot of the Remarks, and in fixing the Article of the Garrisons according to the alternative above mentioned,

We think it absolutely Necessary that this most important Work shou'd remain there fixed and firm and free from the hazard of all new Changes and alterations. And Whereas the Scituation of the contending partys is such, that on the one hand the Emperor may raise further difficultys ; and on the other the Violent temper of the Cardinal Alberoni, Who manages the Affairs of Spain, may push his Enterprizes extremely far, We therefore and the Regent ought to go hand in hand, & mutually stand by each other for the support of such Salutory Measures. For which purpose We are of opinion that after the Ultimatum of Our Plan is determined, as above specified, We should immediately enter into a Reciprocal engagement to abide by it, and to sign it without Variation as soon as the Emperor is ready to come in ; that in the mean time we should continue Our joint good Offices in Holland and elsewhere, for Promoting the acceptance of the Plan as settled ; that if any attack, Rupture or Hostility shoud happen from any one to either of the Parties by reason of the said Plan, or of the Measures taken or to be taken to advance it, that they shoud look upon such proceeding to be against both jointly, and resent it accordingly even by declaring War against the Party attacking, if it shall be necessary and required.

7. As We are perswaded that a Convention of this Nature between us and the Most Christian King woud give the greatest weight to our future Negociations for the Acceptance of our Plan & keep all Partys in more respect, you are to use your utmost Address and Dexterity to bring the Regent immediately to settle and sign an Engagement of the Purport above mentioned, and thereby secure in the best manner the effect of all Our past Cares and Pains for restoreing and Establishing upon the most lasting Foundation the Peace and quiet of all Europe.

8. In Case these Our Commands intirely succeed and you are so happy as to procure a Convention of the Nature abovementioned, You Earl Stanhope are then empowered to proceed to the Court of Spain in case the Regent and both of you shall judge it necessary to promote there a Peaceable Disposition and the acceptance of Our Plan according to such further orders and Instructions as We shall think fit to give you therein.

9. Upon the first Audience you shall have of the Regent We do direct you, among other Compliments you are to make his R.H. in Our Name, to let him know that We are extremely concerned

to hear that such a Turbulent and Seditious Spirit is fomented by ill designing People in France, that if his R.H. is apprehensive of any Commotions, or think our Assistance may be of use to him, you are to offer Him by Our Command all the aid We can give from hence by money, Troops, or Ships of Warr towards curbing the Insolence of the Regents Enemies; and quelling the Animosities which are maliciously stirred up through the Kingedome against him.

10. You are from time to time to give us exact accounts by one of Our Principal Secretarys of State to all Your Proceedings in this great and Important business, entrusted to your Management; And you shall follow such further Orders and Instructions as according to Emergencys that may happen, We shall think fit to give you our selves, or by one of Our Principal Secretarys of State aforesaid.

JAMES CRAGGS, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO STAIR AND STANHOPE.
(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 29.*)

Whitehall 26th June 1718.

. As to the difficultys which appear by those Letters to remain viz^t the signing the Treaty, altho' the Dutch should not be ready to do it, & the fixing upon some previous Convention between the King & the Regent, His Majesty was not a little surprised at the former scruple, since he all along understood it to be H.R.H.'s intention not to stay for the slow forms of the Dutch Government, but to sign as soon as the Emperor was ready to joyn with us. The delay of expecting the States would be too long & hazardous in this nice juncture, & even the Regent's demuring on that account would appear in Holland as an irresolution in him on the whole matter, & retard their Debates; whereas nothing would more contribute to a quicker Dispatch in their assemblys than unanimity firmness & vigour between His Majesty & H.R.H. in bringing this project to a Conclusion without further loss of time and therefore the King hopes & persuades himself that at the first Conference the Regent will agree to give positive orders for signing the Treaty when Mons^r de Penterridter is ready to do it, although the Dutch should not have fully agreed, or empowered a Minister to sign on their part at the same time.

As to the Convention proposed, & the Doubts the Regent moved

in case the Emperor should not accept our Ultimatum, His Majesty indeed cannot well comprehend how the Emperor should become the Regent's Enemy on account of any thing relating to this Treaty, or that there is the least fear of any inconvenience to H.R.H. on that side. However since he has a tenderness on this head, & will not venture a step in appearance of no hazard, with the same frankness and generosity as the King sent His Fleet into the Mediterranean at the Regent's instances as much as the Emperor's, His Majesty does agree to either of the Alternatives which you my Lord Stanhope propose in your Letter, but rather to the latter, of explaining by a separate Article, that it is not meant that the Regent shall break with Spain on any Hostility committed against us, unless the Emperor accepts our Ultimatum. But His Majesty is entirely of opinion that your Lordships should get something fixed and signed, whereby we may be delivered from this uneasy state of uncertainty we now lye under. And 'tis the Regent's interest to show a spirit becoming him on this occasion; otherwise as we know that Spain has personally threatned him with great resentment in case he signs the Treaty; if H.R.H. betrays any fear or wavering upon that usage he must expect always to be treated as a Dependant of Cardinal Alberoni & the Spanish Faction. The harsh Language the King has received has moved His Majestys indignation, but not slackned His just measures, & it would be an insupportable shame if all the Great Powers of Europe should suffer themselves to be bullyed by the mad Rodomantado's of that upstart Cardinal.

As to your Journey, My Lord Stanhope, to Spain, since the Regent presses it, H.R.H. should make it effectually of use to the Common good, otherwise the King thinks it no ways proper that you should undertake such an Errand without the necessary materials to enforce your instances & give weight to your Representations. His Majestys meaning is, that if the Regent remains loose & unfixed, & if our Treaty is to hang upon the phlegmatick proceedings in Holland, your Lordship can hardly make a good figure at Madrid. But if the Regent will sign some Convention to abide by & support our Ultimatum; & if he will give positive Orders to the Abbé du Bois to sign here as soon as the Imperial Minister is ready to do it, without staying for the Dutch; if your Lordship, I say, can go to Spain with those things in your pocket, His Majesty thinks you may make the Regent the Compliment

that you are ready to set out, when he pleases, & to obey H.R.H.'s Commands as his Minister as well as the King's. Accordingly as His Majesty cannot imagine but that the Regent will enable your Lordship in all respects to speak as authoritatively¹ as possible at the Court of Madrid, I shall in all Events prepare Instructions and Full Powers for your Lordship, & I hope to have them ready to be despatched by the beginning of next Week.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 29.*)

Whitehall July 5th 1718.

. I send you inclosed the Copys of two letters from Mo^r St. Saphorin which if they are to be depended upon, give us a very melancholy expectation from thence. Surely Count Konigseck at Paris & Mo^r Penterridter at London cannot be so ignorant of their Masters disposition, as they must necessarily be, if Mo^r de S^t. Saphorin's advices be true, for you, Lord Stanhope, must very well remember, that the Article of the Garrisons, as it is now couched, is very near the same with that which Mo^r Penterridter put into your hands the morning you left London, at a Conference, where several of the King's Ministers met him at My Lord Sunderlands ; & both your Excellencys have constantly acquainted me in your late Dispatches that every step you have made has been approved by Count Konigseck. It is to no purpose to ratiocinate upon these contradictions ; when you read the Letters, your Excellencys will be able to form a better Judgment than I can pretend to ; but what makes me in such haste to dispatch 'em, is the paragraphs in the last of them, which give an account of the overtures made by Spain to the Emperor. These are so remarkable and strong that I think the Regent cannot doubt a minute whether Spain has any other enemy in the World but him or any indignation to us or any other Power in Europe, but for supporting & standing by him. This early intelligence His Majesty would have you make use of to H.R.H. as a proof of His Friendship, who would not lose any time in transmitting it to him ; & has also commanded me to direct your Excellencys to acquaint H.R.H. that he has other certain advices from Vienna, how the King of Sicily pretends there to say, that he could withdraw his Majesty from this Alliance, if he would renounce his pretensions to the Crown of G^t Britain ; a

¹*Sic.*

story so idle and groundless, that you Lord Stanhope very well know, it has never so much as once been mentioned or thought of. Therefore when all these Plots & Counterplots, all the contradictory language & offers which the King of Sicily & Cardinal Alberoni have had & made in every Court of Europe, come to be compared, I will not say what names & Epithets they deserve, but I will venture to affirm it is high time to be no longer imposed upon by such foreign artifices, supported by Domestick Factions, but to conclude & determine the only measures which can secure the publick tranquillity.

[For letters of Craggs to Stair of July 30 and August 1, 1718, see *Annals*, II, pp. 366-70.]

JAMES CRAGGS, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO STAIR.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 29.*)

Whitehall Aug. 5th 1718.

I have your Excellencys Letters of the 11th Inst N.S. with the enclosed Copies of your Dispatches to my Lord Stanhope and Sir George Byng. I have had the honour to lay them before his Majesty who approves them all very well, but commands me to tell you that he is a little alarmed at some of the Circumstances, which accompany what is called the Accession of the King of Sicily. 'Tis remarkable that Count Provana's Words are, that his Master is disengaged from keeping any measures with Spain, and enters into the views and interest of the Quadruple Allyance, but hopes that more regard and better terms will be offered him than is provided by this Alliance. These words are in themselves very general, and in the mouth of the King of Sicily may very well mean nothing, but that he is willing to negotiate with the contracting Powers and come into their measures, provided they alter them more to his advantage; which in other expressions is very plainly, that he will come into another Alliance but not into this. Now the King has no objection to any advantages, which might be obtained by the King of Sicily, but His Majesty perceives very well, that if ever we begin to negotiate upon a new bottom, we return to Sea, uncertain what course to steer, and subject to new Storms and Difficultys, whereas if we proceed upon the solid foundation of this Treaty

already signed by the three greatest Powers in Europe, we can not fail of success each of us at home and all of us abroad. And therefore his Majesty observes with no little concern how lightly and how suddenly his Royal Highness the Regent swallows the Propositions made by the King of Sicily, which evidently proceed from necessity and no manner of good will ; He immediately undertakes to procure him some new advantage, which cannot be done without the consent of the Allys or a Breach of the Treaty. In the first case the King would be very willing and give his consent very readily to procure any advantages for the King of Sicily, but he is of the Regent's opinion that the Emperor will never consent to any at his expence, nor be so well pleased to see Finale in the hands of the Duke of Savoy as in those of the Republick of Genoa ; however this is a matter may be negotiated amicably among Ourselves, but in the mean while, we have nothing to do besides offering the Treaty to the King of Sicily, and desiring him to accede to it. If he does it frankly and with a good grace he may reasonably expect the Kings and the Regents best Offices. The second case is too tender to be much handled. I will only say, that we don't yet seem sensible enough that we have signed a Treaty, which not only engages us to the observation of every part of it, but does not allow us to propose any new Projects, and whoever demands of Us to alter it, asks in other words to break it. There is another thing which you may imagine surprizes his Majesty, and gives him some disquiet. The Regent, who has not only entred into the strictest Alliance with him, but as the King, who judges by himself, is inclined to believe, into an intimate personal friendship, tells your Excellency His Majestys Ambassador, that he designs to give the Princess his daughter to the Prince of Piedmont, who is the next Pretender to his Crown, when we very well know here, that the Sicilian Ministers have entertained Correspondences with the Jacobites with that view. As this is a family matter, His Majesty would have you touch it gently to the Regent, and endeavour to discover, if this has been a Treaty of any long standing, or if it is a sudden motion of kindness to the King of Sicily, upon his professing a disposition to accede. In either case it would be very remarkable, and in the latter it will retard his accession, because all these hopes will keep him back, till he sees some of them answered, whereas it is evident he must have come in, if he had had no new ones offered him, upon our terms. And

on this occasion I must not forget to tell you, that Count de la Perouse assured me ten days ago, that his Royal Highness had told Count Provana there was a secret article in his master's favour. Your Excellency knows very well there is none.

(P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 29.)

Whitehall Aug. 11th 1718.

. Count Provana arrived here last Thursday night ; but I did not see him till Saturday morning. I will give your Excellency a short account of what he has proposed, and what answer he has received from the King, and from me by His Majestys direction. He has taken notice, that the Reversion of Sardinia, which is stipulated by the Treaty in favour of the King of Spain may occasion the same difficulty, and give the same pretence, which Cardinal Alberoni has now taken, to attack Sicily ; and therefore he desires that Kingdom may be given to His Master without any such condition in favour of Spain. Secondly he complains, that Our new Treaty, which recites in the Preamble, that the Treaty of Utrecht shall be inviolably observ'd, except in what relates to Sicily, contradicts itself, when it says, that the Treaty of 1703 with the Duke of Savoy, whereby he is to be put in possession of such part of the Milanese, shall be made good to him for what he actually possesses, but that he shall renounce the remaining part of his pretensions by virtue of the said Treaty, which are all Guaranty'd to him by the Peace of Utrecht. In generall Count Provana desires some new advantages beyond what are lately settled in the Quadruple Alliance to the view of which he declares His Master is willing to enter, but desires the King's interposition at the Court of Vienna to mend the conditions. The King has answered, that He shou'd be glad to do any Service in his power to His Sicilian Majesty ; but the Treaty being so lately signed, it was impossible to alter any of the Articles ; and that if any advantage was to be obtained for His Sicilian Majesty at the Emperor's Expence, the Emperor only could grant it ; which if His Imperial Majesty was ready to do, He was ready to declare himself very well pleased with it. To this answer of the Kings I added, by His Majestys directions, that as to the Reversions of Sardinia, any alteration in that point wou'd depend upon the conduct of the Court of Spain, which might very well prove such, as would turn to his master's advantage, provided

he wou'd by a frank accession to our Treaty, acquire the friendship of the Princes who have signed it. Your Excellency may easily conceive the King is at a loss with this new Minister till such time as he is particularly informed what encouragement he met with from the Regent, what His Royal Highness has promised him, and what he desires to obtain for His Master; since one language there, and another here cannot fail of having a very ill consequence; but the same in both mouths will always carry every thing through. Your Excellency will easily perceive, that what I want, is to hear from you upon this subject. I hope that what has been said here, can have done no harm. But I perceive the Sicilian Minister intends to try what he can get in the three months which are allowed for his Master's Accession, & attend the turn of accidents. I should think he might propose more advantage by a ready agreement, but some people must be cunning for cunning's sake.

[For a private letter of Craggs to Stair of August 29, 1718 (on Cape Passaro and the Northern Question), see *Annals*, II, p. 369.]

JAMES CRAGGS, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO STAIR AND STANHOPE.
(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 29.*)

Hampton Court 15th Sept. 1718.

. I can only deliver to your Excellencys the King's Commands on the two following points: first, That you should endeavour to bring it now to a plain categorical Decision what H.R.H. the Regent intends to do, in case the Cardinal shall think fit to declare war against us. If H.R.H. would speak plain and show that he is in earnest to support his words by his actions, His Majesty cannot believe that even the Cardinal will persevere in his Warlike Dispositions. 2^{dly} I am to repeat to your Excellencies His Majesty's Pleasure that you should procure the necessary Orders to have the Secret Articles as far as they relate to the King of Sicily communicated jointly by France, the Emperor, and Great Britain to the Sicilian Ministers here.

[For letters from Craggs to Stair of September, 18, 23 and 25, 1718, see *Annals*, II, pp. 371-5.]

JAMES CRAGGS, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO STAIR.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 30.*)

Hampton Court Octob^r 20th 1718.

. As to the method proposed to you by the Abbé Dubois of sending a Minister to the Court of Berlin, His Majesty very well approves of it, but when he desires to know what the King's thoughts & Intentions are in relation to that Court, it is His Majestys pleasure, that you answer to Him, that his Intentions are to preserve a good amity & Correspondence with the King of Prussia upon such Terms as become his dignity ; that the Court of Berlin have used him ill in several respects, by neglecting the performance of many Treaties between Them ; but that His Majesty is so desirous, when His Honour shall give him leave, of holding a good Correspondence with his Son in Law, the King of Prussia, and so confident of his Royal Highness the Regent's Friendship to Him, that he is very willing a French Minister should be sent to Berlin : and his Majesty consents very readily that the Regent may empower the said Minister to offer H.R.H.'s good offices to remove any Coldness or Suspicions conceived between the King and His Prussian Majesty. Upon this Foundation His Prussian Majesty will execute the Treaties between them. It is not possible nor proper to enter farther as yet into this Negotiation, but your Excellency will take care to add this proof of the Kings Friendship to the Regent to that contain'd in my dispatch of the 14th inst. wherein it very plainly appears that His Majesty was not afraid of speaking very strongly to the Emperor in defence of his Interests even after He had given them up himself. It is to be hoped this open generous and frank way of proceeding of the King's will more and more confirm H.R.H. in his Resolution to execute the Treaty he has so lately ratified, by recalling His Ministers from Madrid, by declaring Warr against Spain, and by executing vigorously the Articles which engage him with the Emperor and the King, in case the wild Cardinal should not accede to our Treaty.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 30.*)

Whitehall 27th Nov. 1718.

. I dispatch to you Chalk the Messenger with His Majesty's thoughts and directions upon what has lately happened in France. The best we can hope for upon the backwardness the Regent does

express to declare War against Spain, is, that he is willing first to learn from Madrid what Effect Our Resolutions in Parliament so different from what his Eminence the Cardinal Alberoni did expect, will have upon him. If this be his Reason, His Majesty has no other Objection to it but the Mistery His Royal Highness makes of it ; And it is easy to perceive, that We are very far from being fond of a War with Spain. It is the only thing can make the Kings Government uneasy if it continues, it is the only difficulty among the many His Majesty has met with both abroad and at home, which remains for him to overcome ; and therefore it may very reasonably be concluded he is only thinking which is the best way to get the better of it ; His Majesty does not expect from the Regent's Friendship, that he should engage France lightly in a War with Spain ; but he will wonder if his own Interest, the mutual necessity they lye under to support each other, the Treaties so lately made, the General Peace of Europe which can only be obtained this way, and the General Crisis of all our Negotiations, which would become the Contempt of Mankind, if Great Britain or France fail one another, do not engage him to take so necessary a Measure ; and if He does not take it, it is to be supposed he desires it may succeed, to which End nothing can more contribute, than the determined resolute manner of engaging in it. For it is not in Nature, That France attacking Spain on a side where all her Provinces are ready to rebell against her, Great Britain being Mistress at Sea, and the Emperor being able to pour in as many troops in time, as he shall think fit, to subdue Sicily, where the Spaniards can receive no succours ; I say, it is not possible but they must at last listen to reason, and accede to the Quadruple Alliance. Nothing but the failure of these measures can save them, and they cannot fail but by our own Faults.

Another Circumstance, of which I believe my Lord Cadogan and Mr Whitworth have informed your Excellency, gives the King great disturbance. You will see by the inclosed copy of their last letter to my Lord Stanhope, that Monsieur Hop the Ambassador of the States at Paris writes them word as if their Accession were indifferent to the Regent and the Abbee du Bois ; at the same time His Majesty receives the most satisfactory Account from your Excellency of the Regents Concessions in relation to their Fourth Observation, by which he naturally judges that H.R.H. does all that lyes in his Power to bring them in, and thinks himself extremely

obliged to him for it. If Mons^r Hops relations be true, this kind of Discourse can only be attributed to an ill judged desire of taking the softer part of the negotiation in Holland, as We have seen the French Ministers frequently do in Spain, but such a Conduct, besides that it is somewhat unfair to Great Britain, since We ought always to talk the same language, can at best but obtain a preference insidious to Us, and not very usefull to them, and will infallibly be the occasion of the greatest Misfortune. In this Case particularly if the Dutch conceive that France will be very well pleased to see them remain Neutral, We may give that Negotiation over; and to conclude this subject, I must observe to your Excellency with Concern, that the Convention which you sent Us on the 29th Nov^r was not arrived at the Hague on the 2nd Dec^r the day when the States were assembled, and when it might have had a very great and good Effect.

[For a private letter from Craggs to Stair of the same date see *Annals*, II, pp. 376-7.]

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 30.*)

Whitehall 17th Jan^r 1718/19.

Crawford the Messenger brought me Your Excellency's dispatches of the 21st and 22nd of January N.S. to which I now propose to make you a very particular Answer. His Majesty would in the first place have your Excellency return the most friendly thanks to the Regent for the information he has given you of the Convention or Treaty which was so far advanced between Spain and Sweden and so personally calculated against him. His Majesty cannot be of opinion that, now the King of Sueden is dead, such a Design can be carried on any farther, since by all the Accounts which His Majesty receives from the North it appears, that the Princess Ulrica will be declared Queen of Sueden without opposition, and we have very certain intelligence, that her husband, the Prince of Hesse has wrote to his father the Landgrave, as his Sentiment, that the first necessary step will be to conclude their Peace with the King, on which Proposition the Landgrave has dispatched an Officer to confirm and encourage his Son in these measures. However we do not neglect here to take the necessary Precautions, and

a Messenger has already been dispatched to put them on their guard in Ireland.

In relation to the Northern Affairs Your Excellency may very well assure the Regent, that His Majesty is not only willing but desires to act in concert with him. You see thus far he agrees with H.R.H. in his disposition to support the Pretensions of the House of Hesse ; as yet it is impossible to enter into further particulars, but His Majesty has dispatched one Colonel Bassowitz, who was formerly in the service of Sweden, to Stockholm. He passes for a man of sense, who is well informed of the Affairs in that Country, and you may tell H.R.H. that the King will not fail to communicate to him all the Lights and Information he shall receive from the said Colonel Bassowitz, upon which He will be ready to concert further measures with the Court of France. I am of opinion that it is very necessary and proper both for France and Us to talk upon the Supposition of a general peace in the North, and to give all the publick Appearances of our belief and desire that such a one may be contrived. But to talk like men of business, surely there is very little hope of bringing one about by the consent of all parties. As low as Sweden is reduced, she will never consent to sit down by the loss of so many Provinces, neither do I think it for the honour and interest of the King or of the Regent to desire it, for this plain reason : it is obvious, that whoever shall be obliged to restore will be dissatisfied, and it becomes necessary in this Concert which France desires to have with Us, that we should agree, which of all these Powers who have stript Sweden shall be forced to give up those Provinces, for whose sake only we can suppose that Sweden will enter into a Peace. Therefore although it is certain this Peace may be made general, the question will be whom we shall pitch upon to come into this General Treaty of Peace, because they will not be able to make War alone. Upon this Foot it will be necessary that Your Excellency should enter into the clearest Explanations with the Regent and the Abbé du Bois, and obtain from them, if possible, their Sentiments upon this occasion. For, do but consider if they should think of sacrificing the King of Denmark or the King of Prussia or the King of Poland's Interests to those of the Czar ; if We should think of sacrificing the Czar's to those of these Princes ; if the Emperor should have some other Project, and all these Princes should be disputing with one another for the more and the less, this might

prove, instead of an opportunity for a general Peace, an occasion for new Dissentions, even among those who were very well agreed before. Now I will tell Your Excellency my opinion purely by way of Ratiocination. The honour of Sueden will certainly consist in recovering as many Provinces as they can, but their Interest will chiefly depend in having those Provinces of Livonia, Ehstthonia &c. in the Baltick restored to them. Nay, I am one of those who doubt whether they have not an essential Advantage in parting with those German Provinces. I know a great many good Suedes were of opinion that they were only a Burden to their Kingdom, and a Bait to the Ambition of their Princes, which frequently tempted them to enter into new Wars, and seek for new Conquests to the infinite expence and exhausting of Sueden. Therefore to bring the Suedes into a Peace this seems to be the most reasonable measure. And as to the Interest of Great Britain, to say it in one word, it is visibly to put the Trade to the Baltick and the Alliance with Sueden upon the ancient foot of Treaties, which it will become the interest of that Crown to preserve, if they would obtain our assistance to preserve them against their disobliged Neighbours. I must observe to Your Excellency upon this reasoning that I doubt it will not be agreeable to the views they have lately had in France, it appearing by all your letters, that they have some notion, which the King does not very well understand of taking measures with the Czar; and I do not conceive they can take any amicable ones, if they have any thoughts to make him restore the abovementioned Conquests, which in relation to his Navigation and his Trade are so much for his interest, and in relation to his own humour and inclinations so much his favourites, that they may very well be called the Apples of his Eyes. For these reasons His Majesty would have Your Excellency talk over these matters with the Regent and his Ministers in the several shapes they will admit of, without declaring as yet His Majestys Inclinations unless you should find those of the Regent suitable to them. But you will endeavour if you should discover them to be very different from what I have now mentioned to you, to dissuade him from taking any party, till he has not only communicated everything, but concerted something with His Majesty and His Majesty would have you do this in a friendly obliging manner rather than by any pressing vigorous Remonstrance.

By the last post which came from Holland, the King received

Advice of a Treaty signed between the Emperor, Himself as Elector and the King of Poland of which I transmit the Minutes to Your Excellency, for the Copy is not yet arrived, as Mr Bernstorff tells me. The Abbé du Bois has, I know, expressed some Jealousy at this Treaty. You must take notice that Great Britain has nothing to do with it, for it is only made with the Elector of Hanover, and the English Ministry have only heard in general there was such a thing going forward. It has had this good effect, that we understand by the same Post, Orders are come for the Muscovites to withdraw from Poland, by which means the fears of their exciting and maintaining new Divisions and dangerous Designs in Germany are very much removed. I leave it to Your Excellency to soften this matter as much as you can ; Although it relates only to the Elector of Hanover, Mr Bernstorff promises to do so no more, but to communicate everything punctually hence forward. If this Answer should not satisfy, you must counter balance their Objections with the Jealousies His Majesty had conceived of a Negotiation they had with the Czar which they never communicated to him.

Mr Bernstorff desires that there may be no mention made by the Ministers of France about this Treaty, though he agrees it may be communicated to them, but would be glad they had no copy nor Extract till the Ratifications are over.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 30.*)

Whitehall 17th February 1718/19.

. I am now to communicate to your Excellency the Letter which my Lord Stanhope in conformity to the Regent's Request has been directed by the King to write to his Minister at Vienna for the obtaining the Consent of the Emperor to the three months demanded by the Dutch. That Letter is conceived in such strong terms, that the Regent must be readily convinced, upon reading it, of the frankness as well as earnestness with which His Majesty has acted on this occasion. It will therefore be requisite for Your Excellency to shew to H.R.H. the enclosed Copy of the Letter to Mr S^t Saphorin, with that view ; the rather, because we are surprized that upon Mr Whitworth's desiring Mr de Morville's joint Instances to the Dutch for their Accession to the Secret Articles of the Alliance, the latter declared he had no Orders on that head.

And when the Regent will have seen how freely and how perfectly His Majesty has complied with his part, he must think it both just and necessary to send immediate Orders to M^r de Morville to concur with M^r Whitworth in demanding that the States should accede to the said secret Articles, without which We must all be persuaded, that their Accession will be of no manner of use, but on the contrary draw after it many unhappy Consequences, which Your Excellency will readily foresee, upon reading My Lord Stanhope's Letter to M^r S^t Saphorin. His Majesty, in consideration of what he has done so agreeably to the Regent's desire, and of the absolute necessity of that further Accession of the States, would have Your Excellency press the Regent in the strongest manner to send Orders without the least loss of time to M^r de Morville to go hand in hand with M^r Whitworth for obtaining that point of the States.

The King is very well pleased to learn that the Regent is under no such Engagement with the Czar, as could streighten him in the Measures he might take for pacifying the North, and that H.R.H. is even resolved not to stop at the Interests of that Prince ; which are indeed so incompatible with those of Sueden, that it is scarce possible to expect we shall attain to the Northern Tranquillity, if we are to insist upon all the rigour of the former : and since the Regent has declared himself to Your Excellency of a Sentiment so conformable to that of His Majesty you will do well to entertain him in it.

As to the King of Prussia, His Majesty is engaged as well as the Regent for the Guarantee of Stettin and of it's District, & is ready to comply strictly with the Treaty he has with His Prussian Majesty provided the latter will also satisfy his part of it.

I herewith inclose to Your Excellency a Copy of what the Marquis of Monteleone has writ to Consul Rosa here, and what Lord Stanhope has dictated to the said Consul thereupon, all which you will also please to communicate to the French Court.

I had forgot to mention that I likewise inclose a Copy of Lord Stanhope's Dispatch to M^r Whitworth upon the subject of the States' Accession to the Separate & Secret Articles. I believe the said M^r Whitworth will very speedily go to Berlin. The present Views His Majesty seems to have for the Peace of the North are, if possible to settle a Plan, by which the Kings of Prussia, Denmark and Poland may agree with him in one Measure & in some Treaty to preserve to each other what shall be agreed upon, satisfying

Sueden at the expence of the Czar, who should he retain Nerva, Peterbourgh & Cronslot ought to rest satisfied, and must of necessity be so, if all these other Powers agree, particularly should the King, as King of Great Britain, enter into this Treaty at the Request of Sueden, in which I foresee no hurt, especially if France be brought to approve of these Measures. But as they are hitherto crude & undigested Your Excellency will make as yet no Proposition of this kind: but by reasoning or rather by putting of Cases in Conversations with the Regent and his Ministers, you will be able to discover how inclinable they are to such a Scheme, and how likely to assist and support it, & upon the Advices Your Excellency will give to His Majesty you will receive his further Instructions.

P.S. I have one material Circumstance more to add with relation to the Czar, which is, that by the last Letters M^r Jefferys has writ from Petersbourg, we are further convinced of the impossibility there will be to make such a Plan for a Peace, as may content both Sweden & the Czar. M^r de Shaffirof has delivered to M^r Jefferys a Project of Alliance by virtue of which they would have the King be Guarantee to the Czar for all that he is in possession of, & in particular for all the Conquests made upon Sweden, and to furnish 15 Men of War for that purpose to be under his Czarish Majesty's Orders. Your Excellency will easily judge from this, that it would be in vain to pretend to make the Czar consent to such Conditions as Sweden might accept, and that he will only do it, when he is not able to do otherwise, that is to say, when measures shall be taken to reduce him to it. This was your Excellency's first notion, and I do not see that any other Plan is practicable.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 30.*)

Whitehall 9th March 1718/19.

. I will now go through the several heads of your Letters in course, and although the two last of the 12th and 15th Inst. seem to require the most hast, I will defer them to the latter end of my Dispatch, and begin by the Concert that you sent me as agreed and settled at Paris for the Reduction of Sardinia, to which I must acquaint you, that His Majesty does very readily consent. My Lord Stanhope has taken care to press them at the Court of Vienna, to hasten and dispatch their part of it; I have writ to Sir George

Byng, that he may facilitate and execute the King's part, it remains with your Excellency to press the Court of France to the Execution of theirs, and to recommend to them, that the payment of their Subsidies to the Emperor be made in Italy, in hopes that money may not be diverted from the Service of the War in which we are jointly engaged.

The Negotiation with Spain through the Canal of Mons^r de Nancré has furnished us here with no small matter of Speculation. Your Excellency's Remarks upon it are very just and solid, and it is wonderfull the Regent should mistake so plain a point. He cannot but be convinced, that the Cardinal will never enter into this Treaty but by force. If he had any new one to propose to him & would do it without the Consent of his Allies, he must take the Resolution to break with them, and be assured that nothing after such a Step could ever recover their Confidence. If H.R.H. endeavours only to persuade the Cardinal to accept Our Treaty, why does he make a Mystery to his Allies of a Step in every respect but one so justifiable? Has he only a mind that the King & the Emperor should become doubtfull & diffident of His Conduct, or can he hesitate a minute in the opinion, that if the Cardinal cannot detach him from Us, he will endeavour by betraying first himself such kind of Correspondences, to detach us from him? And do but see where we shall be, if at any time a Negotiation though never so trivial between France and Spain is first discovered to us by Cardinal Alberoni. But the great misfortune of such tamperings is, that they really and actually destroy the very end for which they are undertaken; for, as Your Excellency very rightly observes, so far from procuring or forwarding a Peace, they confirm the Spaniards in the resolution of refusing one, by convincing them the Regent dares not make that war against them, the fear of which can only make them tractable. Therefore, My Lord, His Majesty will have your Excellency in a gentle and friendly manner touch upon these and such other reasons to H.R.H. as your own good Judgment and Experience will furnish you. The King was extreemly concerned at the tenderness which the Regent expressed upon the Treaty made by His Majesty with the Emperor & the King of Poland, as Elector of Hanover, without having communicated it to H.R.H. Although the King was obliged to this frankness by no Engagement with France, though it had no relation to the Interests of France or any of it's Allies, yet His Majesty declared himself sorry, that he

had not used it towards H.R.H. ; but he is surprized to find, that at the very time this Complaint was made, His Royal Highness was managing, unknown to him, a Negociation, where all the Treaties and all the Engagements of the two Crowns, all the present and future hopes of friendship and good Correspondence were included.

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As to the Northern Affairs, you judge very rightly that it is proper to say somewhat more particular to the Regent upon them. But I must tell Your Excellency that the King not having yet received any News from Col. Bassowitz who was dispatched to Stockholm, nor the Notification of the late King's Death nor of the present Queen's Accession, His Majesty is at a loss what resolution to come to, and is a little alarmed at the Silence on the part of Sweden, and at the News which is spread that Baron Sparre is going to replace Baron Goertz at Ahland. In general Your Excellency is acquainted with the King's thoughts, which are short (*sic*), by an Alliance to be contracted between Sweden, Denmark, Prussia, Poland, the Emperor and his Majesty, to the content of these Parties, to recover to Sweden what the Czar has taken from her, and let him come into the Treaty *nolens volens* upon these Terms. I do not doubt but Mr Robethon corresponds more particularly with Your Excellency upon this Subject, who being perfectly acquainted with these Affairs by the share the King takes in them as Elector of Hanover will best inform you of other particulars which do not relate to my Province. I will content myself in relation to France, to make three Observations to Your Excellency. The first, that by your Letters it does appear the Regent is unwilling that Denmark should retain any part of their Acquisitions in Germany by the Peace to be made, whereas the King in Interest and in Honour cannot think of abandoning him, who of all the Northern Allies has alone kept any faith with His Majesty, and such a Proposal will also produce a natural Jealousy in the Emperor and other German Princes, that France is desirous to have the Swedes preserve a footing in Germany, in order to assist them as formerly, to disturb the Empire, whenever they shall think it necessary. Secondly, I find the Regent aims at being declared Mediator of this Peace, & pretends that France being Guarantee of the Treaty of Westphalia has a just and certain Title to this Mediation. I am afraid, that till His Royal Highness explains himself more favourably towards the Views of the abovementioned Powers, although the King himself should express the strongest Inclination to

favour this Pretension, it would not be possible without breaking with the Emperor and some of the other Princes, to push it. And thirdly, because the King observes from Your Excellency's Letters a continual suspicion, that the French do not act openly and above-board in these Northern matters and some reasons to apprehend, that whatever they say, they do not mean the same things with Us, but are every now & then returning to their old Maxims and Politicks, which they will not, or cannot understand to be incompatible with their new Treaties. Therefore His Majesty will be very cautious how he puts all his Affairs into their hands, especially since he has remarked how easily the Regent was induced to tamper with Spain without His Majestys Privy. However, My Lord, the King would have Your Excellency give them very good words, assure them of his desire to take them along with him. If this matter of the Mediation be proposed to you, he would have Your Excellency give them reasonable hopes, provided they explain themselves particularly upon the terms they would endeavour to settle, an Explanation without which His Majesty will not be empowered to obtain the other necessary consents. And in general Your Excellency is to contain yourself within the most general Assurances of His Majesty's desire to act in this as well as everything else in concert with H.R.H., but to make the most particular inquisition you can of the Views and designs of France in this great affair. I will only take notice before I finish upon this subject, that if they give Shleinitz Money, as Your Excellency believes, it cannot be in hopes that he will represent to His Master with any success the necessity of yeilding up His Conquests to Sweden, but it must be to dispose him to some measures of their's which I cannot conceive in concert with him will be consistent with Ours.

I am very glad the Abbé Dubois has recovered Credit, especially if it is supported upon the dislike he expressed to Nancrés Negociation. Whatever faults he may have, he certainly is embarked upon a bottom, where he must perish whenever he deserts Our common Cause ; and though it is very melancholy & provoking to observe that he sometimes swerves from it, yet I think every Step he makes in a different road will immediately convince him of his danger, and make him return to it. His Majesty is pleased to find that you have been able to cement a friendship between him and the Marechal d'Estrées ; I think whatever defects he has, it's right to stand by

him, since it is very useless to find out Inconveniencies, unless somewhat better could be proposed, which indeed I despair of.

I come now, My Lord, to your last Dispatches wherein you give the King an Account of the intended Invasion against Us. I cannot say His Majesty is extremely alarmed about it. However, it will be necessary to take the proper precautions. His Majesty will go tomorrow to the House and acquaint them with it. He has avoided it hitherto, because he was afraid of the run such a story might bring upon the Credit, and was willing to wait till the second Lottery was filled up, which I hope was done this morning. If I do not dispatch this Messenger till tomorrow, Your Excellency shall have Cops of the King's Speech and the Addresses of both Houses to him upon it. In the meantime four Batallions and eighteen Squadrons are marched and marching towards the West, where my Lord Cadogan will go and command them if it be necessary. Sir John Norris went last Saturday to Portsmouth, where there is a Squadron ready of seven good ships, which will sail and cruize off the Landsend, and I do not doubt will be able to give a very good account of a dozen Spanish Ships, should they meet with them. He has orders, and is resolved notwithstanding any inequality of numbers to attack them, and my Lord Berkeley will in eight or ten days more be able to sail with eight good Ships either to join Sir John Norris, or make a separate Squadron as shall be judged proper ; and the Seamen do all agree that both these Squadrons will be ready before it is possible for the Spaniards to make the Coast of England. Notwithstanding these Preparations I am persuaded the Parliament will enable His Majesty to increase his Land and Sea forces as he shall think fit. My Lord Stanhope has already sent to Holland to ask four Batallions of the Dutch, and Mons^r de Penterridter has dispatched an Express to the Marquis de Prié to hold six more in a readiness to pass over from Ostend. Upon this occasion Your Excellency must in the most obliging and friendly terms express the King's thanks to the Regent for his kind offer of fifteen hundred Seamen, and the Disposition he is making to keep twenty Batallions along the Sea Coast. His Majesty does not refuse his offer, but will not immediately make use of it, unless he finds a greater necessity than he apprehends at present. Your Excellency will therefore only entreat H.R.H. to keep up the same disposition till you hear further from me.

P.S. 10 Mar. 1718/19.

His Majesty would have Your Excellency let the Regent know that the most effectual Succour H.R.H. can give him at present, is to order as soon as possible the French forces to begin their operations against Spain itself. I leave it to Your Excellency to enlarge upon the necessity of such a Service in this Juncture.

The King has also this day in Council resolved to accept 5 or 600 of the French Seamen only as a Proof that he can trust them, but still paying them himself at the English rates which far exceed the French ones, and will no doubt reconcile them to His Majesty's Service. Of this Your Excellency will be pleased to acquaint H.R.H. and that when he lets the King know at what Port they are ready he will send for them. I enclose to you His Majestys Speech and the Addresses of both Houses with Extracts of M^r Worsley's Letters of the 7th Inst. N.S. from Lisbon which arrived this morning.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 30.*)

Whitehall April 28th 1719.

. Col. Stanhope who will set out in two or three days will inform Your Excellency very minutely of the King's Views with relation to such Engagements as he proposes to take in favour of those Spaniards who are willing to join with him, to shake off the Yoke of Cardinal Alberoni's Slavery. His Majesty agrees with H.R.H. that it deserves good consideration before they enter into any Engagement which might retard or prevent the making of a Peace, but he conceives also, that it will be impossible to engage any of those Provinces into our measures, unless they are strongly perswaded, that they shall not be abandoned hereafter; in which case there are two points, which will very well deserve a serious consideration, not to bind ourselves by too strong Articles, nor to deceive and betray these unhappy people by hopes we do not design to make good to them. But as neither Colonel Stanhope nor whoever shall be employed by the Regent will come to sign any final Agreement, till they have fresh Instructions, I think it is now foreseeing at too great a distance, and we must wait for times and circumstances, which must determine us about particulars. You will see by Colonel Stanhope's Instructions, that he has Orders to follow Your Excellency's directions in every thing; and you will be pleased to join with him in making that Compliment to the

Regent, as if he were come chiefly to receive his Commands, as a Rule for his Conduct ; to which end you may desire the Regent would give him any Memorials or Advice in writing for his Guidance and Instruction.

I need not tell you how very acceptable the news of the Operations of the French Army has been to the King and his Ministers, besides the good effect it has had in dispersing the malicious Insinuations of our Enemies, who said, the Regent would never act, and the fears of our Friends, who apprehended he could not ; the circumstance of destroying so many of the Enemy's Shipping has been very agreeable to this Country. I would therefore beg of Your Excellency to transmit hither as soon as possible the detail of the Spaniards Loss at Port Passage, the size and forwardness of their Ships, with the nature and quantity of their Naval Stores, and the manner in which they have been destroyed or carried off, for such particularitys will give people here a great Satisfaction. You will upon this occasion be pleased to let H.R.H. know His Majesty has given Orders to the Admiralty (of which I send you the inclosed Copies) to dispatch as soon as possible those Frigats which he desires may be sent upon the Coast of Biscay. I need not recommend it to you to make the Regent sensible of the readiness with which His Majesty constantly grants his Requests.

I also send Your Excellency a Copy of the Project, which the King of Sardinia's Minister has delivered to me, which does appear to the King so reasonable, that he would have Your Excellency propose it to the Regent for his Concurrence. The Enterprise you mention upon Cadiz, if attended with success, would certainly put an end to this War ; but the two French Armys, which are to act against Spain leave us very little hopes of a third Body for this Expedition ; and the Fleet under Sir George Byng who still presses for more Ships ; this Squadron that is now going upon the Coast of Biscay, another large one, which the King will send to the Baltick, that in the West Indies, and the Ships necessary to guard Our Coasts & furnish Convoys for the Merchants, will make such an Undertaking impracticable from the great number and expence which must attend it.

I transmit by this Post to Sir George Byng and M^r Davenant the Project of a Convention to be made with the Duke of Florence and Republick of Genoa ; as they have orders to negotiate this affair in concert with the French Ministers or Consuls in those

Places, you will take care to have them instructed accordingly. But if Your Excellency can finish it with those Italian Ministers at Paris, it will yet be better. I send you the Letters open, which you will be pleased to forward. You will observe in those to Sir Geo. Byng the Complaints which are made by the French Secretary here of the Behaviour of Our Men of War ; I believe the truth of the matter is, that a great many French Ships, out of inclination to the Spaniards and a desire of gain, do carry them Stores and Provisions ; if any of the King's Ships meet them, they are furnished with false Letters of Lading, which if the English Captain pay no regard to, they complain to the Council of Marine, who being ignorant of their true design, complain very heavily to Us in England, if on the contrary Our Ships do respect their Letters of Lading and their Passports, which you may be sure they have no difficulty to obtain under false Pretences, they proceed to Palermo or Messina with Succours to the Enemy, of which we have two or three Instances I have quoted in Memorials delivered by me to Mo^r Chammoré. On the other hand, to speak all the truth, I am apt to suspect, that Our Captains encouraged sometimes by an eagerness to make Prizes, do stop the innocent as well as the guilty ; and indeed I must own, that in this case it is very hard to distinguish. I could wish therefore Your Excellency would explain the matter amicably to the Marechal d'Etrées, and know of him what is proper to be done. Sir Geo: Byng has sent us two intercepted Original Letters of the Marquis de Lede, they are not yet intirely decyphered, but when they are, you shall receive Copies of them ; by which, besides the Situation of the Spaniards which appears very bad, you will see that Camock was to go to Barcelona from Palermo on board a French Ship.

When Your Excellency sends us what the Abbé du Bois has promised to communicate to you from the Count de la Marque, I shall be able to tell you more of the King's mind about the Northern Affairs. In the mean time I can perceive by M^r Destouches here that the French will not disguise their Resolution to insist upon it that Sweden their old Ally should preserve some footing in Germany, a point, which I believe, differs from the King's thoughts upon that subject.

. Before I finished the Article relating to the Northern Affairs, I should have desired Your Excellency to make it your business to find out in France what they think of this prodigious

Armament of the Czar. We are here divided in our opinions, whether it is to frighten Sweden into a Compliance with his terms, and in case they refuse 'em, to make a vigorous attack upon that unsettled Government and reduce them by force, or whether it is intended against Germany, for we have an account, that his Czarish Majesty has promised the Duke of Meckleburgh to reinstate him. For my part, it seems to me *ad utrumque paratus*, as Accidents and Circumstances shall admit; but Our Jacobites who never hear of an Armament in any of the four parts of the world, but they believe it is designed to support the Pretender, flatter themselves that the Muscovites will come here to protect the Church of England and maintain the Constitution.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR WILLIAM STANHOPE, APPOINTED PLENIPOTENTIARY IN THE ARMY OF THE MOST CHRISTIAN KING ON THE FRONTIERS OF SPAIN. St. James's, 29th April 1719.

(*P.R.O., King's Letters* 13.)

1. Whereas We judge it to be highly necessary both for Our Service & that of Our Allies, to have some fit person residing on our part in the Army of Our Good Brother, the most Christian King, in order to invite the Spaniards to joyn with Us, to issue out proper Manifesto's for that purpose, to give all suitable encouragement & assurances to those who are willing to shake off the present heavy Yoke laid on them by Cardinal Alberoni, & to do all such other matters & things in concert with the General of the said Army, or with such other as may be authorized to that end, as may appear to be requisite for promoting Our joint views & measures with respect to Spain; We have accordingly made choice of you as Our Plenipotentiary to go with the said Army, as a person well qualified for that Commission, & whose services in your late Employment in Spain have deserved Our Royal Approbation.

2. As soon therefore as you have received the Full Powers we have thought fit to give you under Our Great Seal of Great Britain, together with these Our Instructions to you, & such other Dispatches as shall be put into your hands, you shall without loss of time repair to Paris, & communicate all your orders to Our Right Trusty & Right Welbeloved Cousin & Councillor John, Earl of Stair, Our Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at that Court, who likewise on his part will furnish you with all the lights & advices

he can give, which may be of use for your guidance in this your Commission ; and will likewise introduce you at the Court of Our Good Brother the most Christian King, & procure you from the Ministers there, all Informations and Directions, as may be proper for your better pursuing Our Commands & carrying on the joynt service of both Crowns.

3. When you wait upon the said most Christian King & Our Good Brother the Duke of Orleans you shall give them the strongest assurances in Our name of Our most inviolable Friendship for them, and of Our heartiest endeavours to advance & bring to a happy issue the just Cause We are now engaged in ; That We were extremely pleased to see that Our thoughts concerning the measures to be taken with the Spaniards on the Frontiers were agreeable to the sentiments of the Regent ; that We have accordingly sent you to put in execution those projects ; & to acquaint him with the powers and Orders we have given you, and to receive his further Commands.

4. When you shall have got the Regents Instructions, & such Orders & Directions to the French Generals & other officers, as may be proper & necessary for your more effectually performing this your Commission, you shall immediately set out for the French Army in Spain ; and being arrived you shall concert with such person or persons as shall be appointed for that purpose, the best methods of executing the Full Powers with which We have entrusted you for treating with the Spaniards concerning the restitution of their ancient privileges.

5. As in all likelihood Deputys from several Quarters and Provinces in Spain will apply to you for Our protection and assistance in regaining their lost libertys, & in freeing themselves from the insufferable oppression they groan under from Cardinal Alberoni's despotick management of the authority of his Master, you will soon perceive how willing & how able they are to contribute to the great End We have in view, & accordingly you will give them proper assurances in Our Name ; But We would not have you enter into any solemn Engagements, nor give authentick Declarations or Guarantys, whereby Our Honour & the Dignity of Our Crown may be deeply concerned, without first communicating the conditions to Us for Our approbation & further Orders, unless they shall appear to you & those employed on the part of France absolutely necessary for the Service, which would extremely suffer by the delays of sending over hither for fresh Instructions.

6. As people shall make Overtures & Offers, you that are on the spot, from your own Experience, & from the nature of their proposals will be better able to return the proper answers than We can now suggest to you by these Our Instructions ; only We think fit to take notice to you, that if there remains much diffidence among them on account of what passed formerly, particularly with respect to the Catalans, you may let them know that We are always faithful to Our Royal Word, that Our present Ministers are of a temper & Disposition extremely different from those Who gave up those people to the Mercy of their Enemys, and that Our Parliament here impeached the Authors of those pernicious Councells, particularly for their Male Administration on that head. This doctrine it may be very requisite to inculcate frequently among the Spaniards disposed to favour Our Schemes in order to remove their doubts & confirm them in an intire Confidence towards Us and Our Government.

7. As We have offered to detach such a Number of Our Ships of War, as may be necessary to be assistant in the Operations of the French Army either on the side of Biscay, or of Catalonia, as shall be most advantageous for the Common Service, We shall likewise give directions to the Commanders of the said Ships to follow such Orders as you shall give them, & to take such station, and to perform such service as shall be judged to be most usefull and helpfull to the said Army ; and We do not doubt at the same time but that the French Generals will have Instructions to admit you to their Councils, & communicate freely to you their several projects of operation, that you may be the better able to determine what Orders to give to the Commanders of Our said Ships of War, and may impart to Us from time to time the results of such Councils, & enable us thereby to give you more precise Orders, & to take juster measures for supporting & promoting the views & operations in those parts.

8. You shall regularly correspond with one of Our Principal Secretaries of State, and by him give Us exact accounts of all occurrences which deserve Our Attention, and may be for Our Service ; & that We may be informed of such things as are material with more Expedition, we have ordered several of Our Messengers to attend you, that you may dispatch frequent Expresses with the advices from those quarters which cannot but be of importance for Us to know as early as possible.

9. You shall hold Correspondence with Our Ambassador at

Paris, & with such other of Our Ministers, Admirals or Commanders abroad, as may be fitting, & usefull for your mutual information, & the good of Our Service ; and you shall observe & follow such further Orders & Instructions as you shall receive from time to time from Us, or from One of Our Principal Secretarys of State.

PRIVATE AND ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR WILLIAM STANHOPE
APPOINTED PLENIPOTENTIARY IN THE ARMY OF THE MOST
CHRISTIAN KING ON THE FRONTIERS OF SPAIN. St. James's,
29th April 1719.

(*P.R.O., Kings' Letters 13.*)

1. The General Instructions you will receive herewith are such as may be communicated to Our Good Brother the Regent of France, or to such others at that Court, as Our Ambassador there and you shall think proper. But it is likewise requisite for Our Service, that We should add some Instructions for your guidance of a more private Nature, which however you must also impart to Our said Ambassador.

2. As it is of the highest importance for Us to be exactly informed not only of the publick motions of the French Army but also of the more secret views & Intrigues of the Generals, you will therefore be very watchfull to discover all you possibly can of a more private nature, whether the said Generals act with vigour, whether their operations tend more to amuse the Allys, than really to distress & reduce the Enemy, what temper & disposition you find among the Officers & Soldiers, whether they are most inclined to support the Interests of the Regent, or to favour the Catholick King, and the Designs of the Spanish Faction in France. And in short you must endeavour to give Us as exact a Description as you are able of the proceedings, Inclinations, Cabals and Partys in the said French Army, that We may the better judge how farr We can depend on the diversion to be made on that side, & take Our measures accordingly.

3. As it is very likely that Cardinal Alberoni will have his Emisarys in those quarters & endeavour to tempt France by some specious separate proposals or other, you must be very attentive to find out whether there be such Emissarys, what reception they meet with, what offers they make, & what answers are returned to them on the part of the Generals or Court of France.

4. You shall give the speediest accounts you can of every thing you are able to discover upon the heads above mentioned, & of all other particulars of a secret nature, that shall come to your knowledge ; and you shall for the more safe as well as quick Conveyance send the same by Expresses on purpose.

5. Although We have by Our other Instructions given you power to send positive Orders to the Commander of Our Ships of Warr, which may be attending on the Coasts for the use & assistance of the French Army ; yet Our Will and Intention is, that you should consult the said Commanders, & have their opinion upon the services proposed ; or qualify your orders so that they who understand Marine affairs best, may judge of the feasibleness of such Services, and not be bound to undertake things too bold & hazardous to the manifest danger of the loss of Our said Ships of Warr.

JAMES, EARL STANHOPE, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO STAIR.

(*P.R.O., S.P., France, 164, fo. 124.*)

à Hanovre ce 7 Juin 1719.

[*Copy.*]

. Je joins ici une Copie de la dernière Lettre que J'ay reçue de Mo^r de S^t Saphorin, et qui a fait le tour de la Hollande. Votre Excellence la communiquera confidemment à Mgr. le Regent et à Mr. l'Abbé Dubois. Il y a principalement deux choses à considerer : la Disposition où M^{rs}les Imperiaux paroissent être d'accorder une Capitulation aux Espagnols qui Sont en Sicile S'ils offroient d'en Sortir, Et les Indices que M. de S^t Saphorin a eu, qu'on Songe à un Mariage entre le Prince des Asturies et une Archiduchesse. Quant au premier de ces deux Inconvenients, Nous nous hâtons de le parer efficacement par les ordres que Nous reiterons à l'Admiral Byng, et que Je vous envoie Sous Cachet volant pour que vous en informiez S.A.R. Et au Second egard quoique ce ne Soient encore que de Simples Soubçons, Nous croirions manquer à ce que Nous devons à M^r le Regent, si Nous les luy laissions ignorer, veu qu'il ne Se peut pas que les Cours de Vienne et de Madrid prennent aucune liaison ensemble, que ce ne Soit aux depens de S.A.R. Aussi Si ces Conjectures estoient fondées et qu'un pareil Mariage Se Negociât Sous main, Vous pouvez assurer S.A.R. que Nous nous joindrons à Elle de toutes nos forces pour le traverser, et qu'Elle ne Nous verra jamais biaiser ni balancer en

rien où Sa Seureté et Sa Conservation pourront être concernées.

Sans doute M^r le Regent conclurra comme Nous que plus les Hollandois agissent de mauvaise foy et plus nous avons lieu d'être Sur nos gardes par rapport aux autres Puissances, plus nôtre Union doit eclater, et plus nous devons redoubler de vigueur de tous cotez en poursuivant Nos Mesures. La Conduite des Hollandois enhardira de plus en plus le Cardinal Alberoni, à qui Elle donne le tems d'entreprendre tout ce qu'il luy plaira pendant cette Campagne, sans qu'Il coure risque de perdre les avantages stipulez pour luy dans le Traitté. Mais Nous comptons que les Dispositions que M^r le Regent continue à faire pour penetrer dans l'Espagne, lui feront bientôt Sentir Sa temerite. Rien d'autre ne l'étonnera, Et nous ne viendrons à bout du Cardinal que quand les Succes de l'armée de France auront encouragé les Peuples d'Espagne à remuer contre luy.

L'on ne doit pas être Surpris à votre Cour, Si Nous n'avons pas encore donné une Reponse Categorique Sur le Memoire du Comte de la Marck. Depuis que Nous l'avons reçu, Nous avons Suivi exactement la Methode que M^r l'Abbé Du Bois nous a suggerée par Sa Lettre du 5^e May. Nous avons envoyé M^r Whitworth à Berlin le plutôt qu'il nous a esté possible afin de commencer par mettre cette Cour dans Nos Mesures, et par l'engager à travailler conjointement avec Nous à la Paix avec la Suede. Il est encore à Berlin, et quoyque les Ministres Prussiens ne paroissent nullement disposez à abandonner le Czar, Je ne desespere pourtant pas que Nous ne puissions conclurre avec Eux. Nous avons depeché avant hier un Expres à Mons^r Whitworth avec les Projets des Traitez comme Nous les avons ajustez presentement, pour lever autant que Nous le pouvions les difficultez que Mess^{rs} les Prussiens y avoient formées, Et j'en joins ici les Copies que vous communiquerez à Mgr. le Regent et à M^r l'Abbé Dubois. Nous n'attendons que le Succes qu'aura cette Negotiation pour travailler à un plan general pour la Paix du Nord, et vous remarquerez que c'est à quoy elle tend principalement. Si M^r Whitworth réussit, Nous en aurons l'obligation au Comte de Rotembourg, qui luy Sert egale-ment à eclairer Sa Conduite ; et à l'appuier vers le Roy de Prusse et Ses Ministres. Mais autant qu'Il se loüe de M^r de Rotembourg, autant avons Nous à nous plaindre du Comte de la Marck, qui assurément n'a pas osé avouer le fond de Sa Conduite quand Il a assuré S.A.R. que depuis la mort du Roy de Suede, Il s'etoit efforcé de disposer la Reine à preferer la Paix avec le Roy Nôtre Maitre à

celle de tous les autres Ennemis de la Suede. C'est sans doute ce que luy prescrivoient les ordres de Mgr. le Regent. Mais il y a long tems que Nous avons eu lieu de nous douter qu'Il s'attachât à les Suivre, Et nous apprenons au contraire que c'étoit principalement par Ses Soins que les Conferences d'Aland Se renouvelloient. M^r Whitworth Nous l'a mandé aussi des Son arrivée à Berlin, quoique Sur de Simples Conjectures Nous n'ayons pas voulu risquer de lui faire Injustice. Mais apres que M^r Whitworth a lû une Lettre de Remercement que le Roy de Prusse luy a ecrite Sur ce Sujet, et apres que le Comte de Rotembourg même le luy a confirmé, comme vous le verrez par les Extraits ci joints de Ses Lettres, le Roy ne peut plus Se dispenser de vous charger de faire les Instances les plus precises a Mgr. le Regent, pour que le Comte de la Marck ne soit pas renvoyé en Suede. Nous ne doutons point que S.A.R. n'ait cet egard aux Interêts du Roy, car quels Ordres qu' Elle pût donner au Comte de la Marck Nous ne pourrions nullement Nous attendre qu'Il s'en acquitteroit mieux que de ses precedents. Il est trop engagé dans les Intrigues du Czar et de la Cour de Prusse pour que Sa Majesté puisse reprendre aucune Confiance en luy, et Nous aurions d'autant moins à esperer qu'Il nous rendit de bons offices en Suede, s'il y retournoit, qu'il ne pourroit le faire qu'en dementant toute Sa Conduite passée. On ne pensera pas j'espere que Nous ayons en vüe d'eloigner par là tout ministre de France de cette Cour. Bien loin de là, vous demanderez que S.A.R. y en envoie un, et Nous Serions bien aises que le Comte de Rotembourg y allât, ou tout autre, pourvû que ce ne Soit pas le Comte de la Marck.

Je ne Saurois finir, My Lord, Sans vous repeter que vû la Situation où Nous nous trouvons, et la necessité où Nous Sommes d'agir avec la plus grande vigueur, Si Nous ne voulons devenir le jouet de nos Ennemis. Il me paroît que Mgr. le Regent devoit en toutes manieres tâcher de mettre les Catalans et les autres Peuples des Frontieres dans Son Parti. J'avoüe qu'il faut eviter avec la Derniere Circonspection, tout ce qui peut rendre la Paix avec l'Espagne plus difficile, mais le Retablissement de ces Peuples dans leurs Privileges Seroit un trop grand Bien pour S.A.R. pour qu'aucune Consideration dût l'en detourner. D'ailleurs c'est le vray moyen d'eloigner la Paix et de la rendre impracticable, que de ne faire envisager aucune perte au Roy d'Espagne dans la Continuation de la Guerre ; car Si M^r le Regent Se contentoit d'occuper

quelques places, le Roy d'Espagne compteroit bien qu'Elles lui Seroient rendües un jour, et Il n'auroit qu'à attendre tranquillement la Majorité du jeune Roy de France, et S'abandonner cependant à toutes les vües d'Alberoni Sans faire ni Paix ni Treve, ce qui tres certainement ne tourneroit à compte ni au Regent ni à nous. Au lieu que Si S.A.R. S'appliquoit Serieusement à profiter des Mecontentemens des Espagnols en general, et à faire au Roy Catholique un mal reel & permanent, en mettant les Peuples en possession de leurs Privileges à mesure que Son Armée avanceroit, alors Il faudrait bien avoir recours à la Paix pour empêcher que le mal ne S'augmentât, Et l'on peut compter, les choses en étant venues à ce point entre M^r le Regent et le Roy d'Espagne, que celui ci n'entendra à la Paix que quand on l'aura mis dans l'impuissance de continuer la Guerre. Mais comme c'est la principalement l'affaire de S.A.R. Nous ne faisons que luy en ouvrir nos Pensées, nous remettant entièrement à ce qu' Elle trouvera à propos d'en decider.

(*P.R.O., S.P., France. Vol. 164. fo. 152.*)

A Hanovre ce 16 Juin 1719.

[*Copy.*]

. Nos amis en Hollande, pour assurer le Succes de la Deliberation Sur l'explication de leur Resolution touchant les Articles Secrets, ont crü devoir la remettre au 22 de ce Mois, Et là dessus M^r de Penterridter est parti de la Haye Sans vouloir attendre qu'on pût Signer avec eux : Ce qui est d'autant plus embarrassant que quand meme les Etats Nous donneroient les Eclaircissemens que Nous demandons vray semblablement n'en viendrions Nous jamais à une Signature avec Eux Si Nous attendions de nouveaux ordres et de nouveaux Pleinspouvoirs pour cet effet de Vienne. Pour remedier à cet Inconvenient le Roy a ordonné à My Lord Cadogan que Si les Etats dans leur Assemblée du 22 acquiescent à l'interpretation que Nous donnons à leur Resolution, qu'en ce Cas il procede à Signer avec Eux, conjointement avec M^{or} de Morville en laissant place pour le Plenipotentiaire de l'Empereur. Car il est à presumer que S.M.I. pourra moins Se dispenser de Se conformer à Nous quand Nous aurons Signé actuellement. Je vous envoie Copie de ce que j'ay ecrit là dessus à My Lord Cadogan le 13 de ce Mois. J'en ay mandé la Substance à M^r de S^t Saphorin avec

Ordre qu'il tache de faire expedier incessamment un Pleinpouvoir ou pour le Comte de Kinigseck, ou pour le Comte de Windishkratz, qui est nommé pour la Legation de la Haye : Mais il faut que V.E. fasse ordonner à M^r de Morville, qu'il Signe en attendant avec My Lord Cadogan, après que les Etats auront consenti aux Eclaircissemens qu'on exige d'eux : et qu'il promette aussy que la Declaration touchant les Expectatives Sera donnée de la part de S.A.R. à la Signature du Plenipotentiaire Imperial. Mais quelque Soin que Nous prenions pour assurer en ce Cas la Signature de l'Empereur, Je crois que Mgr le Regent pensera comme nous, que l'Accession des Etats, bien loin de Nous estre d'aucun usage, nous Seroit infiniment à charge, et ne feroit que tourner au profit de Nos Ennemis, Si elle ne les impliquoit ni à la Declaration de Guerre ni à l'Interdiction du Commerce avec l'Espagne. Et quand même nous pourrions en réalité nous passer du Concours des Hollandois Je vous laisse à juger My Lord si dans N^{otre} Parlement il Seroit possible de Soutenir une Alliance qui nous eût tant couté et ne les commettrait cependant aucunement avec des Ennemis, tels que les Espagnols. Aussy s'ils refusoient de donner cette etendue à leur accession, non seulement ne pourrions Nous pas l'accepter ; Mais le Roy Seroit prêt à prendre de concert avec S.A.R. des Mesures efficaces pour empecher leur Commerce avec l'Espagne, et même pour Saisir tous les Vaisseaux Hollandois qui iroient dans la Mediterranée.

JAMES CRAGGS, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO STAIR.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 30.*)

Whitehall 23^d July 1719.

In sending back Ling the Messenger to Col. Stanhope, I take this opportunity of answering whatever Paragraphs I have left unanswered in the last Letters from Your Excellency ; And in the first place, I refer myself to my inclosed Letters to Col. Stanhope for whatever shall relate to this Expedition, which will now be ready in a very few days. Your Excellency will be pleased to tell the Regent, that the Lords Justices have pressed it thus vigorously, purely to give a powerfull diversion to the Spanish Troops, and facilitate the Operations of the French Army under the Mar^l de Berwick, as also at his and the Mar^ls request, by removing, if possible, the necessity they seem to lye under of acting with so much caution and apprehension. As Your

Excellency observes very properly that we have not much time to loose, in order to save some, I believe upon Tuesday or Wednesday next Major General Wade will be dispatched to you for your directions how to communicate this matter to the Regent ; I am of opinion it should be with all imaginable Frankness, and by telling H.R.H. that he is dispatched by the Lords Justices to receive his Commands, which will determine them how to employ this Sea and Land Force : but Your Excellency will at the same time take care, that we be not diverted from any Enterprize that may demolish the Spanish Shipping. I begin to observe that the French have not so much alacrity as could be desired for our Successes of this kind. When he has stayed two or three days at Paris, you will be pleased to dispatch him to the Mareschal de Berwick to concert Measures with him. Your Excellency will be best able to inform him what proper Compliments he may make, & settle with him in what manner he shall be best able to negotiate with the Mar^l. I give you this early notice, first, that Your Excellency may have the credit of proposing all these things in France, as if they arose from the deference which has been paid to your opinion about them, and secondly, that if you could find out any Ingeniers, Pilots or other persons, who have any experience of the Coast, the Ports, the Fortresses and Towns on the Spanish Shoar, you might either get them to talk with Wade, when he arrives, or even obtain of the Regent, that they should go on board Our Squadron, if, Your Excellency thinks they're men to be trusted. Or if Your Excellency could find out some of them that would go Volontiers without any Order from Court, we should have no difficulty of making them a very handsome Present suitable to their Ranks & Services ; but all this is left to your own discretion. By the first Courier that goes to Naples I beg Your Excellency to give an account of this matter to Sir Geo: Byng, for I do not care to trust the Post.

JAMES, EARL STANHOPE, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO STAIR.

(*P.R.O., S.P., France. Vol. 165. fo. 323v.*)

[Draft]

Au Gohre ce 20 Octobre 1719.

. J'envoye à V.E. Copie de la Reponse que my Lord Polwarth a enfin obtenuë du Roy de Danemarc le 11 de ce mois.

Surquoy nous avons dressé le Project cyjoint d'une Convention à Signer avec ce Prince. Les ordres dont on l'a accompagné pour My Lord Polwarth, vous éclairciront sur les Points de cette Convention qui peuvent avoir besoin d'explication. Vous trouverez sans doute que nous avons déjà beaucoup gagné, en faisant consentir le Roy de Danemarc à un Armistice de six mois, pendant lequel la Suede pourra être pourvûe de toutes les Choses nécessaires pour la Campagne prochaine, et à restituer Ruguen et Stralsund à la Suede. Par là il deroge, quant à cet article, au Traitté de 1715 et Se Separe du Czar ; Et s'il Signe notre Convention, comme il est à presumer qu'il le fera, Sa Paix avec la Suede ne pourra guère manquer de s'ensuivre bientôt.

Le Roy de Danemarc nous a fait demander en même tems par my Lord Polwarth, dans quel Endroit nous Souhaittions que Sa Paix fût conclûe avec la Suede, et Si Notre Roy vouloit en être seul Mediateur, ou s'en associer encore quelque autre.

Quant au Lieu du Congrez pour ce qu'on appelle les Traittez Solemnels, il ne peut être qu'à Brunswic, qui a été agréé pour cela depuis longtems de toutes les Parties interessées dans cette Guerre. Mais nous voyons que tout l'essentiel entre la Suede & le Danemarc devroit être réglé & ajusté à Stockholm par un Traitté Preliminaire.

Quant à la Mediation, celle de l'Empereur a aussy été reconnûe de toutes les Parties depuis qu'on a songé au Retablissement de la Paix. Et l'on peut d'autant moins s'en abstenir presentement, que son Concours est d'une necessité absoluë pour tout ce qui se traite touchant des Provinces de l'Empire. La Mediation du Roy vient aussy d'être acceptée par la Suede & par le Danemarc ; My Lord Carteret est déjà autorisé à en faire les Fonctions, en Cas que le Roy de Danemarc envoie un Ministre à Stockholm pour y arretter les Points Preliminaires de sa Paix, Et le Roy demande au Roy de Danemarc la France pour Commediatrice. S.M., toujours attentive à ce qui peut interesser la gloire de Mgr. le Regent, n'a point balancé ladessus. S.A.R. ayant prêté sa Mediation & sa Garantie pour les Traittez par lesquels des Provinces Allemandes sont detachées de la Suede, le Roy n'a pû douter qu'il ne luy seroit très agreable d'intervenir de même dans un Traitté par lequel la Suede doit rentrer dans l'Empire. Nous en avons communiqué avec M^r le Comte de Senectere qui a été entierement de cet avis, Et qui, pour gagner du tems, a crû devoir prendre sur luy, d'écrire à M^r de Campredon, qu'à l'arrivée d'un Ministre

Danois à Stockholm il eût à luy offrir la Mediation et la Garantie de la France pour le Traitté qu'il conduiroit avec la Suede. Cette Garantie regardera principalement le Duché de Sleswick. Comme la Mediation du Roy n'a été acceptée que sous cette Condition, M^r de Senectere a bien prévu qu'aussy celle de France ne seroit acceptée par le Roy de Danemarc qu'autant qu'Elle luy garantirait ce Duché de la même maniere qu'il luy sera garanti par la Grande Bretagne, Et que M^r de Campredon ne pouvoit rien risquer en prenant cet Engagement. Car la Paix du Danemarc est absolument necessaire à la Suede pour la mettre en état d'agir avec vigueur contre le Czar ; Le Danemarc ne consentirait jamais de gré à rendre le Sleswick. Et c'est aussy le pire qui pût luy arriver, quand toutes les Puissances se ligueront ensemble pour le luy arracher par la Force des Armes ; Le Roy comme Electeur et le Roy de Prusse le luy ayant garanti par les Traittez de 1715 pourroient ils jamais luy proposer de faire la Paix en rendant tout ce qu'ils luy ont garanti ? À la verité nous luy avons parlé d'un ton ferme pour le reduire à la Restitution de Ruguen et de Stralsund ; mais ces Endroits sont coupés de ses autres États, ils luy sont à charge, il a voulu les vendre, Et pour le dedommager en quelque maniere de la derogation qu'il feroit par cette Restitution aux Traittez de 1715. Nous luy avons parcontre offert, d'ajouter la Garantie de la Grande Bretagne à celle de l'Electorat pour le reste. Mais nous n'aurions aucune de ces raisons à alleguer pour la Restitution du Sleswick ; Et parcontre le Roy de Danemarc soutient avec fondement, que les Garanties cy devant données à la Maison de Gottorp ne sauroient avoir lieu dans le Cas present, puisque cette maison a été l'Aggresseur, en pretant son País, ses Places et ses Troupes au feu Roy de Suede.

Neantmoins vous remarquerez, que la Garantie que Nous allons donner au Roy de Danemarc pour le Duché de Sleswick est clausée par deux choses essentielles. Elle ne subsistera qu'en Cas qu'il fasse la Paix, Et cette même Garantie nous autorisera à procurer au Duc de Holstein une Satisfaction pour la Partie du Sleswick qui luy appartenoit : Laquelle Satisfaction nous tacherons de rendre aussy ample que faire se pourra.

Ainsy, my Lord, nous ne pouvons qu'esperer que S.A.R. agréera le parti qu'a pris le Comte de Senectere, et qu'Elle confirmera et autorisera incessamment par ses ordres à M^r de Campredon ce que M^r l'Ambassadeur a crû devoir luy suggerer.

Depuis que nos Depeches sont parties pour Coppenhague & pour Stockholm, nous avons receu un Expres de My Lord Carteret, avec un Projet de Traitté Preliminaire à offrir au Roy de Danemarc. Ce Projet a été postulé par My Lord Carteret et M^r de Campredon conjointement, Et il leur a été remis signé par le Secretaire d'Etat M^r de Hopken. J'en joins icy la Copie ; Il ne differe pas beaucoup de notre Convention, Et vous y verrez que la Suede consent déjà à laisser le Sleswick au Roy du Danemarc à peu près sur le même pied que nous le luy garantirons. Elle offre une Somme d'Argent pour Ruguen et Stralsund, et outre cela la Ville de Wismar. Nous aimerions mieux procurer cette Ville et Son District au Duc de Holstein, avec tout le Holstein si la Suede pouvoit être portée à ceder quelque Terrain au Roy de Danemarc du coté de la Norwegue ; Et quoyque nous n'ayons en garde de rien avancer làdessus à ce Prince, crainte d'être desavouéz par la Suede, nous avons pourtant suggeré à My Lord Carteret la pensée de V.E. touchant la Dalie, Et veritablement il paroît que la Suede pourroit s'en deffaire sans grands inconvenient. Elle le devroit en justice pour accroître la Satisfaction du Duc de Holstein ; quand elle ne le feroit pas pour contenter le Punctilio du Roy de Danemarc, qui croiroit son honneur blessé, s'il ne recevoit que de l'argent de la Suede, quelque besoin qu'il en ait. Et cet objet sembleroit être trop peu considerable, pour y arretter une Paix si indispensable aux Suedois, et leur Retablissement dans l'Empire. My Lord Carteret est toujours dans la persuasion, qu'ils renonceront à l'Exemption du Sund pour se faire rendre Mastrand ; mais V.E. voit par ma Lettre à My Lord Polwarth, que nous tachons aussy de faire entrer cette Exemption en partie dans l'Equivalent pour Ruguen et Stralsund.

M^r de Campredon ayant ainsy anticipé sur la lettre de M^r de Senectere, par rapport à la Mediation et ayant luy même conseillé à la Suede de laisser le Sleswick au Danemarc, il se fera d'autant moins de scrupule d'en offrir la Garantie, qu'après le Consentement de la Suede il ne luy restera plus de pretexte de la refuser, dès que le Roy de Danemarc l'annexera comme une Condition à la Mediation ; dont M^r de Campredon a déjà commencé les fonctions.

En comparant ensemble le Projet venu de Suede, et la Convention envoyée à My Lord Polwarth, quand celle cy sera signée, l'on ne pourra que regarder la Paix comme fort avancée, pour peu que la Suede veuille avoir de complaisance pour un Ennemi qu'Elle ne doit point mepriser tant qu'Elle a les Moscovites sur les bras. Par

cette signature même il faudra aussy que le Roy de Danemarc devienne plus traittable, puisqu'il aura irrité le Czar en se separant de luy, et qu'au bout de l'Armistice il ne sera plus tems de faire des Concerts pour les operations de la Campagne prochaine.

Je ne puis pas quitter ce Sujet sans vous marquer, My Lord, que dans toutes les occasions M^r le Comte de Senectere concourt avec nous de la meilleure grace du monde, à tout ce qui peut interesser l'honneur et le Service de S.A.R. et les interets communs et l'Union des deux Maitres.

Le Roy ordonne à V.E. de réiterer de sa part vers Mgr. le Regent les Recommendations qu'il luy a fait faire cydevant pour le Payement des Subsidies dûs au Landgrave de Hesse Cassel. La Conduite de ce Prince nous avoit fait suspendre ces instances ; Mais presentement qu'il agit de maniere que le Roy et Mgr. le Regent ne peuvent qu'être contens de luy, Sa Majesté croit que S.A.R. devoit d'être d'autant plus portée à la satisfaire sur cette Demande que son Prince Hereditaire a si bien merité de la Cause Commune, en soutenant la Suede par sa constance.

(*P.R.O., State Papers, France. Vol. 165, fo. 32.*)

à Hanover ce 20^e Août 1719.

Depuis ma Lettre du 30^e Juillet, et le Depart de M^r de Campredon, l'Incertitude où nous etions par rapport à la Prusse, m'a empeché de repondre plutôt aux diverses Depêches de V.E. Et Je voulus attendre l'Evenement de cette Negotiation qui nous a paru tres douteuse jusqu'au moment qu'elle S'est conclüe. Cette même Incertitude et l'apprehension où nous etions que la Suede ne pliât devant le Czar avant qu'on pût prendre les mesures necessaires pour l'en delivrer, ont produit les ordres ci joints que le Roy a donnez à My Lord Carteret le 2^e de ce mois N.S. quelques jours apres le depart de M^r de Campredon. Tandis que Nous etions en risque de voir la Prusse Se tourner contre Nous, il y auroit eu de la Temerité à Nous engager dans aucune Demarche qui pût Nous commettre avec le Roy de Danemarc et avec le Czar ensemble, de sorte que Nous ne pouvions que conseiller alors à la Suede de S'accommoder avec l'une ou l'autre de ces deux Puissances Si Elle vouloit avoir nôtre Secours : a la verité Elle feroit encore bien de Suivre cet avis, mais quand même Elle s'en éloigneroit, la Conclusion de nos Traitez avec la Prusse, et du Traitté Preliminaire avec la Suede a changé comme

vous voyez nos Dispositions, Et presentement que nos Etats en Allemagne Sont couverts par le Roy de Prusse, nôtre Escadre doit agir pour la Deffense de la Suede contre le Czar, quoiqu'Elle ne se fût pas accommodée avec le Danemarc, pourveu Seulement qu'Elle cede Stettin au Roy de Prusse, et que nôtre admiral ne prevoye pas une Jonction trop prochaine des vaisseaux Moscovites & Danois contre luy. Et ce dernier cas ne nous paroît plus guere à apprehender, depuis que Nous Savons que le Danemarc a besoin de la meilleure partie de Ses vaisseaux Sur les Côtes de Norwege pour y porter le necessaire. Ils n'en ont que quatre dans le Sund, Et Ils ont même offert de les joindre à nôtre Escadre pour la Deffense des Côtes d'Allemagne, mais à condition qu' Ils n'avanceront pas au delà de Bornholm. Et quoyque nous ne voulions pas nous embarasser des vaisseaux Danois, Soit pour ne point ombrager les Suedois, Soit pour estre d'autant plus en liberté d'agir Selon leurs besoins, Nous Sommes pourtant bien aises de Savoir les bornes qui Sont prescrites à ces quatre Vaisseaux.

Aussi M^r de Campredon est revenu dans des Circonstances bien plus heureuses qu'elles ne l'étoient lorsqu'Il partit d'icy. Le Roy est extremement sensible à la promptitude, avec laquelle Mgr. le Regent s'est conformé aux Instances qui luy ont esté faites en faveur de la Suede ; Et Sa Majesté est bien persuadée, que quand M^r de Campredon y arrivera avec la Somme qui luy est confiée, et les Instructions qu'Il a de S.A.R. il contribuera infiniment à faire embrasser aux Suedois le Parti que Nous leur proposons, et qui tres certainement est le Seul qui convienne et a Eux et à Nous.

Nous le ferons partir incessamment, Et nous Sommes d'avis qu'Il porte Ses Lingots d'or avec luy en Suede, où ils Seront d'un bien plus grand poids, que S'Il les laissoit en arriere à Hambourg. Nous croyons qu'Il devra passer par Nôtre Escadre, ce qui ne le detournera pas de 30 heures ; Et nôtre Admiral aura ordre de luy remettre la Lettre qu'Il doit écrire au Czar, afin qu'on puisse l'envoyer à ce Prince directement de Stockholme aussitôt que nôtre Convention Sera Signée avec la Suede. Cette Precaution nous fera gagner du moins quatre ou cinq jours de tems, et decidera peutetre du Sort des Russes.

L'on n'a pas le tems de faire copier pour V.E. le Traitté Preliminaire de Paix que le Collonel Bassewitz a Signé avec la Suede, les deux Promissoires que My Lord Carteret a signé, les Traitez et Articles Secrets que M^r Whitworth et M^r Hensch ont Signez à

Berlin, et la Convention Preliminaire de l'Alliance avec les Articles Secrets qui ont esté envoyez le 15^e de ce mois à My Lord Carteret pour les Signer avec la Suede avant que nôtre Escadre agisse pour Elle. Mais toutes ces Pieces ont esté données à M^r le Comte de Senneterre ; Et Il les envoie à M^r l'Abbé du Bois de qui vous pourrez en prendre Copie. Celà joint aux Copies ci incluses des ordres qu'ont esté envoyez à My Lord Carteret et au Chevalier Norris, que V.E. communiquera aussi à S.A.R. et à M^r l'Abbé Du Bois, vous donnera une pleine idée de toute la Situation presente de ces affaires. J'y ajouteray Seulement qu'avant que de Savoir le Succes de la Mission de M^r de Campredon, et les Ordres dont S.A.R. trouveroit à propos de la charger, Nous ne pouvions pas inserer la Mediation et la Garentie de la France dans la Convention que nous faisons proposer à la Suede. Mais cette Insertion a esté faite des le moment que M^r de Campredon a esté icy de retour. Et vous comprenez aisement que S'agissant des Cessions de trois Provinces que la Suede a possédé en Allemagne, Nous ne pouvions pas nous dispenser de joindre la Mediation de l'Empereur à celle de la France, Surtout la Suede ayant Specialement compris la Mediation et Garantie de l'Empereur dans le 6^e Article du Traitté Preliminaire. C'est aussy tout ce que le feu Roy de France a jamais pretendu que d'estre joint à l'Empereur dans cette Mediation, quoique dans ce cas present la France sera mediateur réel, et l'Empereur ne le Sera que de nom, vû que tout doit Se conclurre incessamment à Stockholm, Sans attendre l'Entremise d'un Ministre Imperial.

L'article qui regarde le Roy de Prusse Sera sans doute celui qui Souffrira le plus de difficulté en Suede. Cependant Je ne puis pas croire que la Cession de Stettin puisse estre refusée, lorsque la France y insistera avec Nous, et que les Suedois verront que ce ne sera qu'à ce Prix qu'Ils pourront obtenir nos Secours. S.A.R. qui entre Si fort dans la necessité de cette Concession de la part de la Suede, y Sera encore plus confirmée quand Elle Saura que par le Traitté conclu en 1714 entre le Czar et le Roy de Prusse, celui ci est engage à garantir au Czar, l'Ingrie, la Carelie et toute l'Estonie, et particulièrement les villes de Revel, de Nerva et de Wybourg, contre quiconque les attaqueroit, et Specialement contre la Suede, Et que Il est même obligé de les deffendre de toutes Ses Forces. Aussi avons Nous ordonné bien expressement à My Lord Carteret, de Suggester aux Suedois qu'en signant l'article qui porte la Cession

de Stettin, Ils donnent une Declaration formelle comme quoy Ils n'y consentent qu'à condition que le Roy de Prusse ne donnera aux Ennemis de la Suede, & particulièrement au Czar aucun Secours contre Elle, directement ni indirectement. M^r de Campredon est pleinement instruit de tout cecy, Et nous ne le laisserons pas partir sans lui avoir fourni toutes les Lumières que nous pourrons Sur ces affaires. Nous sommes tres convaincus que nous ne pourrons pas le confier a une Personne qui en fasse un meilleur usage tant pour nous que pour Son maitre.

M^r de Rotembourg a reçu les Ordres de S.A.R. touchant la Garantie qu'Il doit signer à Berlin pour Breme, Vehrden et Stettin. Je vous envoie le Projet qu'Il a offert là dessus, avec ce que M^r Whitworth m'en mande. Ce Projet est defectueux, mais Mons^r de Rotembourg ne fait nulle difficulté d'y remedier. Et Je prie V. Ex^{ce} de marquer et à Mgr. le Regent, et à M^r l'Abbé les obligations que Nous leur avons de tous les Services que ce Ministre nous a actuellement rendus, et est encore prêt à nous rendre.

(*P.R.O., State Papers, France, Vol. 165, fo. 431.*)

A Hanovre ce 9^e Novembre 1719.

[*Copy.*]

J'ay reçu par le Courier du Comte de Seneterre les Depêches de V.E. du 18th 20. Octob^r, Et Elles ont donné au Roy une Satisfaction particuliere, aussi bien que les Lettres de Mgr. le Regent et de M^r. l'Abbé Du Bois. Il a bien crû que toutes les Mesures qu' Il prenoit pour faire reconnoître la Mediation de la France dans les Traitez du Nord, et pour obtenir du Danemarc la Restitution de Ruguen et de Stralsund, Seroient tres agreables a S.A.R. Et Son principal motif en celà à esté de le convaincre de la Sincerité de Son Amitié, et de Son Attention à tout ce qui peut interesser la gloire de S.A.R. Elle apprendra avec plaisir, que la Convention que Nous avons proposée au Roy de Danemarc, en a esté acceptée. Je vous l'envoie telle qu'elle a esté Signée, Et vous verrez qu'on n'y a changé que quelques Expressions tres indifferentes. Nous n'avons voulu promettre qu'en termes generaux l'Equivalent pour Ruguen & Stralsund, et Nous avons absolument refusé d'en promettre un en Terre. Le Roy de Danemarc y a acquiescé, Et ce Sera à la Suede à voir Si Elle aimera mieux ajoûter à l'Exemtion du Sund, à laquelle

Elle paroît disposée à renoncer, une Somme d'argent, ou quelque Terrain du côté de la Norvegue.

Nous avons aussi fait les Demarches necessaires pour dissuader la Cour de Prusse du Dessein d'acquiescer Ruguen & Stralsund, Et vous verrez par l'Extrait ci joint de la Lettre de M^r Whitworth, que M^r d'Ilgen luy a promis d'abandonner cette vûe ; Cependant Si M^r Cnyphausen la poursuivoit encore, Le Comte de Rotembourg & M^r de Whitworth sont d'opinion, que les oppositions directes viendroient mieux de la Suede que de Nous. A quoy les Ministres Suedois doivent Se porter d'autant plus facilement, que Je ne puis croire qu'ils osassent pour quelque prix que ce fût S'exclurre Euxmêmes de l'Empire, apres tous les Efforts que Nous avons faits pour les y retablir.

Vôtre Ex^{ce} verra aussy par le même Extrait que le Czar Se ravise quant à nous, et qu'il y a lieu de croire qu' Il accepterait la Mediation du Roy, Si Sa Majesté la luy offroit eu luy écrivant Elle même. Mais avant que de rien determiner là dessus, le Roy vous ordonne de concerter avec S.A.R. la Methode qu'Il y auroit à tenir. Sa Majesté croit que Sa Mediation, celle de l'Empereur, et celle de la France, devraient estre offertes au Czar conjointement, et dans le même tems. Car il S'agit de l'intimider, et de luy faire envisager des Mediateurs capables de la reduire à une Paix raisonnable, et de leur rejettoit leur Entremise et les Conditions qu' Ils luy proposeroient. Outre que par là Nous engagerions en quelque maniere l'Empereur contre luy, S.A.R. goûtoit cette Idée, Je vous prie d'en écrire en droiture à M^r de S^t Saphorin, pour qu'Il la passe aussy à la Cour Imperiale, et qu'on Soit d'autant plus en etat de faire cette offre de Mediation au Czar.

Nous avons déjà disposé le Comte de Flemming à faire de Son mieux pour engager et le Roy Son Maître et la Republique de Pologne dans la Guerre qu'Il faudroit faire au Czar. Mais Il demande la Reversion de la Courlande pour un Prince de la Maison de Saxe, et le Recouvrement de Kioff et de Smolensko pour la Republique, Et c'est Sur quoy Nous n'avons pas crû devoir faire de difficulté. Quant à la Courlande, Il conviendra incontestablement mieux à tous les voisins, qu'Elle Soit entre les mains d'un Prince particulier qu'entre celles du Czar, ou du Royaume de Pologne, Et Je joins icy ce que J'en ay écrit à M^r Whitworth. Et quant à Kioff et Smolensko, outre l'Interêt qu'Il y a d'éloigner le Czar le plus qu'Il se peut, l'on ne pourra parvenir à faire prendre

à la Pologne les armes contre luy qu'autant qu'on luy fera envisager qu' Elle recouvrera du moins ce qu' autre fois le Czar a conquis Sur Elle. Mais le Comte de Flemming nous dit, et Je crois avec fondement, que ces motifs, ni la juste Jalousie que doit avoir la Pologne de la Puissance du Czar, ne Seroient pas assez efficaces pour leur faire prendre parti contre luy, Et que pour y preparer les Esprits des Polonois, il faudra necessairement repandre de l'argent parmi Eux, comme fera le Czar de Son côté. Le Roy veut aussy à cet [effet] contribuer à gagner les Suffrages de la Republique ; Et des Son retour en Angleterre, Il enverra un Ministre à Franstadt avec une Somme du moins de Soixante mille Ecus, et ne regrettera pas même une plus grande Somme pourvû qu'Il soit assuré du Succes. Cependant comme tout ce que Nous pouvons fournir ne paroît point Suffisant au Comte de Flemming, ni même proportionné aux Depenses que fait le Czar en Pologne ; Et comme Il est persuadé que le Concert pris avec Nous, Sera infiniment agreable à Monseigr. le Regent, Il croit que Sur la Communication qui en Sera faite à S.A.R. Elle ne hesitera point de contribuer aussy quelque Somme pour le faire reussir. Nous ne pouvons douter aussy que S.A.R. ne Soit tres disposée à faire de Son côté quelque effort pour avancer un Projet Si avantageux à la Suede, Et Nous Sommes Sûrs qu'Elle ne vous Saura pas mauvais gré que Nous ayons promis d'appuyer vers Elle la Demande que luy en feroit le Roy de Pologne. Le Comte de Flemming fera envoyer pour cet effet M^r le Coq à Paris et voici une Copie de la Lettre dont le Roy le chargera pour le Regent, Et Sa Majesté vous ordonne de l'assister de vos meilleurs offices pour obtenir de S.A.R. une Somme, qui, jointe à la nôtre puisse porter coup en Pologne. M^r le Coq est homme fort Sensé, et Nous avons beaucoup à nous loüer de luy à tous egards, Et Il se laissera diriger entierement par Votre Excellence. Le Roy de Pologne est actuellement à Franstadt où le Senat est assemblé. Le Comte de Flemming va S'y rendre incessamment. L'on debuttera par envoyer au Czar l'ambassade Solemnelle qui fut resoliée à la Diette de Grodno, pour luy demander Satisfaction Sur divers Griefs importans. L'Instruction même a aussy esté reglée par cette Diette, mais le Czar a trouvé moyen d'empêcher jusques à present par Ses Creatures l'Envoy de cette ambassade, Et le Roy de Pologne luy même n'avoit pas encore jugé à propos de la pousser, puisqu'Elle engagera indispensablement la Republique Si Elle reçoit un Refus du Czar comme il est tres apparent ; mais presente-

ment Il va la faire partir Sur l'avis que le Comte de Flemming luy a donné par un Exprez de ce dont Il est convenu avec Nous, et ce Comte Nous assure que les Mesures Sont prises avec les principaux Senateurs de telle manière que le Czar ne pourra plus retarder cette Demarche Si decisive de la Republique. L'argent que Nous donnerons d'abord Servira principalement aux fraix de cette ambassade, Et quand Elle aura esté acquittée et les Esprits preparez en Pologne ; alors le Roy convoquera une Diette pour y faire prendre les Resolutions necessaires. Je fais ce Detail à Votre Excellence pour vôtre Information, et pour que vous vous en Serviez pour preparer Mgr. le Regent à bien recevoir les Representations que luy fera M^r le Coq. Mais tout cecy doit estre menagé avec Secret, Et il faut avoir la precaution de ne jamais nommer la Guerre aux Polonois quand on veut les y faire entrer. Il faut Se contenter de la leur proposer Sous le nom *de moyens pour procurer la Paix.*

. Les Bruits que la Cour de Madrid fait courir, comme Si Elle entretenoit des Negotiations Souterraines avec Mgr. le Regent, ne nous mettroit nullement en peine ; Car comme d'un côté nous ne Souhaittons autre chose, Sinon que l'Espagne S'adresse à S.A.R. lorsqu'Elle aura à faire des Propositions de Paix acceptables et conformes à nos Traittez ; D'autre côté aussy nous nous reposons entierement Sur la Sincerité et la Droiture de S.A.R. bien persuadez qu'Elle n'ecouterà aucune Proposition de l'Espagne Sans nous en faire part.

Le Roy a esté fort aise de voir par vôtre Lettre du 30, que S.A.R. ait reçu Si agreablement la Proposition que vous luy avez faite de concourir avec Nous à la Mediation pour la Paix entre le Danemarc et la Suede, et à la Garantie que Nous avons prêtée pour cette fin au Roy de Danemarc pour le Duché de Sleswic.

[For a despatch from Craggs to Stair dated Dec. 22, 1719 (about the disgrace of Alberoni), see *Annals*, II, 125-7.]

JAMES CRAGGS, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO STAIR.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 31.*)

Whitehall Dec. 24th 1719.

I write this Letter to Y. E. singly upon account of a Conversation I had to-day with Signor Clodio Ré, and what I said to him upon

it by the King's Order. When I was this morning at Court just before I went into His Majestys Closet, he told me several things which I desired him to put in writing, and which I do not repeat, because he having complied with my Request, I enclose them to Your Excellency. But when I came from His Majesty, I brought him with me to my Office, and told him, that I was commanded to let him know, that as for the Investiture of the Expectatives, the King of Spain must never hope, that His Majesty or the Regent would break that Article of their Treaty so lately confirmed to the Emperor which gives His Imperial Majesty the Investiture of those Fiefs, that descend to the Queen of Spain's Sons. That as to Gibraltar, matters had extremely changed, since the King of Spain had hopes given him to have it restored: And that the Losses which His Catholick Majesty had sustained, would at a proper time be ballanced with those he had occasioned to Us. But that all these particularities were at present needless. For the King had ordered me to ask of him, Clodio Ré, whether by the terms contained in the inclosed Paper, *That His Catholick Majesty was disposed to accept the known Project of the Quadruple Alliance, &c.* he understood, that it would be accepted as a Preliminary to a future Congress, wherein a Peace should be treated. In which case His Majesty was extremely well pleased with the Proposal, and resolved in every thing, that should not violate his Treaties & Engagements, to shew his utmost regard for the Interests of the King of Spain. But if the abovementioned words were only general, & that His Catholick Majesty hoped, without accepting the Quadruple Alliance as a Preliminary, to appoint a Congress, where every thing contained in them should be examined *de novo*, His Majesty esteemed such an offer as a design to make the Allies differ about those points they were already agreed in, and could not understand what reason the Court of Madrid had to believe, they would now, after a successful War, consent to Proposals, which would not have been accepted before it began. I also told Signor Clodio Ré in general, how desirous we were to finish this War, and renew with Spain those ancient amicable Treaties, which were formerly esteemed by those that understood the Interest of both Nations, so necessary for them. And as to the Duke of Parma his Master, I told him, the King was very sensible of his good Intentions and Offices in removing from the Court of Madrid that publick Nuisance Cardinal Alberoni; and as a sense of them had already ordered me to represent them at

the Court of Vienna, and write to his Minister there to imploy his Good Offices in the Duke of Parma's favour. And I shall write to Mo^r S^t Saphorin accordingly by tomorrow's Post. His Majesty in the mean time would have Y. E. and Earl Stanhope speak in the same sense to Mo^r Penterridter at Paris.

It is not to be doubted but that Mo^r Landi has already made Overtures of the same nature to the Regent, for which reason the King has contented himself with these general Answers, which keep up religiously to his Treaties, and engage him to nothing but a friendly Intercession for the Duke of Parma, which carries no consequence to the publick Affairs, and which he certainly deserves for his undoubted and successfull Endeavours to remove the Cardinal.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 31.*)

Whitehall, 1st Feb^r 1719/20.

. His Majesty very well approves of what Your Excellency proposed about procuring Powers and Orders from the Courts of Vienna and Madrid to their respective Generals in Sicily to treat of an Armistice and of the Evacuation of that Island by the Spaniards, and that Sir Geo. Byng should concur therein. But His Majesty thinks the King of Spain's Frankness in sending at once the Instrument of his Accession signed by himself has entitiled him to so much regard from the Allies, that he should be gratified in the concluding a Cessation of Arms in Sicily without waiting for the Treaty of Evacuation, the particulars of which may take up some time to settle ; besides that as to the delay it might give to the Treaty, though it be true that by the Quadruple Alliance the Evacuation ought to precede the Congress, yet the Spaniards by the same Article may defer it till the Exchange of the Ratifications of their Accession is over.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 31.*)

À Londres, ce 18^e Fevrier, 1719/20.

[For the first portion of this letter, see *Annals*, II, pp. 413-16.]

Dans cette Situation Votre Excellence jugera avec quelle mortification S. M. reçoit les avis que V. E. luy donne comme si l'on ne se repentoit pas seulement de la communication qu'on luy a faite de l'acceptation de l'Espagne, mais aussi que l'on vous fait entendre

que son refus de restituer Gibraltar, pourroit attirer de très mauvaises Consequences.

A l'égard du premier point, Dieu sçait avec quelle droiture S. M. a toujours refusé d'ecouter la moindre proposition de l'Espagne, sans faire dans l'instant part à S. A. R. de ces ouvertures, et s'il n'y en a jamais eu de meurie, c'est parceque le Roy n's'est jamais crû en estat de les recevoir sans les communiquer immédiatement à Ses Alliez. Il y a certaine justice que les Ennemis même ne peuvent refuser à la verité, et si Monseigneur le Regent a quelque moyen pour s'informer de ce qui s'est passé à Madrid, il y apprendra qu'on ne s'y est jamais flaté de pouvoir detacher le Roy de ses Interêts, et que pourtant il s'est passé un tems ou ils n'auroient rien négligé ni refusé pour tenter Sa Majesté, s'ils en avoient conçu la moindre esperance. Le Roy a toujours parfaitement bien compris qu'une paix et des Liaisons avantageuses avec l'Espagne seroient faciles à celle des Puissances Confederées qui voudroit les obtenir soit en sacrifiant les autres entierement, soit en s'emparant de la Negociation par des Promesses de faciliter les Termes et les Conditions avec les autres, pourveu qu'on cedat à celle-cy toutes les Convenances qui luy seroient necessaires. Mais S. M. s'en rapporte à S. A. R. si bien, loin d'avoir des pareilles veües, Elle n'a non seulement souscrit à ce que la France proposat toujours les Conditions avantageuses et plausibles pour l'Espagne. Mais si dans la Cession même de Gibraltar qui estoit une offre volontaire de S. M., si Elle eut pû prevenir cette Guerre, le Roy ne consentit point à ce que S. A. R. s'en fit le merite, et si du depuis S. M. ne s'est entierement confiée aux soins de S. A. R. pour les interêts communs, sans chercher par aucun Canal secret à s'asseurer de la faveur dans les Traités à faire ; au contraire Elle a voulu passer pour roide et difficile quoyqu'Elle avoüe qu'en tems de Paix Elle a des Interêts à soutenir avec l'Espagne qui ne demandent pas seulement une Cession d'Inimitié, mais une bonne Harmonie entre les deux Couronnes.

Pour le second Point, à moins que S. A. R. ne donne à S. M. quelques raisons (et Je puis dire qu'Elle est toujours prête d'ecouter celles de S. A. R. avec grande partialité) pour luy faire voir qu'Elle n'est pas bien fondée en droit, en raison et en equité à conserver Gibraltar, si Elle le veut, S. M. ne peut regarder cette Insinuation que comme une espece de menace la plus entonnante du monde pour Elle.

Enfin, My Lord, S. M. ne doute point que S. A. R. se departe de cette Amitié dont ils se sont tous deux si bien trouvés, pour suivre des Idées nouvelles et incertaines. Elle le conjure d'observer si ces Avis ne lui viennent point des mêmes Quartiers, d'où sont provenües toutes les difficultés et les Objections à chaque pas qu'ils ont fait ensemble, quoyque le Succés et les Suites n'en ayent pas seulement justifié la sagesse, mais auroient aussi dû faire voir d'une maniere à n'en pouvoir plus douter les mauvaises intentions de ceux qui s'y opposoient. ¹

[A covering despatch from Craggs to Stair of this same date is to be found in *Annals of [the House of] Stair*, II, pp. 144-5, in which it is remarked that the cession of Gibraltar would be a "ridicule upon our successes in this war," and that "it may well be doubted whether His Majesty would have it in his power" to make the cession. A copy of the letter is in *P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 31*.

Another despatch concerning Gibraltar, of which there is a copy in *P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 31*, dated March 10, 1719/29, is printed in *Annals*, II, pp. 417-18.]

JAMES CRAGGS, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO STAIR AND STANHOPE.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book 31*.)

Whitehall 16th Mar. 1719/20.

[The first part of this despatch is printed in *Annals*, II, pp. 418-19. It proceeds :]

If H.I.M. would release him² from these Burthens, and show him some other favours, which from his very great Authority and Influence in Italy he may do at a very small expense to himself, whatever this Prince's Inclinations may be, his necessities and dependencies will be so great, that we think here he must use his utmost Interest with his Daughter in favour of those measures we hope the Court of Spain would take. I will not enlarge to Your Lordships upon the Advantages of such a successfull Attempt. You will understand them better than I can represent them. I

¹ Extracts of this despatch are given in *Wiesener*, III, pp. 293-6.

² The Duke of Parma.

will only let you know the King's Pleasure that you should endeavour to satisfy Mo^r Penterridter of the necessity of making it, and endeavour to procure his hearty Assistance.

The other point is in relation to Sir Geo. Byng, who had his Instructions formerly not to consent to the Evacuation of Sicily, while we apprehended the Spanish Troops transported into their own Country might be employed against France or Great Britain. Though the face of affairs is entirely altered, Mo^r Hoffman informs me, that in pursuance of those Directions he refuses to concur now to the Evacuation of Sicily, though it is what we most desire at present ; whereupon I send him the King's Orders in the two inclosed Letters, which if Lord Stanhope and you approve, I desire you would transmit to him by the speediest Conveyance ; & H.M. would have Lord Stanhope as Secretary of State and whatever you two, who are upon the spot shall judge necessary to explain or amend these Instructions.

(*P.R.O., S.P., France 167, fo. 324.*)

14th April [1720].

[*Copy.*]

. You will see by my Letter to Sir Geo : Byng that the King entirely approves of what he has done in concert with General Mercy, and renews his Orders to him accordingly. H.M. does also approve of the Answer which Your Excellency in conjunction with Mo^r. Penterridter has given to the Abbé Landi concerning his Propositions about the Evacuations of Sicily and Sardinia, which is wholly agreeable to His Majesty's thoughts and intentions. H.M. has read the Letter written to the Abbé Landi by Mo^r Penterridter on that subject, which he thinks a very proper one, and would have Your Excellency acquaint the Abbé Landi with H.M.'s opinion that the Imperial Minister could not well have writ in another manner. The King has also seen with great satisfaction Your Excellency's Letter to M^r Schaub, which H.M. approves as conformable to his own Sentiments and to the true honour and interest of the Crowns of Great Britain and Spain, & hopes that you took care to send it by a safe Conveyance.

SIR ROBERT SUTTON

1720-1722

ROBERT SUTTON, who was in deacon's orders, appears to have accompanied Lord Lexington to Vienna, as chaplain, in 1694. On his uncle's leaving Vienna, at the end of 1697, he remained as Secretary, and ended by being British resident at the Imperial capital until 1701, when he was knighted and went to Constantinople as ambassador. Here he remained until, in 1716, he was relieved of his duties and came home, only to be sent out again in 1717 to Vienna to attempt to mediate a peace between the Emperor and the Sultan. In 1718 he was at Passarowitz, and after the conclusion of the peace he seems to have returned home, but only for a short while. In April 1720 he was again called upon for service, for he relieved Stair in Paris. We can but surmise the reputation he had built up for himself: the length and the constancy of his employment argue in his favour; on the other hand, certain angry letters to him from Craggs, now in the British Museum, indicate that Sutton was not well versed in the routine of the diplomatic service, and was not very quick in adapting himself to rules at a place so near London as Paris. Under these circumstances it is perhaps not surprising that in 1721 Carteret was selected to go as ambassador to Paris. The scheme fell to the ground owing to the deaths of Stanhope and Craggs, and the diffidence with which Sutton was regarded at home is reflected both by the meagreness of the business which was confided to him and by the awkward arrangement whereby Sir Luke Schaub was appointed ambassador to the court of France along with him in that same year. The result could have been foreseen, and indeed it may be said that the only outstanding feature of Sutton's period of office in Paris was a violent quarrel with Schaub.

In September, 1720, Sutton was given a commission to repair

to Cambrai for the Congress, but he did not leave Paris till November 1721, nor does he ever seem to have gone to Cambrai, nor was he ever employed again. He now entered politics, and in 1722 was returned as Member for Nottinghamshire. Although he received the Order of the Bath in 1725, trouble came upon him heavily, for in 1732 we find him deeply involved as one of the directors in the scandal of the Charitable Corporation, and pleading before the House of Commons that he was a great sufferer by the ruin of the corporation, and in extenuation of his offence that though a manager, he was seldom there "and knew very little of what was done." But he did not escape entirely, for in April 1733 the House of Commons censured him for neglect of duty. This was virtually the end of the matter; Sutton and his co-directors had powerful friends, a lottery was established on behalf of the sufferers, a dividend was paid, and the matter dropped. In the parliament that was dissolved in 1741 Sutton sat for Great Grimsby, but was not returned to the new house; he retired into private life; domestic sorrow came upon him by the loss of a son aged nine in 1743, and he himself died on August 13, 1746.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SIR ROBERT SUTTON, APPOINTED AMBASSADOR
EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY TO THE MOST
CHRISTIAN KING.

(*P.R.O., King's Letters 13.*)

St. James's 29th April 1720.

1. Having received between Us and Our respective Dominions.¹

2. You shall likewise desire an audience of the Regent according to the late Treaty concluded between Us & the most Christian King.²

3. You are likewise to make suitable Compliments in Our Name to the rest of the Princes of the Blood, ... other Crowned Heads.

4. Whereas by the 2nd Article of the Treaty signed at the Hague elude or infringe the said Article.³

5. It being stipulated by the 3^d article of the Treaty above

¹ As in Stair's instructions, April 29, 1717, § 1.

² As in Stair's instructions, April 29, 1717, § 2.

³ As in Stair's instructions, April 29, 1717, § 4.

mentioned, and confirmed by the Quadruple Alliance, That the several contracting Powers therein mentioned *do refuse* from the time you shall have made such Demand.¹

6. Whereas it is agreed by the 4th Article of the Treaty at the Hague *if it be possible, by the end of June 1717*. You are to represent to His most Christian Majesty, as occasion may require, that this Article be in all its parts punctually put in execution.²

7. You shall also Correspond from time to time with those Commiss^{rs} transmit to Us on that Subject.³

8. The Clause relating to Religion at the end of the 4th Article of the Treaty of Ryswick and continue, as occasion may require to urge Our Orders herein, till the same are complied with, & the proper Declaration made on the part of France at Ratisbon.⁴

9. You shall likewise represent may also be set at Liberty.⁵

10. You shall insist in Our Name that the French naturalized English delivered to you with these Our Instructions.⁶

11. You shall carefully observe the Motions & Intentions of that Court prejudicial to the publick Peace.

12. You shall entertain a good Correspondence & particularly with those of the States Gen^l of the United Provinces.

13. You shall protect & Countenance Our Merchants duly & punctually observed.

14. Whereas Our Royal Predecessor not to give the hand to any Envoy in your own House.

15. You are likewise to Correspond with Our Ministers your respective Posts the more successfully.

16. Of all matters you shall be informed which you are to observe accordingly.

17. At your return which may contribute to inform Us of the present condition of that Government and Kingdom.

¹ As in Stair's instructions, April 29, 1717, § 5 with one verbal alteration.

² As in Stair's instructions of April 29, 1717, § 6.

³ As in Stair's instructions, April 29, 1717, § 7.

⁴ As in Stair's instructions, April 29, 1717, § 9.

⁵ As in Stair's instructions, April 29, 1717, § 10.

⁶ As in Stair's instructions, April 29, 1717, § 11.

JAMES CRAGGS, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO SUTTON.

(*P.R.O., S.P., France, Vol. 168, fo. 67.*)

[*Copy.*]

Whitehall 13 June 1720.

. In the first place I am to tell you that His Majesty had consented that the Congress should be held in some town belonging to France; the Emperour has made some difficulty and desired that Nancy might be the place. We have answer'd here very sincerely that we were engaged before to the Regent, and could therefore pass no Offices in favour of His Imperial Majesty's request. The King is now told by Count Staremberg, that H.R.H. the Regent has assured Mo^r Penterridter that he had no objection to Nancy if the King would consent to it. Whereupon at his Request, the King has ordered me to tell Your Excellency & Lord Stair, if he be still in France, that you should wait upon the Regent and lett H.R.H. know that His Majesty has no objection to Nancy if he has consented to it; and that you communicate the same to Mo^r. Penterridter with this Clause to both of them that unless the Regent disengages His Majesty from his first promise he cannot depart from it. I will not conclude upon this Subject without taking notice that one hears no more of late about the Congress than if there were none to be. Will you be pleased to enquire what may be the reason of this silence?

(*P.R.O., S.P., France, Vol. 168, fo. 111.*)

[*Copy.*]

Whitehall June 27th 1720.

. I did, before the King went away, receive his Orders to instruct Your Excellency upon all occasions to express his Inclinations to favour the pretensions of the Duke of Parma. That Prince's Minister has since wrote me a Letter, and given me a Memorial, by which you will be more particularly apprised of them, and which may direct you to make proper applications in favour of them.

I take this opportunity to acquaint you with a Conference that My Lord Stanhope and I had with the French Ambassador before he set out for Paris. It was upon his communicating to Us a Letter from the Regent to him, wherein H.R.H. complains of the

ridiculous and groundless Reports which had lately been spread, that he had disgraced the ArchBishop of Cambray; whereupon We took occasion to acquaint him, that the King had of late made several observations that gave him no little uneasiness. First, that ever since the French Ambassador was here he had not once talkt to Us about any business. 2^{ly} That the ArchBishop of Cambray who by H.R.H's orders had frequently corresponded with Us, and sometimes employed M^r Destouches to negotiate with Us, had been silent ever since that time. 3^{ly} That during the same Interval, My Lord Stair had received no Commands from the Regent, nor the least Communication of what was doing, though We learnt from all hands, that Couriers were going to and from Spain. 4^{ly} We complain'd to the Ambassador of the strange unprovoked language which M^r Law constantly used towards this Nation and the threats which he so publickly and wantonly gave out against the Manufacture, the Trade, Funds and Credit of it. We also told him, what is very true, that His Majesty was informed so as not to doubt of it, since the Regent himself did not deny it to my Lord Stanhope when at Paris, that M^r Law had been so bold as to advise H.R.H. to attack Us. 5^{ly} That although H.M. did not pretend so much as to insinuate to the Regent whom he should or should not employ, yet that he was not void of those Sentiments, which all Courts and all men must naturally have when they perceive any man, who professes himself their bitter Enemy, enjoy in so particular a manner the favour and protection of his Master. 6^{ly} It was very observable that while this prime Minister seems to affect this extraordinary language and behaviour, and while the situation of the Affairs of Europe promise a general Tranquillity, and those of France do not demand any newer exorbitant expence, that they are making the most prodigious Armaments by Sea and land, making vast Magazines in the Low Country and harbouring great Members of Our Rebells in Paris and other Towns and Provinces of France. 7^{ly} and lastly, That We did not want information which acquainted Us, that it was proposed to the Regent to surprise Us during the King's Absence, and that from a certain Party in France Propositions had been made in Spain by the means of S^r Patrick Lawless, which if their Catholick Majesties should agree to, that Party did not doubt to procure H.R.H.'s concurrence to attack Us. And therefore We told the Ambassador that comparing all these things with the great

silence that had been so long observed towards Us, the King had given Orders to arm some ships for the preservation of Our Coast, and a Squadron is actually fitted out, though under a different pretence, and not to alarm the Country.

Upon the whole, I first beg leave to make some reflections and then to advise you what use to make of these Informations. Though upon so many Circumstances it had been unpardonable not to secure Ourselves by arming this Squadron, yet I own I cannot conceive, that the Court of France would at this time be capable of so rash, so weak and perfidious a measure, as to fall upon a very good Friend and Ally, from whom they have nothing to apprehend. I rather believe, that M^r Laws passions against Us, his Vanity, the Disconcert of his Schemes, his Jealousy of Our Credit, and the Wagers he has made upon the Fall of it, make him hope, that by giving out these things he shall ruin Our Stocks, which, I don't know for what reason, he seems to have mightily at heart. I inform you thus particularly of what has pass'd, because, in case the Regent should talk to you upon this Subject from what the French Ambassador will have told him, you may know what to say to set him right, in case any ill turn has been given to this conversation. The Archbishop of Cambray has been informed of the same things by M^r Destouches, from whom I do not apprehend any malicious construction, nor should I from the French Ambassador, but for M^r de Pleneuf, who was his Governor here, and whose good Intentions, as well as those of M^r de Chammorel the French Secretary here, are very subject to caution. As I have given Your Excellency this Intelligence, that you may not appear ignorant in case you are spoke to, so I would not have you begin any discourse of this nature, unless you receive the King's Orders from My Lord Stanhope.

JAMES, EARL STANHOPE, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO SUTTON.

(*P.R.O., S.P., France, Vol. 168, fo. 188.*)

[*Copy.*]

À Pirmont le 15/26 Juillet 1720.

. Mons^r l'Archeveque de Cambray à écrit une longue Depêche à Mons^r Destouches, ou Il donne les plus fortes Assurances de la Resolution de S. A. R. à continuer à vivre eu bonne Intelligence avec le Roy Nôtre Maitre, et à cultiver de plus en plus la bonne Amitié qui Subsiste entre Eux, et que les Suggestions malicieuses

que des Gens malintentionnez peuvent avoir faites au contraire, sont sans aucun fondement. Nous ne voulons point douter de la Sincerité des bonnes Intentions de S. A. R. Surtout quand les assurances qu'on Nous en donnent¹ viennent de la part de Mons^r l'archeveque de Cambray, mais pourtant Nous avons juste Sujet de nous plaindre, qu'on doit avoir envoyé des Ordres de France à Son insçu qui Sont tout à fait opposez aux assurances qu'on Nous donne, car Nous avons reçu avis de Mons^r Finch, Ministre du Roy à Stockholm, que le Sieur Campredon, dont nous avions Sujet d'estre contents par Sa Conduite passée, avoit voulu engager la Cour de Suede de donner les mains à ce que la France fût Seule Mediatrice de la Paix entre la Suede & le Czar à l'exclusion de la Grande Bretagne, ce que Nous ne Saurions croire qu'Il eût osé entreprendre, Sans avoir reçu des Ordres de la Cour de France pour cet effet. On dit que c'étoit par un concert qui avoit esté menagé par Mons^r Laws, comme vous verrez par l'Extrait, ci joint de la Lettre de Mons^r Finch : Nous ne saurions Nous empêcher de regarder ce Procédé comme peu digne de l'amitié de S. A. R. dont on vient de nous donner de nouvelles assurances, et il faut en même tems estre bien Simple pour S'imaginer que la Suede, qui a de Si grandes obligations à la Grande Bretagne, voulût exclurre Sa Majesté de la Mediation.

Nous avons aussi esté informez que le Comte Sparr, Ministre du Roy de Suede à Paris, avoit, par l'Entremise d'un vieux Ministre, que Nous Supposons estre le Marechal d'Huxelles, entamé une Negociation avec Schleinitz, Ministre du Czar, au prejudice de la Grande Bretagne, Sans y estre autorisé de la part de la Suede, qui avoit desapprouvé Son Procédé.

Nous avons aussi des avis de la Haye, que le Prince Kourakin y avoit tenu le même langage au Secrétaire de Suede, par toutes lesquelles choses il est evident, qu'il y a des Personnes à Paris qui Se mêlent des affaires Etrangères, Sans la participation de Mons^r l'archeveque de Cambray. C'est pourquoy comme celà peut estre d'une pernicieuse consequence tant pour lui que pour nous, Nous le prions tres instamment de vouloir approfondir cette affaire, et d'y apporter un prompt remede. Nous nous sommes déjà plaint des Intrigues de Mons^r de Bonac à Constantinople et des étroites Liaisons qu'Il a avec le Ministre Moscovite contre les Interets de la Grande Bretagne, qui ne cherche qu'à procurer une paix Generale dans le Nord. Nous esperons que S. A. R. y aura fait une Serieuse

¹ *Sic.*

attention, et qu'Elle voudra bien nommer un autre Ministre qui ne contrecarre pas les Mesures que Sa Majesté prend de concert avec S. A. R. pour retablir la Tranquillité Publique dans toute l'Europe.

Nous Sommes bien aises d'apprendre que Mons^r Laws reconnoît la nécessité d'une bonne Correspondence entre la Grande Bretagne et la France, et que lui et Mons^r l'archeveque vivent en bonne intelligence ensemble, Et puisqu'Il convient qu'Il s'est echappé de parler indiscretement à l'égard de la Grande Bretagne, Nous esperons que cela le rendra Sage à l'avenir et qu'Il ne fera rien qui puisse nuire aux Interêts de S. A. R. et estre desagreable au Roy nôtre Maitre Son plus fidele allié.

Je n'ay rien autre chose à ajouter, Sinon de prier V. Excellence de faire hâter la Ratification de la Garantie de la France pour le Duché de Sleswic, de la manière que l'auront recommandé les dernieres Lettres de Mons^r Campredon en France, et puisqu'il S'agit de Mons^r de Campredon, ayez la bonté de dire à Mons^r l'archeveque de Cambray que Sa Conduite a esté telle jusqu'à present, que Nous ne pouvions Nous lasser de louer Son procedé, et que ce qui vient d'arriver dernièrement en Suede, Nous est une preuve demonstrative qu'Il doit avoir reçu des Ordres bien precis pour avoir changé du blanc au noir. Il convient par cette raison, extremement à Mons^r l'archeveque de Cambray de prendre Si bien Ses Mesures que l'on n'envoye point d'ordres aux Ministres Etrangers à Son insçu. Il vous plaira aussi de faire remarquer audit archeveque, Sur l'amitié duquel Nous comptons toujours, combien S. A. R. est mal Servie par ceux qui peuvent avoir envoyé Soit les ordres à Mons^r de Bonac dont Nous nous plaignons, Soit ceux à Mons^r de Campredon, Soit enfin les Insinuations que l'on doit avoir faites au Czar de traitter d'une Paix avec la Suede à nôtre Exclusion.

Son Altesse Royale par la Conduite qu'Elle a tenüe Jusqu'à present dans les affaires du Nord, S'étoit acquise à juste titre l'Amitié, la Reconnoissance et la Confiance du Roy de la Grande Bretagne pour lui avoir procuré Sa Paix avec la Suede, au Roy de Suede pour l'avoir tiré du peril eminent où Il se trouvoit, au Roy de Prusse pour lui avoir procuré Sa Paix avec la Cession de Stettin et de Son District, et du Roy de Danemarc pour lui avoir procuré une Paix, dont Il avoit besoin, et lui avoir donné la Garantie du Slesvic. Se peut il qu'apres avoir rendu des Services Si essentiels à tant de Couronnes qui engagent par consequent les dites Couronnes à une reconnoissance eternelle envers la Puissance qui leur a procuré

tant de bien, ou vüille¹ renverser par des Négociations, et des Menagemens hors de Saison avec le Czar tout ce que l'on vient d'établir avec tant de gloire, et perdre le fruit de tant de bons offices rendus à tant de Puissances depuis peu de tems? Ce fruit ne pourroit estre autre qu'un attachement à Monseigneur le Regent, et une Predilection en Sa faveur contre tout ce qui lui Seroit contraire. Je vous avoüe que Je ne conçois rien à un tel procedé. Je veux croire que ce Sont des restes de l'animosité et de la passion que marquoit contre Nous Mons^r Laws depuis quelque tems. Je veux croire que l'Experience et l'attachement qu'Il a pour Son Maitre lui auront fait Sentir presentement que la passion l'avoit emporté trop loin, Et Je veux me reposer Sur les Esperances qu'Il vous donne pour l'avenir; mais pour que Nous puissions ajoûter une entiere foy aux assurances que l'on nous donne, vous representerez partout où il conviendra, combien il importe que l'on donne et à Constantinople et à la Cour de Suede, des ordres differents de ceux qu'y doivent avoir presentement les Ministres de France. Quant à Constantinople, Je vous avoüeray ingenuëment que la Conduite de Mons^r de Bonac a esté telle depuis longtems, que Je doute Si aucuns nouveaux ordres le feront changer tout à coup, et Je croy qu'il conviendrait au Service de S. A. R. qu'on lui designât un Successeur.

(*P.R.O., State Papers, France, Vol. 169, fo. 172v.*)

[*Copy.*]

À Hanovre le 5^e de Nov. 1720. N.S.

. Le Roy vous ordonne de presser Mo^r le Regent d'instruire incessamment le Sieur de Campredon de manière qu'il puisse avec autorité, et par des moyens réels avancer soit en Suede, soit vers le Czar, le but que nous nous proposons. Il s'agit d'encourager le Roy de Suede à prendre le Parti que nous croyons le Seul qui puisse le Sauver: D'ébranler le Czar en luy faisant vivement Sentir qu'Il reste des Amis à la Suede, Et d'aider à Sa Majesté Suedoise à disposer les Esprits des Suedois qui composent le Senat et les Etats. Pour cet effet vous reitererez vos Instances les plus urgentes, pour que S. A. R. renouvelle Ses anciennes alliances avec la Suede, qu'Elle luy fournisse des Subsidés sans delay; qu'Elle ne tarde point à Se declarer et à faire travailler M^r de Campredon pour la

¹ *Sic.*

maison de Hesse, et qu'Elle luy ordonne de co-operer avec M^r Finch à ce qui pourra procurer une prompte Paix à la Suede, et la Succession à cette Maison.

La France est si evidemment interessée en tout cecy, que non seulement nous comptons que M^r le Regent se determinera sans balancer aux Resolutions et aux Demarches que nous luy proposons, mais qu' Il regardera les Instances que Nous luy en faisons, comme la preuve la plus convaincante de la Sincere Amitié du Roy, et son Attention Suivie par tout ce qui concerne les veritables Interêts de la France, et l'honneur de S. A. R.

APPENDIX

KING'S INSTRUCTIONS TO COMMISSIONERS

1. COMMERCIAL TREATY OF 1713
2. GENERAL CHARLES ROSS' INSTRUCTIONS, 1714.
3. DUNKIRK
4. DEMARCATION OF FRONTIERS IN AMERICA

1. COMMERCIAL TREATY OF UTRECHT

The supplement to the Treaty of Utrecht upon which Bolingbroke is supposed to have most set his heart was the commercial treaty of St. Germain based upon the ninth clause of the Treaty of Utrecht. This treaty, to negotiate which commissioners were appointed in 1714 (N.S.) under instructions which are here printed, was never ratified by the British parliament; it was greatly hampered by being defeated in the House of Commons on June 18, 1713, owing to the combination of the Hanover Tories with the Whigs, and though negotiations continued, the Whigs, when in power, refused to consider the prospect of any special facility being given to Anglo-French trade. (See Stanhope's letter to Stair, above, p. 98.)

Of the commissioners appointed, Charles Whitworth, later Lord Whitworth, was an old servant of the Crown, and was to be continued as a valued diplomat in northern questions under George I. There is a full notice of him in the *Dictionary of National Biography*. James Murray, second son of the Fifth Viscount Stormont, was born about 1690, and was member of Parliament for Dumfriesshire from 1711 to 1713 and Elgin 1713 to 1715, when he was unseated by order of the House of Commons. Being always a strong Tory he joined in 1715 in the rising of that year, and on February 2, 1720/1, he was created Earl of Dunbar by King James III. He died at Avignon in 1770. There is a notice of him in *The Complete Peerage*, by G. E. C.

(new edition), s.v. Dunbar, from which these details are taken.

Of Sir Joseph Martin it is more difficult to speak with confidence. From the fact that Sir Joseph Martin was an assistant governor of the Russia company it may be inferred that he is the same as the Joseph Martin who had secured a monopoly of the trade in Russian tobacco from Peter the Great, and was forbidden by the House of Lords in 1707 to use it. (See *Hist. MSS. Comm.*, House of Lords Papers, New Series, 1706-8, No. 2402, p. 277.) What is certain is that he was supported by the Tory interest in April 1711 for election to the board of the East India Company, but failed to secure election. He was a commissioner for the two state-lotteries and became a knight in 1712. In 1713 he sat for Hastings in the House of Commons, being re-elected in 1714 on his appointment to the commission, but on the dissolution of Parliament after the demise of the Crown, he was not re-elected, and though he remained a deputy lieutenant for London, his political career sinks into oblivion. He died at the age of about eighty on August 16, 1729, remembered only as "an eminent Turkey merchant." (See Abel Boyer, *Political State of Great Britain*, Vols. I, p. 263; IV, 71; VII, 267; VIII, 443; XXXVIII, p. 199; *A Correct List of the Lords . . . as also of the Knights [&c.] of the Last & Present Parliament*. . . London, 1715, p. 19.)

Mr. Herne was a Whig—or rather he was supported by the Whigs in the election to the Board of the East India Company in 1711—and where Joseph Martin failed, Herne was successful. He died on March 18, 1713/14, being then member for Clifton-Dartmouth-Hardress in Devon. (Boyer, *ut sup.* I, 263; VII, 267. *Hist. MSS. Comm.*, Portland Papers, V, 401.)

The appointment of two Tories and two Whigs to be commissioners seems to point to the Tory Government being actuated in this matter of commerce by something other than purely party motives.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR CHARLES WHITWORTH, JAMES MURRAY, SIR JOSEPH MARTIN AND FREDERICK HERNE, APPOINTED COMMISSARYS TO TREAT WITH THE COMMISSARYS OF THE MOST CHRISTIAN KING. Windsor, 14th February 1713/14.

(*P.R.O.*, *King's Letters* 13.)

Whereas in the Ninth Article of the Treaty of Navigation and Commerce concluded at Utrecht the $\frac{31}{11}$ day of $\frac{\text{March}}{\text{April}}$ 1713 between

Us, and Our Good Brother Lewis the Fourteenth, the Most Christian King, it is among other things agreed, that Commissarys on both sides shall meet at London to consider of and remove the difficultys concerning certain Merchandizes which are excepted on the part of France out of the Tariff of 1664, and concerning several other heads, specified in a separate Instrument belonging to the said Treaty, which has been proposed on our Part, but were not wholly adjusted; and likewise that the said Commissarys shall at the same time endeavour (as may be most agreeable to the Interest of both Nations) to examine more thoroughly the methods of Trade on both sides, and to find out and establish just and mutually advantageous means both for removing the Impediments in that matter, and regulating the Dutys on both sides, We therefore, for promoting so necessary a Work, which tends to the settling a free and open Intercourse of Trade between the two Nations, and thereby strengthening the Peace, and increasing the benefit of it for the good of Our Subjects in particular, have thought fit by Our Commission under Our Great Seal bearing date at Windsor the Thirteenth day of December last, to Appoint you to be Our Commissarys for treating and concluding with the Commissarys on the part of France all such matters and things as are referred to your Cognizance and Determination in pursuance of the Ninth Article of the Treaty of Commerce abovementioned.

You are therefore to meet the Commissarys which Our Good Brother the most Christian King shall send hither, and to inspect and examine the Commission or Powers given to them in order to see whether they be sufficiently empowered to enter into Negotiation with You.

And whereas some doubts or difficultys may arise concerning the true sense and meaning of some Article or Clauses of the said Treaty of Commerce, Our Will and Pleasure is, that in the first Place, and before you proceed to treat of any other matter you do explain and settle with the aforesaid Commissarys of France the precise and genuine sense of such Article or Articles or any Clause or Expression therein contained concerning which any doubt or difficulty may happen to arise; and particularly you are to adjust with them the following Points, as Preliminary to the Whole.

That whereas We have observed it to have been sometimes suggested on the part of France that the Bill for making effectual the Eighth and Ninth Articles of the said Treaty having not passed into

an Act in the last Session of Our Parliament here, the whole Treaty is become void and of none effect ; it is therefore highly necessary to be asserted that what is positive in the Treaty remains binding and in full force, and what is conditional ought to take Place whenever the Condition is fulfilled.

And whereas some have affected to doubt concerning the Extent of the Words *Goods and Merchandize of Great Britain* mentioned in the Ninth Article aforesaid, We think it very proper to remove all cavil for the future, and to have them explained as they were at first understood to be, viz^t any Goods and Merchandizes belonging to Our Subjects of Great Britain, and as they are explained in the abovementioned Bill lately depending in Our Parliament.

We think it likewise expedient that an Explanation be made, that any Exemptions of Dutys, or Privileges in Commerce that shall be granted to, or enjoyed by any other Nation in respect to the four Species excepted out of the Tariff of 1664 be in like manner enjoyed by Our Subjects in pursuance of the Eighth and Ninth Articles of the said Treaty of Commerce.

And whereas several matters must necessarily arise during the course of this Negotiation, which We cannot now foresee, and which will require particular directions, therefore for the more regular and ready dispatch of all such Points, whereon you shall want further and more distinct Instructions, We do hereby direct you from time to time to apply to Our Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, and to receive from them, and follow such orders and Instructions as shall be given You by them. We having signify'd Our Pleasure to Our said Commissioners that they do receive your Applications and furnish you with the necessary Instructions thereupon.

2. GENERAL CHARLES ROSS' INSTRUCTIONS

These instructions are here printed, for, although the mission was never undertaken by Ross and therefore they were never put into real effect, they represent the attitude of the ministry in April 1714 towards the problems of the neutrality of Italy and the position of the Protestants in the Empire under the treaty of Westphalia. With regard to the latter question, there is no deviation shown by these instructions from those contained in despatches to Shrewsbury and Prior ; the former problem was much more

thorny and the instructions here given should be compared with the correspondence with Prior on the same subject culminating in the proposed defensive alliance with France to safeguard the neutrality in July 1714.

Charles Ross of Balnagowan (by purchase), brother of Lord Ross of Hawkhead, had served in the army, and as appears from a petition in the Portland Papers (VIII, p. 311) of 1708 had served among the garrison of Londonderry and Enniskillen in King William's time. The year 1703 saw him in the Netherlands commanding the Royal Irish Dragoons under Lord Cutts, and he was promoted Major-General by Marlborough after the battle of Blenheim (*Hist. MSS. Comm.*, 12th report, App. III (Cowper papers, Vol. III), p. 41).

In 1707 he became member of the united House of Commons for Ross-shire, a seat which he held until his death. In 1710 he adhered to the Tory party, and a summary of a speech which he made in April, 1714, defending the abandonment of the Allies in 1712, may be found in *Hist. MSS. Comm.*, 15th report, App. VII (Ailesbury papers), p. 215, with a reply by Craggs. It was at this time that he was appointed ambassador to France, contrary it would appear to the wishes of Oxford, but in accordance with those of Bolingbroke.¹ After the death of Queen Anne he appears as an adherent of Sir William Wyndham, supporting Walpole's attack on Stanhope's Spanish policy in 1718, when, according to a Jacobite agent, "none spoke better than General Ross" (*Stuart Papers*, Vol. VII, p. 570). He evidently was a member of the commission for inquiring into the affairs of the South Sea Company, and it was while acting in this capacity that he caused the greatest political sensation of his life. For he was approached by James Vernon with a bribe on behalf of Aislachie, an action as foolish as criminal in view of Ross' large fortune. Ross laid the matter before the House of Commons, and Vernon was expelled. On the accession of George II he recovered the command of his Dragoons and was promoted General of the Horse. He died at Bath on Aug. 4,

¹ Cf. Ministère des aff. étr. No. 255, fo. 76. Gaultier to Torcy, April 16, 1714 (N.S.): "M. de Bolingbroke veut absolument que Prior soit rappelé et que le general Ross luy succede, et l'on m'a assure qu'il l'emporteroit malgré le Trésorier." And again, *Ibid.*, Vol. 261, fo. 73, Gaultier to Torcy, Jan. 15, 1714 (N.S.), My lord d'Oxford me dit encore vendredy dernier que le general Ross ne sera point le successeur de M. Prior. Je suis bien aise car il ne vaut pas Mathieu."

1732. (See *Gentleman's Magazine*, 1732, Vol. II, p. 929; *The Scots Peerage*, ed. Sir James Balfour Paul, Vol. VII, p. 258, Edinburgh, 1910.)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR CHARLES ROSS, APPOINTED ENVOY EXTRAORDINARY TO THE MOST CHRISTIAN KING. St. James's, 23rd April 1714.

(*P.R.O., S.P. France, Vol. 158, fo. 126.*)

1. Having received these Our Instructions with Your other Dispatches You shall . . . between Us and Our Dominions respectively.

2. You shall likewise desire Audiences of the Princes and Princesses of the Blood . . . Spain and other Crowned Heads.

3. You are to take the first opportunity of renewing those instances which have been already made in Our Name, that Care may be taken in the Treaty now to be made at Baden between the Emperor and Empire and the Most Christian King that the Peace of Italy may be better provided for than it seems to be by the 30th Article of the Treaty lately concluded at Rastadt, and particularly that the Interests of Our Good Brother the King of Sicily may be therein definitely and clearly settled. This is a matter which We take very much to heart and You are therefore to lay the utmost weight upon it, and to insist that his Imperial Majesty may be obliged to explain himself as to the Duration of the Treaty of Neutrality made at Utrecht the 14th day of March 1713, since the Stipulation in the 30th Article of the Treaty of Rastadt, which relates thereunto, is plainly fallacious; the aforesaid Treaty for a Cessation of all Hostilities in Italy appearing by the terms thereof, and particularly by the 11th Article, to be in force only till a Peace be made with France, and consequently that his Imperial Majesty is not bound by his Engagement at Rastadt to observe an Armistice in Italy any longer than during the continuance of his War with France.

4. And whereas by the 21st Article of the Treaty of Peace lately concluded between Us and the Most Christian King, it is agreed that in making the Treaty with the Empire, all things concerning the State of Religion in the aforesaid Empire, shall be settled conformable to the tenour of the Treatys of Westphalia, so that it shall plainly appear that the Most Christian King neither will

have, nor would have had any alteration made in the said Treatys : And whereas We, being determined to neglect nothing Which We can do to promote so good a work, have resolved to send a Minister to joyn himself with those of the Protestant Princes and States of the Empire in endeavouring to have this great Point finally adjusted and secured, You are to represent that We make no doubt but the Ministers of his Most Christian Majesty will be instructed to show the same facility on this head in the Treaty now to be made at Baden, as is promised in that which was made with Us at Utrecht, And you are to press for positive assurances that such Instructions are given.

5. You shall carefully observe the motions . . . so happily re-established in Christendom.

6. You shall entertain a good Correspondence and Intercourse with Ministers . . . to the Welfare and Advantage of Our Dominions in particular.

7. You are likewise to correspond with our Ministers . . . in foreign Courts . . . respective Posts more successfully.

8. You shall protect and countenance Our Merchants . . . duly and punctually observed.

9. And whereas Our most Dear Uncle King Charles the Second . . . not to insist to have the hand from an Ambassador in his own House, who may happen to be in the Court where you reside.

10. Of all matters which you shall learn . . . which you are to observe accordingly.

11. At your return from thence, We shall Expect a particular Account . . . present condition of that Government and Kingdom.

3. DUNKIRK

John Armstrong, who was appointed the chief commissioner for the supervision of the destruction of Dunkirk, was in 1717 Quarter-master-General, King's Chief Engineer, and one of the principal officers of the Ordnance. He had originally been appointed in 1713, and he continued commissary for Dunkirk at various intervals till 1730 (*P.R.O., France* 194). There is a short notice of his life in the *Dictionary of National Biography*.

Jacob Ackworth was appointed surveyor of the Navy in 1715, and was knighted by King George I in 1722 on the occasion of a royal progress to Spithead. He was a man of some originality of

ideas in regard to ship construction, and died on March 16, 1749, after nearly thirty-four years' service as surveyor.

Colonel Thomas Lascelles, of the Royal Engineers, had served ever since the Battle of the Boyne, and was reckoned to be one of the ablest engineers in Europe. A full record of his services will be found in the *Dictionary of National Biography*.

(*P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book*, 214, p. 354.)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SIR JAMES ABERCROMBIE AND COLONEL RICHARD KING. Kensington, 26th June 1712.

You are immediately upon the receipt of these Our Order and Instructions to repair to Dunkirk with the greatest dispatch you can possibly use. On your arrival at that place you are to wait on the Governor or Officer Commanding in Chief, and to deliver to him the Letter herewith put into your hands; after which you are to acquaint the said Governor or Officer Commanding in Chief that you are directed to enquire of him whether he has received the orders of his Most Christian Majesty for surrendering into Our hands the town, citadel and forts of Dunkirk; that in case he has received such orders you are to concert the most proper measures with him for the evacuation of this place by the troops of France, and for the receiving into it such of ours as shall be appointed for this service.

You have herewith an account of the number of forces which we design to send, as also of what part of them the ships, vessells and boats belonging to the squadron can at once carry on shore, and you are with the permission and assistance of the said Governor or Commander in Chief to hire such vessells and boats as may be sufficient for the remainder, that so the disposition for landing may be made in the best manner, and that the whole body of troops may be transported from the ships to the shore at one and the same time.

As soon as the said Governor or Officer Commanding in Chief shall have given you satisfaction in the points above mentioned, one of you is instantly to make the best of his way to joyn Our Fleet in the Downs or wherever else they shall be, and to acquaint Our Trusty and Welbeloved, Sir John Leake, Knight, Admiral and Commander in Chief of Our Fleet and Our Trusty and Welbeloved John Hill, Esq., Brigadier General of Our forces with the

preparations which shall be making for carrying Our troops on shore, and for receiving them into the town, cittadel and forts of Dunkirk. The same person is by the first opportunity to send an account of your proceedings to one of Our Principal Secretarys of State.

The other of you is to continue at Dunkirk and to use his best endeavours to have everything in readiness, not only for the bringing of troops on shore, but for their reception in that place, and is immediately on the appearance of Our Fleet to give an account to Our Admirals and to Commander in Chief of Our Land Forces of the State of all matters, that they may take their measure accordingly.

(P.R.O., Foreign Entry Book, 214, p. 356.)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR JOHN HILL, ESQ., BRIGADIER GENERAL,
APPOINTED TO BE GOVERNOR AND COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF
DUNKIRK AND COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE TROOPS IN GAR-
RISON. Kensington, 27th June 1712.

Upon the receipt of these Our Instructions, you are forthwith to repair on board the ship or yatch which shall be appointed to receive you, having first given all such orders as belong to you to give, for hastning the rendezvous of the three regiments to be embarked in the river of Thames with the squadron which is now in the Downs.

Being arrived on board you are immediately to consider and settle with Our Trusty and Welbeloved Sir John Leake, Knight, Admiral and Commander in Chief of Our fleet, the most convenient disposition of the land forces in the several ships and vessells, and you are to apply to him for beer and any other provisions or stores which may appear necessary to be furnished to the soldiers under your command, as well during their continuance in the Downs, as in their passage to Dunkirk.

And whereas in Our Instructions given to Our Trusty and Welbeloved Sir James Abercrombie and Colonel Richard King it is directed that as soon as the Governor of this place shall be ready to evacuate the same, and all things necessary for your reception there shall be prepared, one of them do instantly make the best of his way to join Our Fleet, in order to inform Our Admiral and you of the state of all matters relating to this service on the part

of France ; you are therefore upon the report which shall be made to you by one of the above mentioned Officers, in concert with Our Admiral to make the disposition for your landing, and to take all measures necessary for the executing these Our Instructions with the greatest dispatch, and in the best order as soon as you shall receive Our commands to sail.

On your arrival before the Port of Dunkirk, the other of the afore mentioned officers will attend you, to acquaint you with what he shall have further done in pursuance of Our Instructions and to give you a more perfect account of the scheme which shall have been settled there, for the landing Our troops, and for your taking possession of the place.

When you shall be landed with the regiments under your command, you are to march with them according to the method which you shall have before established in concert with the Governor or Commander in Chief, or whoever else shall be appointed by His Most Christian Majesty to surrender this place into Our hands ; and having taken possession of the town and cittadel of Dunkirk and of the forts thereunto belonging you are to visit every part of the same, and to make such distribution of Our troops, and to take all such further measures as may be most effectual for the securing in Our possession what shall be thus delivered up. And whereas this place is put into Our hands by his Most Christian Majesty on this trust and confidence, that no disturbance whatever shall be offered to the Civil Government thereof, but on the contrary that all things shall continue and be preserved on the same foot that they att present are, That the King's Ships and those of private persons shall go out and in without any restraint, and that as well the ships as the effects of his Most Christian Majesty and of his subjects shall be as secure as they now are, and that all the officers belonging to the Magazines shall continue without molestation to perform their respective dutys, and to take care of what is committed to their charge, and whereas our honour is concerned that these engagements be religiously kept and punctually made good, It is Our Will and Pleasure and We do hereby strictly charge and command you that you oblige as well the Officers as Soldiers under your command to observe the exactest discipline, that you use your utmost endeavours to prevent any just cause of complaint against any of them, and that you punish with the utmost severity according to the powers given by Our

Commission such officers or soldiers as shall in any instance presume to offend, and that you may be the better informed of the conditions on which this place is put into Our hands, We have directed a copy of the conditions agreed to by Us and by his Most Christian Majesty to be herewith delivered to you.

As soon as you are in quiet possession, your first care must be to examine what may be necessary to be sent you from hence, for the better subsistence of Our forces and for the greater security of the place which We entrust you with. You are by the first and every other opportunity to transmit to one of Our Principal Secretarys of State an exact account of all your proceedings and to observe such further orders and instructions as We shall from time to time communicate to you by one of them.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR JOHN ARMSTRONG AND JACOB ACKWORTH,
AND IN THE ABSENCE OF EITHER OR BOTH OF THEM
THO. LASCELLES, APPOINTED TO BE INSPECTORS OF THE
DEMOLITION OF DUNKIRK AND MARDYKE. St. James's,
1st July 1717.

(P.R.O., King's Letters, 13.)

1. Whereas by the Fourth Article of the Treaty of Defensive Alliance lately concluded between Us and the most Christian King, and the States General of the United Provinces, it is agreed, that the most Christian King shall take care, that every thing which was formerly stipulated with the Crown of France, relating to the Demolition of the Town and Harbour of Dunkerke, and likewise every thing relating to the removing all suspicion of making a new Harbour at Mardyke should be entirely executed by the end of the Month of June last past if possible ; and whereas We have appointed you to be Inspectors and Eye Witnesses on Our part of the execution of the said Fourth Article, We have thought fit to give you the following Instructions for your better guidance in the execution of Our Commission under Our Great Seal of Great Britain, herewith delivered to you.

2. You are upon the receipt of these Our Instructions to repair forthwith to Dunkirk and there by consulting and advising with Engineers & Pilots & such other Officers and Persons, as are skilled in Works of this nature, to pursue such methods as you shall judge most convenient and necessary for seeing every part of the

said Stipulation, between Us, & the most Christian King, duly executed in its full extent, & according to the true intent & meaning thereof.

3. As the particulars of the Work to be done both in relation to the New Channell & Sluices of Mardyke & likewise in relation to the Old Channell & Works of Dunkirk are fully contained and specified in the said fourth Article of Defensive Alliance, We have thought it proper to refer you thereto and have caused such a part thereof to be inserted in these your Instructions, as may best serve for a full and exact guide to you in the Execution of your Commission, which part of the said fourth Article is as follows :—

Explication de ce qui se doit inserer dans le Quatrieme Article du Traité touchant le Canal et les Ecluses de Mardyck.

Premierement, Que le grand passage de la Nouvelle Ecluse de Mardick qui a quarante quatre pieds de largeur sera detruit de fond en comble ; c'est a dire en ôtant ses Bajoyers, Planchers, Busques, Longrines et Traversines sur toute sa longueur, et en enlevant les portes dont les bois et la Ferreure seront desassemblés, et tout cecy pourra être employé ailleurs à tels usages que sa Majesté Très Chretienne jugera à propos ; pourvû cependant qu'on ne s'en serve jamais pour aucun Port, Havre ou Ecluse à Dunkerque, ou à Mardick, ou en quelque autre endroit que ce soit a deux Lieuës de distance d'aucune de ces deux places, l'intention des Parties contractantes et le but qu'on se propose par ce Traité etant qu'aucun Port, Havre, Fortification, Ecluse, ou Bassin ne soient faits ou construits à Dunkerque, à l'Ecluse de Mardick ou en quelque autre endroit que ce soit sur l'Estran dans une telle distance sur cette Côte.

Secondement, Que la petite Ecluse restera à l'égard de sa profondeur comme elle est à present, pourvû que sa largeur soit reduite à seize pieds, c'est a dire en avançant de dix pieds du côté de l'occident le Bajoyer de la Pile, après avoir ôté six pieds du plancher et Busques du Radier de toute sa longueur du même côté, les quatre pieds du Plancher restants etant necessaires pour servir de fondement au nouveau Bajoyer ; et comme on doit avancer le dit Bajoyer de dix pieds vers l'orient, on detruira pareillement dix pieds de la même Pile du côté de l'occident depuis sa fondation, afui que le present Radier ne puisse jamais servir pour une Ecluse de la largeur de vingt six pieds comme celle cy est a present.

Troisièmement, Les Jettées et Fascinages depuis les Dunes ou l'endroit ou la Marée monte sur l'Estran quand elle est la plus haute jusques à la plus basse mer seront rasés des deux cotes le long du nouveau Chenal partout au niveau de l'Estran, et les Pierres et les Fascinages qui sont au dessus de ce niveau pourront estre emportés et employés à tel usage que Sa Majesté Très Chretienne jugera à propos pourvû cependant qu'on ne s'en serve jamais pour aucun Port ou Havre à Dunkerque, ou a Mardick, ou en quelque autre endroit que ce soit à deux Lieües de distance d'aucune de ces deux places, L'intention des parties contractantes, et le but qu'on se propose par ce Traité etant qu'on ne sera jamais plus de Jettées ou Fascinages dans cette distance sur aucun endroit de l'Estran de cette Côte.

Quatrièmement, Il est encore stipulé qu'immediatement après la Ratification du present Traité on employera un nombre suffisant d'Ouvriers à les Destruction des Susdites Jettées le long du nouveau Chenal, afin qu'elles soient rasées, et cet ouvrage accompli dans deux mois après la Ratification s'il est possible ; mais comme il a esté représenté qu'a cause de la saison on ne pourroit jusques au Printems prochain commencer à retrecir le Radier du petit passage ni detruire le grand Radier, il est accordé que cet Ouvrage sera commencé le cinquième d'Avril et entièrement achevé de la vingt cinquième de Mars manière cy-dessus spécifiée, s'il est possible, à la fin du Mois de Juin mil sept cent dix sept.

Cinquièmement, La Demolition des Dignes ou Jettées des deux Cotés du vieux Chenal ou Port de Dunkerque sera entierement achevée par tout au Niveau de l'Estran depuis la plus basse mer jusques en dedans de la Ville de Dunkerque, et s'il reste encore quelques morceaux du Fort Blanc et des Chateaux Verd et de Bonne Esperance, ils seront rasés totalement egaux avec l'Estran.

4. You are to follow from time to time such further Directions & Instructions, as you shall receive from Us, or One of Our Principall secretarys of State, with whom you shall constantly Correspond, & give an account to him of all your proceedings, & in case any difficultys may arise in the execution of this Work, which you shall think proper to represent to Our Minister at the Court of France, you are to represent them to Our said Minister accordingly, & to Correspond with him from time to time as you shall find it necessary for the more easy and expeditious Discharge of your Commission.

4. COLONIAL QUESTIONS

The commercial treaty being no longer a matter for discussion, there only remained outstanding the question of Plantations for consideration by special commissioners, and in order to settle the frontiers and rights of the two nations in America Martin Bladen was appointed commissioner, and instructions (*P.R.O. S.P. France*, 166, fo. 8) were drafted for him under date July 3, 1719. Both he and Daniel Pulteney, who was later associated with him, under the same instructions, were strong Whigs, but while Bladen was very generally a supporter of Walpole, Pulteney showed much more "independence." There is a notice of both these politicians in the *Dictionary of National Biography*.

INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE LORDS JUSTICES ¹ FOR DANIEL PULTENEY AND MARTIN BLADEN, APPOINTED COMMISSARYS TO TREAT WITH THE COMMISSARY OR COMMISSARIES TO BE APPOINTED BY THE MOST CHRISTIAN KING. Whitehall 3rd September 1719.

(*P.R.O., King's Letters* 13.)

Together with these Instructions You will receive His Majesty's Commission under the Great Seal of Great Britain appointing you the said Daniel Pulteney & Martin Bladen jointly and severally to be His Majesty's Commissarys for treating of and concluding with the Commissary or Commissarys on the part of the French King, all such Matters and Things as are referred to your Cognizance & Determination by the said Commission, in pursuance of the 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th Articles of the Treaty of Peace concluded at Utrecht the $\frac{31}{11}$ Day of $\frac{\text{March}}{\text{April}}$ in the year of Our Lord 1713, between Her late Majesty Queen Anne and Lewis the Fourteenth late the Most Christian King.

You are therefore with all convenient speed to repair to the French Court where you are to meet the Commissary or Commissarys to be appointed by the most Christian King to whom you shall communicate your Full Powers, and the same time inspect the Commission or Powers given to him or them, in order to see whether they be in due and sufficient Form; In which Case, you

¹ Lord Parker, Chancellor; Duke of Argyll and Greenwich; Duke of Roxburghe; Earl of Berkeley, and James Craggs.

are to enter into Treaty with the said Commissary or Commissarys, wherein you shall proceed as directed by your Commission and these Instructions.

It being provided by the 10th Article of the Treaty of Utrecht that the Limits and Boundaries between Hudson's Bay and the Places appertaining to the French, be settled by Commissarys on each Part, "which Limits both the British and French Subjects shall be wholly forbid to pass over, or thereby to go to each other by Sea or by Land," You are to endeavour to get the said Limits settled in following manner, that is to say :

That the same begin from the Island called Grimington's Island or Cape Perdrix in the Latitude of $58\frac{1}{2}$ North, which the Company desire, may be the Boundary, between the British and French Subjects, on the Coast of Laboradore towards Rupert's Land, on the East Main, and Nova Britannia on the French Side ; and that no French Ship, Barque, Boat or Vessel whatsoever shall pass to the North Westward of Cape Perdrix or Grimington's Island, towards or into the Streights or Bay of Hudson, on any pretence whatsoever. And further, That a Line be drawn from the South Westward of the Island of Grimington or Cape Perdrix (so as to include the same within the limits of the Bay) to the Great Lake Micosinke alias Mistosseney, dividing the said Lake into two Parts (as in the Map to be delivered to you), and that where the said Line shall cut the 49th Degree of Northern Latitude, another Line shall begin and be extended Westward from the said Lake, upon the 49th Degree of Northern Latitude over which said Lines so to be described as abovementioned, the French and all Persons by them employed, shall be prohibited to pass to the Northward of the said 49th Degree of Latitude, and to the North and North Westward of the said Lake or supposed Line, by Land or Water, on or through any Rivers, Lakes or Country to trade, or Erect any Forts or Settlements ; And the British Subjects shall likewise be forbid to pass the Supposed Line, either to the Southward or Eastward. But you are to take especial Care in wording such Articles as shall be agreed on with the Commissary or Commissarys of His Most Christian Majesty upon this head, that the said Boundaries be understood to regard the Trade of the Hudson's-Bay Company only, That His Majesty does not thereby recede from His Right to any Lands in America, not comprized within the said Boundaries ; And that no pretension be thereby given to the French to claim

any Tracts of Lands in America, Southward or South west of the said Boundaries.

And whereas it has been represented by the said Company, That the French, have since the Peace of Utrecht, viz^t in 1715 made a settlement at the head of Albany River, upon which River the Company's Principal Factory is settled, whereby the French may intercept the Indian Trade from coming to the said Factory and may in time utterly ruin the Trade of the Company if not prevented ; You are to insist that the said Fort be given up or demolished by the French, and their subjects withdrawn from that Settlement.

And it being further provided by the 11th Article of the said Treaty that satisfaction be made according to Justice and Equity to the Hudsons-Bay Company for the " Damages and Spoil done to their Colonys, Ships, Persons & Goods by the Hostile Incursions and Depredations of the French in time of Peace " ; and the said Company having delivered to His Majesty's Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, an Account under their Common Seal, of the Losses sustained by them from the French in times of Peace, which will be delivered to you, with proper Vouchers for the same ; You are in like manner to insist that Satisfaction be made to the said Company, pursuant to the said Article.

And Whereas by the 12th Article of the said Treaty, " Nova Scotia or Acadie with its Ancient Boundaries, as also the City of Port Royal, now called Anapolis Royal, and all other things in those Parts which depend on the said Lands and Island, together with the Dominion Propriety and Possession of the said Lands, Islands & Places And all Right whatsoever by Treatys or by any other way obtain'd, which the most Christian King, the Crown of France or any the Subjects thereof have hitherto had to the said Lands, Islands and Places, and the Inhabitants of the same, were yielded and made over to the late Queen, and to the Crown of Great Britain for ever, except Cape Breton and the other Islands lying in the mouth of the River of St. Lawrence and in the Gulph of the same name," You are to take notice that the Boundaries of Nova Scotia are described by the Charter of King James the first to Sir William Alexander, afterwards Earl of Stirling, bearing Date the tenth of September 1621 in the following words. Viz^t—' all the Lands ' & Islands lying within the Promontary commonly called Cape ' Sables being in the 43^d Degree of N^o Lattitude or thereabouts ' thence Westerly to the Bay, commonly called St. Marys Bay and

‘ from thence Northerly in a Streight Line by the mouth of that
‘ Great Bay (which runs Easterly by the Country and divides the
‘ 2 Nations call’d Surriquois & Etechimenes) to the River S^t Croix
‘ thence Westerly to the Head of that River, thence Northerly to
‘ the next Bay, which discharges it self in the River S^t Lawrence,
‘ thence Easterly along the Coast to the Bay Gaspé, thence S^o
‘ Easterly to the Bacalio Islands or Cape Breton and leaving those
‘ Islands on the right and the Gulph of St. Lawrence & Newfound-
‘ land and the Islands thereunto belonging upon the left, thence
‘ to Cape Breton in the Latitude of 45 Degrees or thereabouts, then
‘ South West to Cape Sables again.’

But whereas in Consequence of the Treaty of Breda, several other Lands were formerly delivered up by Sir Thomas Temple as part of Nova Scotia to the French, which Lands did belong to the Crown of Great Britain altho they were not a part of Nova Scotia, since which time, the French in Consequence of that Cession, did make several Settlements upon the said Lands and others belonging likewise to the Crown of Great Britain lying westward and southwestward of Nova Scotia, between the River of St. Lawrence and the Atlantick Ocean, and did annex the same to Nova Scotia, as appears by a Commission given by the late French King to M^r Subercase where he is termed Governour “of Acadie and Cape Breton Island and Islands adjacent from Cape Rosiers of the Great River of St. Lawrence, as far as the East part of Kennebeck River.” Now you are to insist, that the French are obliged by the Treaty of Utrecht to deliver up all Lands and Settlements whatever which they have at any time possessed as part of or dependent on Nova Scotia, and that His most Christian Majesty has no Right to any Lands whatever lying between the said River of St. Lawrence and the Atlantick Ocean, except such Islands as lye in the mouth of the said River, and in the Gulph of St. Lawrence, and are given up to the French by the Treaty of Utrecht, wherefore you are to press that the necessary Orders be dispatched for the due Execution of this Article of the Treaty, which hath not hitherto been fully complyd with.

And Whereas the French have for several Years since the conclusion of the last Peace, taken upon them, not only to fish on the Coast of Nova Scotia, and on the Islands of Cançeau, but likewise to make Settlements on the said Islands, notwithstanding they are expressly prohibited by the 12th Article of the Treaty of Utrecht,

“from fishing in any of the Seas, Bays and other Places on the Coast of Nova Scotia, that is to say, on those which lye towards the South East within thirty Leagues beginning from the Island commonly called Sable inclusive, and thence stretching along towards the South West ”; You are hereby directed to insist that the French have no right or Title to fish any where within 30 Leagues, of the South East Coast of Nova Scotia, beginning from the Island of Sable inclusively, and thence stretching along to the South West, or to fish or make any Settlements on the Islands of Cançeau or any other Islands within the Gut or Bay of the same Name, which belong to His Majesty as part of Nova Scotia, nothing being reserved to the French by the said Treaty except Cape Breton and the Islands lying within the Mouth of the River of St. Lawrence or the Gulph of the same Name, But if the French Commissary or Commissarys should pretend to ground a more Extensive Claim upon the Words of the said Treaty, as it was signed in French than does appertain to them by the same Treaty as it was signed in Latin, You are to insist upon it that the Treaty in Latin is to be your Guide in all Cases, tho even by the Treaty in French they can have no Title to any Islands lying in the Bay or Gut of Cançeau.

And Whereas by the 14th Article of the said Treaty, it is expressly provided, that “in all the said Places and Colonys to be yielded and restored by the most Christian King, in pursuance of the said Treaty, the Subjects of the said King may have liberty to remove themselves within a Year to any other place, together with all their moveable Effects,” You are to take notice that the French Inhabitants of Nova Scotia have long since elapsed the time for removing their Persons and Effects from thence, and are thereby absolutely become subjects to the Crown of Great Britain; And Whereas they have hitherto refused to take the Oaths of Fidelity and allegiance to his Majesty or to the late Queen, being instigated thereunto by their Priests and even by the Governours of Quebec and of Cape Breton; as the Indians have also been, to set up a Claim to all that Countrey; You are to use your utmost endeavours to obtain a particular Order from the French Court requiring the said Governours of Quebec and Cape Breton, and the Missionarys in those Parts for the future, not to interpose or meddle with anything that does or may concern His Majesty’s Interest in Nova Scotia, and particularly that they do not dissuade His Majesty’s French Subjects there, from taking the Oaths of Fidelity and Allegiance

to His Majesty, nor instigate the Indians to molest or disturb His Majesty's Subjects in those Parts.

Whereas upon Application made by the French Court, we did lately cause Restitution to be made to Mons^r Hiriberry, of a Ship taken off of the Coast of Cançeau by the Squirrell Man of War upon assurance given by the French Minister residing here that Orders had then been given by the French Court for Restitution to be made to His Majesty's Subjects, of all such Ships or Effects as had been taken by the French by way of Reprisal upon that Account ; Now in case the said Restitution shall not have been made you are to insist that Effectual Orders be given by the French Court for that purpose without further delay, and at the same time you will take notice that this Reprisal was made directly contrary to the 16th Article of the Treaty of Utrecht.

It being especially provided by the 13th Article of the Treaty of Utrecht, that after the Cession of Newfoundland made by His Most Christian Majesty, His Subjects should not fish upon any part of the Coasts of the said Island, except only from " Cape Bonavista to the Northern Point of the said Island & from thence running down by the Western Side to Point Riche," Notwithstanding which Provision it has been represented, that the French have sometimes taken upon them to fish in other Parts of the said Island, contrary to the Express Words of the aforesaid Article ; You are to insist that the French Court do give strict Orders for the more punctual Observance thereof for the future.

Whereas the five Nations of Indians bordering upon New York are undoubtedly subject to the Crown of Great Britain, whose Right of Dominion over them is fully acknowledged by the 15th Art. of the said Treaty, Now you are hereby directed to endeavour to procure an Order to the Governours of Canada and of Cape Breton, requiring them in the strongest Terms, not to molest or disturb, nor to suffer the Indians in Alliance with the French to molest or disturb in any manner the said five Indian Nations, directing likewise them the said Governors & each of them to recall the Missionarys, now settled among the five Indian Nations, and not to permit any other Missionarys to go amongst them for the future, upon any pretence whatsoever.

Whereas it is provided by the 11th Art. of the said Treaty that Satisfaction shall be made for all Ships or Goods taken by the Subjects of either Nation from the other in time of Peace ; You

are hereby required to insist that Satisfaction be made accordingly to such of His Majesty's Subjects, whose Claims and Demands upon this head shall be delivered to you herewith or transmitted to you hereafter, during the Course of your Negotiation ; But no Application having hitherto been made by the French Court to His Majesty, concerning any Damage of this Nature sustained by their Subjects ; If the Commissary or Commissarys of His most Christian Majesty should demand Reparation for any Ship or Goods taken from the French in Time of Peace ; before you enter into the Discussion of such Demands, You are to send home Copys of the several Cases to One of His Majesty's Principal Secretarys of State or to Our Secretary during His Majesty's Absence in order to obtain full Information thereof from hence, and to give the Parties concerned in Great Britain, an Opportunity of making their Answer thereunto.

And whereas by the 11th Art. of the said Treaty, the Commissarys on the Part of Great Britain and France are to enquire into those things of which the French Subjects may complain relating to the Capitulation of the Island of Nevis You are to insist that the French have no Right to demand any thing upon that Account ; the Inhabitants of that Island having punctually observed and performed as much as lay in their Power all that was exacted of them by the first Capitulation, into which they entered voluntarily ; Whereas on the other hand the French broke, not only the first but the second Capitulation also, upon which they ground their Pretensions, altho the same was forced upon the Inhabitants contrary to the usage of War, and the Impost of the first Capitulation after they were in the Power of the French ; All which will more fully appear by the Affidavits and other Papers transmitted from that Island, as also by the Memorial delivered by Mo^r D'Ibberville the late French Envoy at this Court, and the Representation of His Majesty's Commissioners for Trade and Plantations thereupon, Copys of all which will be delivered to you.

And Whereas the French at that time took Four Gentlemen Prisoners from the said Island on pretence of Hostages, for the due performance of the Articles of the 2nd Capitulation, though they were neither given up by the Island, nor went with their own Consent, of which number one M^r Charles Earl still remains a Prisoner at Martinico, You are to insist upon an Order from the French Court to the Governor of that Island, for the Release of

the said Prisoner, upon the payment of such just Debts as he may have contracted there with private Persons, though its presumed the said Debts cannot be very considerable, several large Summs having from time to time been remitted from the Island of Nevis for the support of him and the other Prisoners.

You are hereby likewise farther directed to insist, pursuant to the 11th Article of the said Treaty, that due Satisfaction be made to the Inhabitants of the Island of Montserat for the Damages by them sustained in the Year 1712, according to such Accounts of the said Damages as shall be delivered to you in their behalf.

Whereas by the 11th Article of the said Treaty, Claim is reserved to the Subjects of His most Christian Majesty to have their pretensions discuss'd by Commissarys to be appointed for that purpose relating to the Capitulation of the Fort of Gambia ; And Whereas the Royal African Company have delivered into His Majesty's Commissioners for Trade & Plantations a Memorial containing an Answer to the Pretensions which the French found on the said Capitulation, with certain Affidavits thereunto annexed ; You are hereby instructed to insist, That the French have no just Claim on the said Royal African Company, on Account of the said Capitulation for the reasons mentioned in the Companys Memorial, which will be delivered to you.

And Whereas the said Company have likewise annexed to their said Memorial an Account of Ships taken from them by the French in time of Peace, You are to endeavour, pursuant to the 11th Article of the Treaty of Utrecht, whereby provision is made for Cases of this Nature, to procure Satisfaction for the said Company on this Account.

And Whereas the said Company have likewise represented, that they did suffer very considerable Damages by the Depredations made by the French in time of Peace on the Island of Montserrat, You are further instructed to endeavour to procure satisfaction to be made them for the same conjointly with the other sufferers in the said Island, pursuant to the 11th Art. of the Treaty of Utrecht.

Whereas it has not been thought proper to impower you by your Commission to treat of any Boundarys besides those of Hudson's Bay and Nova Scotia, Nevertheless least the French should take this as a tacit Acknowledgement of their pretended Right to the several Settlements they have made on the Back

and Westward of the British Plantations on the Continent of America ; You are to declare to the French Commissary or Commissarys that His Majesty has ocason to believe the French have made several Incroachments upon the British Settlements in those Parts, which may be discussed when His Majesty shall have received from the respective Governours of His Colonys in those Parts, a full and particular Account of all such Encroachments as they have already complain'd of. And in the mean while you are to take particular Care in the wording of such Articles as shall be agreed between you and the French Commissarys in relation to the Boundaries of Hudsons Bay and Nova Scotia, that His Majesty be not thereby concluded with Respect to the Boundaries of any other Lands or Territories His Majesty or His Subjects may have a Right to, on the Continent of America.

You are hereby directed during the time of your Residence in France, to get the best information you can, concerning the Situation, Trade, Strength, Laws and Government of the French Colonys in America, but more particularly concerning the Establishment and Constitution of the Mississippi Company, which you are to transmit to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State attending His Majesty beyond sea to be laid before His Majesty and to Our Secretary to be laid before Us, as also to His Majesty's Commissioners for Trade and Plantations.

You are hereby required to communicate from time to time, all your Proceedings during the Course of your Negotiation unto the Earl of Stair, His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary now residing at the French Court and to confer and consult with him on all matters relating thereunto and desire his Advice and Assistance in the carrying on the Negotiation entrusted to your Care.

And Whereas divers Matters & Difficulties may arise, during the Course of your Negotiation which could not be sufficiently foreseen and provided for by these Instructions, You are hereby directed to keep a constant Correspondence with His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State attending His Majesty's Person and with Our Secretary to whom you shall, by all Occasions transmit an exact Account of your Proceedings, and you are to govern yourself by such farther Instructions, as you shall from time to time receive from His Majesty under His Royal Sign Manual, or signed by one of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, or

from Us signed by ourselves or signified by Our Secretary in Our Name, You are also to correspond with His Majesty's Commissioners for Trade and Plantations desiring their Advice upon any Difficulties that may occur, and you shall follow their Directions in all Matters relating to your Negotiation, provided the same be not contrary to your Commission or these instructions, or to any further Commission, Orders or Instructions which you may hereafter receive from His Majesty or from Us.

At your return from the French Court, you are to lay before His Majesty a full and particular Account of your Proceedings in the several Matters, contained in His Majesty's said Commission and in these Instructions ; As likewise in all such other matters as shall from time to time, be referred to your Negotiation by One of His Majesty's Principal Secretarys of State, and if such your Return shall happen during His Majesty's Absence, you shall lay a Duplicate of the said Account before Us. You are also to deliver to His Majesty's Commissioners for Trade and Plantations a Duplicate of the said Account, so far as the same may relate to their Cognizance.

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